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1				Introduction	
	
The	spark	for	this	thesis	came	long	before	I	thought	to	write	one.	Four	years	ago,	
I	was	sitting	in	a	conference	room	at	the	University	of	Canterbury,	sweating.	The	
grey	elephant	jumpsuit	under	my	jacket	was	monstrously	warm.	Anthony	and	I	
had	(somehow)	managed	to	get	our	names	on	the	list	for	a	presentation	by	
Bathurst	Resources	Ltd,	a	coal	mining	company.	Hamish	Bohannan,	the	
managing	director,	had	come	to	talk	to	engineering	professionals	about	the	
future	of	coal	in	New	Zealand’s	South	Island.	Bathurst	were	trying	to	expand	coal	
mining	on	the	West	Coast,	relying	on	the	intensifying	dairy	industry	to	float	the	
demand	for	coal	with	milk	dehydration	factories.	Bohannan	acknowledged	that	
coal	was	a	contentious	issue,	and	asked	for	the	following	discussion	not	to	leave	
the	room.	I	was	waiting	for	an	opportune	moment	to	remove	my	jacket,	don	the	
large	elephant	head	hidden	in	my	bag,	and	raise	my	cardboard	sign,	‘CLIMATE	
CHANGE’.	The	elephant	in	the	room.	But	Bohannan	beat	me	to	it.	Climate	change,	
he	began,	was	happening.	Undoubtedly.	It	would	change	the	way	humans	and	
our	industries	operate.	Just	as	AIDS	was	one	of	the	crises	of	the	80’s	and	90’s,	he	
said,	climate	change	was	now	the	biggest	current	challenge	faced	by	humanity.		
	
In	a	glance,	Anthony	and	I	decided	not	to	disrupt	the	presentation,	but	to	listen.	
Bohannan	explained	that	while	climate	change	was	important	to	address,	coal	
was	currently	a	vital	resource	for	humankind,	and	opportunities	lay	ahead	in	
New	Zealand	for	more	efficient	and	effective	coal	use.	I	stood	up,	and	asked	how	
he	could	justify	starting	new	coal	mines	when	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	
Climate	Change	had	recently	reported	that	to	remain	within	two	degrees	of	
global	temperature	rise	we	must	leave	eighty	per	cent	of	known	fossil	fuel	
reserves	in	the	ground.	Bohannan	smiled,	and	reminded	me	I	was	only	picking	
statistics	that	suited	my	argument.	He	said	that	capping	the	production	of	coal	
would	hinder	many	countries’	efforts	to	develop	infrastructure—could	we	deny	
those	communities	the	opportunities	and	standards	of	living	that	we	enjoyed?	I	
replied	that	many	of	those	same	communities	are	the	most	at	risk	from	the	sea	
level	rise,	droughts,	floods,	fires	and	disease	that	we	can	expect	in	a	warming	
world.	As	coal	remains	the	most	potent	fuel	contributing	to	climate	change,	we	
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should	cease	to	open	any	more	mines.	The	moderator	directed	the	conversation	
elsewhere,	and	other	audience	members	asked	questions	about	technicalities	
and	efficiency.		
	
At	the	end	of	the	presentation,	the	moderator	motioned	towards	us,	thanking	us	
for	our	“emotional”	contribution.	He	then	thanked	Bohannan	and	the	rest	of	the	
audience	for	their	discussion	of	practical	and	scientific	factors.	Anthony	and	I	
were	angry.	Afterwards,	we	told	the	presenters	our	concerns	were	more	than	
emotional—they	were	backed	by	huge	bodies	of	scientific	knowledge	and	
expertise.	We	were	met	with	the	same	polite	and	accommodating	condescension.	
I	could	not	comprehend	what	I	saw	as	friendly,	but	firm	resistance	to	the	
implications	of	climate	research.	New	coalmines	were	fuelling	a	humanitarian	
crisis	to	burn	water	out	of	milk.	Could	the	presenters	see	and	accept	the	effects	
of	decisions	he	played	a	part	in?	Then	again—can	anyone?	Hamish	Bohannan	
requested	that	his	discussion	of	the	coal	industry	did	not	leave	the	room.	I	
requested	that	he	cease	to	support	operations	that	would	make	for	a	more	
dangerous	world.	Unfortunately,	neither	request	was	granted.	
	
In	discussions	such	as	these,	decisions	that	diminish	the	life-giving	capacity	of	
ecosystems	can	be	supported,	or	resisted.	Resistance	comes	in	many	forms.	One	
can	demonstrate	resistance	to	actions	that	compromise	the	behaviour	of	
ecosystems	and	the	safety	of	people	who	live	in	them;	or	one	can	create	
resistance	to	knowledge	of	how	our	behaviour	affects	ecosystems	and	each	
other.	In	this	instance,	as	in	so	many	others,	the	second	mode	of	resistance	
proved	more	effective	than	the	first.	It	left	me	feeling	like	we	were	playing	a	lost	
game.	In	my	experiences	of	environmental	activism,	every	act,	action,	and	
interaction,	feels	like	a	game.	It	can	be	a	game	to	win	someone	over,	a	game	to	
get	media	attention,	or	a	game	to	outmanoeuvre	a	ship	exploring	for	oil.	When	
you	land	on	a	piece	of	emotive	communication	that	affects	someone,	it’s	a	win.	
When	ancient	trees	are	torn	to	shreds,	or	when	the	media	tear	you	to	shreds,	it’s	
a	loss.	We	play	games	to	save	forests	and	games	to	save	face.	Not	all	strategies	
are	strategic;	some	tactics	are	less	tactical	than	others.	There	are	rules	to	
breaking	the	rules.	Scoring	points	isn’t	always	the	point.	Like	in	any	game,	there	
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can	be	tears	of	joy	and	relief,	and	tears	of	shock	and	grief.	It’s	hard	to	hedge	your	
bets	when	you’re	gambling	the	planet.	I	was	losing	enough	games	to	know	I	
wanted	to	get	better	at	them.	Articulating	environmental	crises,	and	negotiating	
the	barriers	that	prevent	people	from	connecting	with	them,	is	a	very	difficult	
game.	There	is	often	a	communicative	gulf	between	those	with	the	most	power	
to	affect	our	environmental	decisions	and	the	diverse	communities	affected	by	
them.	I	wanted	to	be	a	more	sensitive	communicator	in	spaces	where	
environmental	decisions	are	made.	This	led	me	into	the	discipline	of	science	
communication.		
	
Global	challenges	like	climate	change	create	fertile	common	ground	between	
environmental	activists	and	scientists,	with	science	communication	woven	
throughout	and	between.	Authors	in	the	science	communication	community	
have	started	exploring	the	role	they	can	play	in	political	activism	(Roche	and	
Davis,	2017;	Weitkamp,	2017).	As	I	was	eyeing	up	the	science	communicators’	
game,	science	communicators	were	eyeing	up	the	activists’	game.	This	dance	
revealed	the	grounds	of	my	thesis	topic.	In	the	following,	I	will	explore	the	
relationship	between	science	and	environmental	activism.	How	does	
environmental	activism	affect	the	games	scientists	are	playing,	and	how	does	
science	affect	the	games	activists	are	playing?	I	will	look	at	some	of	the	ways	
scientific	knowledge	is	communicated	within	the	environmental	movement,	and	
how	this	influences	the	games	of	both	activists	and	scientists.	How	do	science	
and	activism	help	one	another’s	play,	and	how	do	they	hinder	it?	I	hope	that	this	
exploration	will	yield	some	useful	insights	for	activists,	scientists,	and	science	
communicators	in	various	areas	of	the	environmental	justice	playing	field.	It	is	
fluid	and	important	territory	to	explore,	because	in	many	cases,	our	ultimate	
game	is	the	same−	keep	life,	human	and	otherwise,	living.	The	aim	of	the	game	is	
to	keep	the	game	going.	And	sometimes	it	doesn’t	feel	like	a	game.		
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2 Background	chapter	
	
This	chapter	outlines	the	theoretical	backdrops	of	concepts	that	I	draw	upon	in	
this	thesis.	Before	exploring	the	relationship	between	science	and	environmental	
activism,	I	will	look	at	how	science	is	defined,	the	role	of	science	in	decision-
making,	the	discipline	of	science	communication,	and	what	constitutes	
environmental	activism.	This	will	give	some	context	as	to	how	I	will	use	these	
terms	throughout	this	discussion.		
	
	
2.1 Defining	‘science’	
	
The	term	‘science’	slips	in	and	out	of	our	everyday	conversations	so	often	it	has	
become	invisible.	Our	familiarity	with	‘science’	veils	its	elusiveness	as	a	concept.	
In	this	section	I	will	outline	some	past	and	ongoing	discussions	of	what	is	
thought	to	characterise	‘science’.	As	science	evolved,	and	cultural	and	political	
landscapes	changed,	there	have	been	shifts	in	the	ways	knowledge	is	
approached,	applied	and	accepted.	We	use	the	word	‘science’	simultaneously	to	
refer	both	to	processes	of	inquiry,	and	the	pieces	of	knowledge	acquired	through	
those	processes.	The	fluidity	of	social	circumstances	and	language	over	time	
make	it	challenging	to	define	what	science	is	and	what	it	is	not.		
	
A.F.	Chalmers	(2013)	collated	discussions	and	accounts	of	the	scientific	method	
in	his	book	‘What	is	This	Thing	Called	Science?’,	first	published	in	1976.	These	
philosophical	accounts	aim	to	determine	if	there	are	inherent	characteristics	of	
what	we	label	as	‘science’,	and	if	so,	what	these	might	be.	In	the	seventeenth	and	
eighteenth	centuries,	empiricists	like	John	Locke	([1690]	1967)	and	David	Hume	
([1739]	1933)	maintained	that	sense	perception	alone	could	plant	seeds	of	
knowledge	in	the	mind.	Empiricists	argue	that	scientific	knowledge	must	be	
arrived	at	through	observations	of	the	world’s	phenomena,	obtained	via	our	
experience	and	perception.	At	this	point,	what	we	now	call	‘scientific’	knowledge	
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was	regarded	as	being	derived	from	observable	‘facts’	(Chalmers,	2013).	This	
view	is	insufficient,	as	our	very	conception	of	‘facts’	relies	on	our	own	theories	
(Chalmers,	2013).	Many	authors	have	critiqued	versions	of	empiricism	because	
they	underemphasise	the	importance	of	social	liberation	movements	in	their	
accounts	of	scientific	development	(Harding,	1986).	Softer	empiricist	positions	
maintain	that	something	can	only	be	known	by	our	experience	(Longino,	1990).	
	
Scientists	do	not	merely	record	what	they	witness;	they	aim	to	explain	these	
observations	with	generalising	theories	(Okasha,	2016).	Scientists	can	use	
experimentation	and	intervention	to	narrow	the	spectrum	of	material	under	
observation,	and	improve	the	chances	that	they	will	observe	a	particular	
phenomenon.	An	explanation	of	science	must	then	address	how	theories	are	
reasoned	from	observations.	Scientists	can	derive	theories	by	deductive	and	
inductive	reasoning.	An	inference	is	deductive	if	the	premises	(or	observations)	
entail	the	conclusion	(Okasha,	2016).	If	theories	are	deduced	from	observations	
they	rely	on	the	implicit	truth	of	observations.	Observations	are	fallible,	and	
deductive	reasoning	cannot	guarantee	a	correct	link	between	observations	and	
theories.	Theories	can	be	deductively	sound	even	when	the	relationship	between	
phenomena	is	misinterpreted.	Deductive	reasoning	cannot	account	for	the	
development	of	reliable	knowledge.	Alternatively,	inductive	reasoning	allows	
theories	to	extrapolate	about	the	general	behaviour	of	a	phenomenon	from	finite	
observations	of	this	phenomenon	(Chalmers,	2013).	The	observations	do	not	
necessarily	entail	the	conclusion.	Scientific	theories	generated	by	inductive	
reasoning	do	not	stand	up	to	deductive	reasoning,	but	they	do	often	provide	
reliable	predictions	about	the	world	(Okasha,	2016).	The	reliability	of	inductive	
theories	is	established	by	the	quantity	of	observations	that	support	the	theory,	
and	the	absence	of	observations	that	contradict	it.		
	
Karl	Popper	(1969)	was	the	most	vocal	challenger	of	inductivism.	He	argued	that	
theories	created	by	inductive	reasoning	were	too	easily	adjusted	to	
accommodate	new	observations.	He	introduced	falsification	as	a	way	of	
determining	whether	theories	were	scientific;	a	theory	could	only	be	scientific	in	
nature	if	observations	could	be	made	to	falsify	it.	For	example,	I	might	state	that	I	
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have	the	power	to	turn	invisible,	but	only	when	no	one	is	looking.	Try	as	one	
might,	no	one	can	definitively	prove	me	otherwise.	The	falsificationist	account	
maintains	that	my	theory	cannot	be	scientific,	because	no	observations	can	be	
made	to	prove	it	wrong.	Falsificationalists	do	not	hold	that	unfalsified	theories	
are	true,	only	that	scientific	knowledge	can	evolve	more	efficiently	when	
evidence	is	sought	to	disprove	theories	as	opposed	to	supporting	them.	The	
more	straightforward	it	is	to	falsify	a	theory,	the	stronger	the	theory.	However,	
both	the	inductivist	and	the	falsificationist	positions	fall	short	of	providing	an	
account	of	science	that	is	compatible	with	some	of	the	field’s	major	
developments,	such	as	the	Copernican	Revolution	(Chalmers,	2013).	The	
Copernican	Revolution	showed	a	theory	(in	this	case,	that	the	earth	was	not	the	
centre	of	the	universe)	that	inductive	reasoning	could	not	account	for	until	over	
a	century	later	when	a	whole	new	system	of	physics	developed	that	enabled	
observations	to	match	the	theory.	Early	falsifications	of	the	Copernicus	theory	
were	relative	to	the	scientific	assumptions	of	the	day,	and	the	theory	proved	
itself	in	spite	of	falsification,	not	owing	to	it.	This	highlights	the	complexity	of	
social	circumstances	that	constrain	and	facilitate	scientific	discovery.		
	
Thomas	Kuhn	(1970)	challenged	the	falsificationist	and	inductivist	accounts	of	
science	by	posing	that	science	is	characterised	instead	by	its	dominant	
paradigms.	He	connected	science	with	revolutions,	whereby	structures	of	
thinking	are	continually	broken	down	and	replaced	by	entirely	new	structures.	
These	new	structures	form	the	new	norms	of	the	discipline,	a	new	set	of	baseline	
assumptions	that	form	a	paradigm.	Here	knowledge	can	be	classed	as	scientific	if	
it	can	be	accommodated	by	the	prevailing	paradigm	of	the	field.	Scientific	
communities	become	more	organised	when	they	conform	to	a	single	paradigm,	
which	guides	the	scientific	endeavours	in	a	field	until	these	norms	are	
challenged,	collapse,	and	overturn	(Kuhn,	1970).	This	formation	and	subsequent	
breakdown	of	scientific	paradigms	provides	a	more	dynamic	account	of	how	
science	moves	and	changes,	but	it	does	not	describe	consistent	characteristics	
that	set	science	apart	from	other	forms	of	knowledge.	Chalmers	(2013)	
concluded	that	there	was	no	universal	account	of	the	scientific	method	that	could	
span	the	spectrum	of	scientific	activity,	but	that	combinations	of	the	
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characteristics	described	could	help	identify	the	physical	sciences	against	a	
background	of	other	knowledge	claims.	
	
While	many	have	attempted	to	identify	science	amidst	other	types	of	knowledge,	
some	argued	that	it	has	no	intrinsic	characteristics	that	grant	it	special	status.	
Paul	Feyerabend	(1975)	claimed	that	no	account	of	science	was	able	to	
accommodate	various	scientific	movements,	challenging	all	efforts	to	account	for	
the	scientific	method	in	a	way	that	afforded	it	privilege	above	other	forms	of	
knowledge.	He	proposed	an	anarchistic	account	of	knowledge	whereby	the	
power	held	by	the	supposed	epistemic	authority	of	the	sciences	could	be	
disputed	and	reclaimed	(Feyerabend,	1975).		
	
The	mythical	objective	
	
Part	of	the	allure	of	science	is	that	it	is	observation-based.	It	was	once	thought	to	
offer	ways	of	understanding	the	world	beyond	the	biases	of	subjective	
viewpoints.	Scientific	endeavours	inquire	for	reliable	knowledge	about	the	
biophysical	world,	and	they	have	attracted	respect	and	support	for	their	
attempts	to	limit	the	influence	of	subjective	beliefs	and	biases	over	its	findings.	
Simultaneously,	science	relies	on	our	capacity	to	observe,	a	process	enabled	by	
subjective	positions.	Consider	the	following.	
	
My	experience	is	no	illusion.	The	objects	I	see	on	my	desk	really	exist	
and	are	located	precisely	where	I	see	them.	I	can	prove	that:	With	
vision	as	my	only	guide,	I	can	reach	out	directly	to	the	pencil	and	pick	
it	up...	Sensation	entails	the	registration	and	coding	of	light,	sound,	
and	other	energies	that	impinge	on	the	sense	organs...	The	ability	to	
interpret	this	information,	to	extract	from	it	meaningful	and	useful	
representations	of	our	world,	is	called	perception.		
—Peter	Gray,	Psychology	(Tredinnick,	2006,	p.	37)	
It	is	our	ability	to	perceive	that	allows	us	to	make	the	observations	science	
requires.	However,	what	is	a	‘meaningful’	or	‘useful’	representation	will	lie	in	the	
eyes	of	the	perceiver.	Different	beliefs	and	life	experiences	guide	our	attribution	
of	utility	and	meaning.	The	verbs	‘interpret’	and	‘extract’	demonstrate	the	active	
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process	that	determines	what	‘meaningful’	or	‘useful’	observations	we	will	make.	
Our	drive	to	meet	social	and	survival	needs	play	a	huge	role	in	our	perception,	
and	thankfully	so.	But	does	this	extend	the	truth	of	our	observations	beyond	
what	works	for	the	perceiver	in	a	given	context?	It	has	become	increasingly	clear	
that	our	beliefs	and	theories	affect	observation	processes	at	a	variety	of	stages.	
Internal	mechanisms	called	modules	control	the	initial	stages	of	our	perception	
unconsciously,	and	appear	to	be	influenced	by	portions	of	our	background	
knowledge	(Godfrey-Smith,	2003).	This	makes	it	unclear	what	theories,	or	parts	
of	theories	are	affecting	different	stages	of	our	observation.	Final	observations	
are	the	reconstructed	portions	of	information	we	receive	through	filters	of	our	
perception.	Yet	science	is	often	driven	by	the	belief	that	there	are	objects	sitting	
on	a	desk	that	we	can	observe,	the	belief	that	there	is	an	objective	world.	Or,	
objectively,	a	world.	
It	became	a	norm	in	the	scientific	approach	to	distance	the	subjective	observer	
from	the	material	observed.	The	use	of	first	person	perspective	in	scientific	
observations	or	results	is	still	often	deemed	detrimental	to	the	integrity	of	the	
discipline.	By	distancing	the	observer	from	the	observations,	the	observations	
are	distanced	from	the	complex	patterns	of	selection	and	reconstruction	that	
characterises	our	observation	process.	Although	it	is	now	widely	accepted	that	
science	is	not	value-free,	the	myth	of	scientific	objectivity	was	well-entrenched	in	
societies	where	science	was	regarded	as	liberating	and	illuminating	(Irwin	and	
Wynne,	1996).	These	myths	of	neutrality	and	objectivity	still	prevail	in	various	
forms	and	varying	degrees	(Gray	and	Campbell,	2009).	The	values	of	impartiality	
and	objectivity	have	been	attached	to	the	sciences	historically,	and	may	still	be	
mistaken	for	characteristics	of	scientific	knowledge.	These	myths	can	have	
severe	social	consequences	when	science	is	wielded	for	political	power	under	
guises	of	rationality	and	objectivity	(Guston,	2001).		
	
My	thesis	explores	science	communication	within	environmental	activism.	The	
systemic	nature	of	most	environmental	challenges	makes	them	inextricable	from	
social	inequality.	Not	only	does	social	inequality	affect	our	physical	interaction	
with	our	environment;	it	also	shapes	our	observations	and	interpretations	of	the	
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world.	For	much	of	the	past	three	hundred	years	many	people	regarded	scientific	
knowledge	as	an	anti-authoritarian	influence	that	could	challenge	entrenched	
ideological	norms	(Godfrey-Smith,	2003).	However,	there	is	now	a	large	body	of	
work	demonstrating	the	ways	that	science	performs	and	reinforces	norms	and	
ideologies.	Although	many	authors	have	rigorously	contested	notions	of	
universal	objectivity,	I	am	choosing	to	focus	on	the	challenges	provided	by	
feminist	theorists.	This	reflects	my	interest	in	the	ways	inequalities	affect	our	
construction	and	perception	of	knowledge.	Of	course	inequality	is	not	limited	to	
that	of	a	gendered	nature,	but	many	of	the	themes	raised	in	feminist	critiques	
can	(and	should)	be	made	intersectional	to	address	other	forms	of	inequality.	
Oppressed	publics	can	be	well	positioned	to	challenge	the	epistemic	ground	
science	springs	from,	because	these	grounds	often	fail	to	account	for	diversity	in	
the	human	experience	(Medina,	2013).		
	
Assumptions	arising	from	gendered	norms	and	inequality	are	often	central	to	
feminist	critiques	of	science	(Nelson,	2008).	Numerous	authors	have	
documented	the	ways	androcentrism	and	gendered	norms	drastically	shaped	
how	biological	phenomena	were	observed	and	recorded	in	the	sciences	(Nelson,	
2008;	Hrdy,	1981;	Keller,	1985;	Bleier,	1998;	Martin,	1991).	These	criticisms	
show	the	extent	to	which	experienced	social	norms	and	power	dynamics	are	
mirrored	in	scientists’	investigations	and	observations.	They	demonstrate	that	
the	hierarchies	and	conventions	we	internalise	play	a	large	role	in	constructing	
our	accounts	of	reality.	As	social	assumptions	and	power	imbalances	have	such	a	
fundamental	impact	on	our	perceptions	and	reconstructions	of	phenomena,	
attempts	to	remove	or	downplay	the	subjectivity	of	the	scientist	denies	
accountability	for	what	they	have	learned	to	observe	(Haraway,	1988).	
	
Donna	Haraway	(1988)	described	the	suggestions	of	universal	objectivity	as	a	
‘god-trick’,	because	it	disembodies	knowledge.	She	challenges	the	transcendence	
implied	by	conventional	notions	of	scientific	objectivity,	where	knowledge	
becomes	detached	from	the	particular	embodied	experience	of	those	who	
acquired	it.	Both	Harding	(1986)	and	Haraway	(1988)	emphasise	importance	of	
‘situatedness’,	both	of	knowers	and	knowledge.	This	makes	the	location	and	
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embodiment	of	knowers	central	to	knowledge	claims.	Haraway	(1988)	proposes	
a	feminist	objectivity,	sought	through	the	‘partial	vision’	available	to	particularly	
embodied	and	specifically	located	knowers.	In	this	account	movement	towards	
objective	knowledge	can	only	be	sought	through	situated	experiences,	instead	of	
being	sought	in	spite	of	them.	These	works	seek	to	improve	the	epistemic	quality	
of	knowledge	produced	throughout	the	sciences,	and	to	revisit	the	standards	for	
what	is	considered	scientific	knowledge.		
	
The	real	question	
	
The	conversations	about	what	science	is	or	should	be	are	thick	and	tangled.	In	
discussing	what	we	think	science	is	it	pays	to	consider	what	we	think	science	
does.	The	obvious	answer	would	be	that	science	tries	to	describe	the	world	
(Godfrey-Smith,	2003).	But	the	‘world’	that	science	is	trying	to	describe	is	up	for	
consideration.	Is	it	a	world	that	exists	independently	of	our	experiences	of	it,	and	
theories	about	it?	A	positive	response	to	this	question	would	send	us	in	the	
direction	of	scientific	realism.	Peter	Godfrey-Smith	(2003)	moves	towards	this	
position	by	providing	a	naturalistic	account	of	‘common-sense	realism’.		
	
We	all	inhabit	a	common	reality,	which	has	a	structure	that	exists	
independently	of	what	people	think	and	say	about	it,	except	insofar	
as	reality	is	comprised	of	thoughts,	theories,	and	other	symbols,	
and	except	insofar	as	reality	is	dependent	on	thoughts,	theories,	
and	other	symbols	in	ways	that	might	be	uncovered	by	science.		
	
—Peter	Godfrey-Smith,	2003,	p.176	
	
This	account	is	responsive	to	future	scientific	discoveries	that	may	reveal	new	
relationships	between	thoughts	and	reality.	Godfrey-Smith	(2003)	then	goes	on	
to	describe	a	‘scientific	realism’	as	‘common-sense	realism	naturalised’,	where	an	
‘actual’	and	‘reasonable’	goal	of	science	is	to	provide	accurate	descriptions	of	
reality,	and	to	depict	the	unobservable	elements	of	reality.	If	this	is	an	‘actual’	
and	‘reasonable’	goal	of	science	then	the	scientific	realist	must	allow	for	the	
possibility	that	scientific	descriptions	can	match	the	actual	behaviour	of	a	
universe	that	exists	regardless	of	our	experience	and	descriptions	(Godfrey-
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Smith,	2003).	A	scientific	realist	can	be	sceptical	that	any	current	theory	does	in	
fact	describe	a	universal	reality,	but	not	pessimistic	to	the	point	that	one	believes	
this	could	never	be	the	case.	Godfrey-Smith	(2003)	positions	himself	a	scientific	
realist,	and	it	has	become	a	relatively	popular	viewpoint.	I	imagine	that	a	large	
proportion	of	science	practitioners	would	subscribe	to	some	variation	of	
scientific	realism.	
	
Alternatively,	science	could	be	trying	to	describe	a	world	that	only	exists	in	
response	to	our	experiences	and	theories.	Forms	of	constructivism	and	
empiricism	have	challenged	scientific	realism.	Godfrey-Smith	(2003)	uses	the	
term	‘metaphysical	constructivism’	for	the	view	that	it	is	impossible	for	a	
scientific	theory	to	accurately	describe	a	world	that	exists	independently	from	
our	experience,	because	reality	inherently	depends	on	what	we	think.	Authors	
such	as	Nelson	Goodman	(1996)	occupy	the	metaphysical	constructivist	position,	
using	construction	to	describe	the	relationship	between	theories	and	reality.	
From	this	perspective	reality	is	constructed	by	thoughts	and	experience.	
Godfrey-Smith	(2003)	distinguishes	‘metaphysical	constructivism’	from	‘social	
constructivism’,	a	similar	position,	which	he	takes	issue	with	because	it	does	not	
separate	construction	of	ideas	from	the	construction	of	reality.	I	find	myself	wary	
of	those	kinds	of	separations.	Our	very	preoccupation	with	‘reality’	is	enabled	by	
our	ideas	of	what	it	could	be.	Separating	the	construction	of	ideas	from	the	
construction	of	reality	still	requires	us	to	have	some	kind	of	idea	of	what	a	
constructed	reality	might	be,	thus	assuming	we	can	separate	the	two	kinds	of	
construction	could	be	misleading.		
	
Some	constructivist	positions	developed	from	the	works	of	Immanuel	Kant	
([1781]	1998),	who	differentiated	the	‘noumenal’	world,	which	exists	in	and	of	
itself,	from	the	‘phenomenal’	world,	which	is	the	world	we	experience.	Although	
we	can	have	knowledge	about	the	phenomenal	world,	we	play	a	part	in	its	
construction,	and	it	does	not	exist	beyond	our	minds	(Godfrey-Smith,	2003).	
Phenomenalism	is	the	position	that	descriptions	and	discussions	of	the	‘real’	are	
merely	discussions	about	the	patterns	of	our	sensations	(Godfrey-Smith,	2003).	
Perhaps	here	it	is	useful	to	differentiate	between	existence	and	access.	While	the	
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Kantian	view	allows	for	the	existence	of	a	reality	beyond	our	experience	of	it,	it	
does	not	allow	it	to	be	corroborated	from	our	phenomenal	world.	In	other	
words,	existence	does	not	entail	access.	For	the	scientific	realist,	the	existence	of	
a	‘noumenal’	world	entails	the	possibility	of	access	to	it	and	description	of	it.	
Michael	Devitt	(1997)	described	the	position	of	constructive	antirealism	in	his	
analysis	of	realism	debates.	This	is	the	view	that	different	publics	construct	
different	phenomenal	worlds	by	overlaying	various	concepts	to	their	experience	
(Devitt,	1997;	Godfrey-Smith,	2003).	This	adds	relativism	into	the	mix,	where	
‘reality’	varies	across	cultures	and	situations.	This	position	does	not	allow	for	the	
existence	of	a	‘noumenal’	world	that	operates	beyond	people	and	our	subjective	
variations,	because	relativism	asserts	that	reality	is	dependent	on,	and	subject	to,	
context.		
	
Bas	van	Frassen	(1980)	puts	forward	a	more	moderate	challenge	to	scientific	
realism.	He	describes	a	version	of	instrumentalism,	whereby	scientific	theories	
should	be	tools	to	help	with	our	experience	of	the	world.	Whether	or	not	it	is	
possible	to	describe	a	‘real’	world	with	the	tools	of	science	is	immaterial−	what	
matters	is	their	practical	use,	and	ability	to	help	us	make	predictions.	Van	
Frassen	(1980)	suggests	that	we	should	aim	to	develop	theories	that	accurately	
describe	observable	parts	of	the	world,	but	as	Godfrey-Smith	(2003)	points	out,	
there	are	no	clear	boundaries	around	what	is	observable	or	what	could	be	made	
observable	by	science.	However,	the	idea	of	science	as	a	pragmatic	tool	to	
navigate	our	phenomenal	worlds	is	appealing.	This	allows	us	to	use	and	discuss	
science	without	necessarily	committing	to	a	position	on	the	existence	of	a	
‘noumenal’	reality,	or	the	ability	of	science	to	describe	it.	
	
Towards	a	working	definition	
	
As	we’ve	seen,	science	is	not	so	straightforward	to	define.	Although	various	
criteria	have	been	developed	through	the	ages	to	demarcate	science,	no	clear	set	
of	characteristics	has	meaningfully	set	science	apart	from	other	types	of	
knowledge	(Evans,	2005).	Helen	E.	Longino’s	Science	as	Social	Knowledge	(1990)	
emphasises	the	social	nature	of	the	scientific	practice,	and	the	contextual	values	
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and	interactions	that	shape	the	endeavours	of	scientists.	This	view	suggests	that	
science	is	better	understood	through	its	social	as	opposed	to	its	epistemic	or	
methodological	characteristics.	Irwin	and	Wynne	(1996)	also	argue	that	science	
is	socially	negotiated,	and	that	institutional	structures	and	relations	shape	what	
we	accept	as	science.	Sociologists	use	the	term	‘boundary	work’	to	describe	the	
process	of	socially	constructing	boundaries	between	science	and	non-science	
(Gieryn,	1983).	Boundary	work	is	concerned	with	the	fluidity	of	social	
interactions	and	behaviour	that	characterise	the	non-fixed	territories	of	the	
sciences	(Guston,	2001;	Gieryn,	1999).	Practically	speaking,	what	gets	classed	as	
‘science’	has	social	justice	as	well	as	epistemic	implications.	It	can	affect	the	way	
we	accept	and	apply	knowledge	about	our	world,	influencing	our	behaviour	as	
social	agents.		
	
Providing	a	simplified	explanation	of	‘science’	risks	understating	the	
immeasurably	rich	and	diverse	collective	of	human	experiences	that	
simultaneously	create,	contest,	expand	and	apply	the	sciences.	However,	our	
continued	use	of	scientific	categories	suggests	that	we	may	perceive	some	value	
in	imagining	an	identifiable	‘science’	(Evans,	2005).	With	that	in	mind,	in	the	
context	of	this	thesis	I	will	use	‘science’	to	refer	to	the	biophysical,	or	natural	
sciences.	Drawing	particularly	on	the	work	of	Donna	Haraway	and	Thomas	Kuhn,	
I	take	the	‘biophysical	sciences’	to	be	the	cumulative	methodical	efforts	to	
observe	and	understand	the	density	and	distribution	of	matter	and	energy	
around	the	biosphere,	by	situated	knowers.	As	I	will	be	discussing	science	
communication	within	activist	movements,	social	negotiation	of	what	counts	as	
scientific	knowledge	will	depend	on	the	culture	and	social	norms	in	each	context.	
Paradigms	of	scientific	approach,	method	and	interpretation	are	constantly	
being	revisited	and	revised.	Loosely,	I	regard	communication	as	‘science	
communication’	if	it	echoes	a	generally	accepted	paradigm	of	the	scientific	
community.	Here	it	seems	appropriate	to	defer	(perhaps	evasively)	to	
Wittgenstein’s	approach,	whereby	the	meaning	of	a	word	is	embedded	in	the	
social	context	in	which	it	is	used	(Wittgenstein,	1965).	
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2.2 The	role	of	science	in	decision	making	
	
Making	decisions	is	difficult.	Making	responsible	decisions	is	even	more	so.	
Against	a	backdrop	of	unnerving	social,	environmental	and	climatic	change,	
we’re	tasked	with	making	decisions	regarding	an	increasingly	uncertain	future	
(Chatterton	and	Pickerill,	2010;	Homer-Dixon,	2006).	Whether	decisions	are	
made	at	an	individual,	community	or	societal	level,	they	present	a	host	of	
challenges	and	complexities.	In	most	countries,	the	power	to	make	decisions	that	
affect	how	we	organise	ourselves	and	interact	with	the	non-human	world	is	
concentrated	in	governing	bodies	and	institutions.	These	governing	bodies	are	
responsible	for	forming	and	overseeing	policies	that	direct,	enable	and	constrain	
human	activity.	Policies	have	a	huge	bearing	on	most	facets	of	our	lives	including	
health,	equality,	natural	hazards,	industrial	practices,	food	security,	and	the	non-
human	environment.	Science	produces	knowledge	that	is	vital	to	these	areas.	
The	interplay	between	science	and	policy	has	massive	implications	for	the	
trajectories	of	industrial	and	community	behaviour.	In	the	face	of	ecological	
collapse,	it	is	widely	argued	that	we	need	science	to	reveal	the	impacts	of	
existing	social	and	environmental	practices,	and	make	recommendations	for	
future	policies	and	problem	solving	(Kropp	and	Wagner,	2010;	Likens,	2004;	
Skolnikoff,	1999).		
	
The	feedback	between	science	and	policy	has	been	the	subject	of	extensive	
discussion	and	analysis	in	science	and	technology	studies	(Luján	and	Todt,	2007;	
Sarewitz,	1996).	Each	affect	the	development	of	the	other,	and	both	shape	the	
movement	and	interactions	of	citizens.	Scientific	knowledge	can	increase	the	
range	of	policy	options	available	and	makes	predictions	about	their	impacts	
(Dowd	and	Yosie,	1981).	There	are	greater	volumes	of	research,	evaluation	tools	
and	identified	areas	of	uncertainty	than	ever	before,	making	policy	formation	a	
tangled	and	multifaceted	process	(Kropp	and	Wagner,	2010).	Scientific	
recommendations	for	policy	are	sought	at	a	range	of	scales.	‘Strategic	advice’	
involves	a	broad	long-term	scope;	such	as	emission	reduction	plans	to	address	
climate	change	(Taylor	et	al,	2003).	‘Operational	advice’	guides	the	practical	
implementation	of	policy,	such	as	developing	more	energy	efficient	insulation	
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and	heating	methods	(Taylor	et	al,	2003).	And	importantly,	policy	makers	do	not	
take	scientific	advice	in	isolation,	but	consider	it	as	part	of	a	broad	range	of	
intersecting	social	and	economic	interests.		
	
Academics	take	various	stances	on	the	roles	that	science	and	scientists	should	
play	in	policy-making	(Gray	and	Campbell,	2009).	Public	controversy	typically	
arises	in	response	to	science	in	policy	areas	like	natural	hazards,	health,	and	
ecological	wellbeing	(Luján	and	Todt,	2007;	Tesh,	2000).	Authors	such	as	
Blockstein	(2002)	argue	that	there	are	ethical	imperatives	for	scientists	to	
advocate	for	certain	policies.	Others,	including	Lackey	(2007),	think	the	scientific	
community	should	inform	decision	processes	but	refrain	from	actively	
advocating	for	or	against	policies.	This	position	stems	from	a	belief	that	political	
advocacy	falls	outside	the	realm	of	appropriate	scientific	practice	(Gray	and	
Campbell,	2009).	It	also	reflects	the	concern	that	scientific	knowledge	will	be	
taken	out	of	context	to	satisfy	political	motivations.	Distancing	science	from	
politics	for	the	sake	of	disciplinary	integrity	raises	questions	about	its	social	
integrity,	for	political	stances	of	every	kind	have	social	and	environmental	justice	
implications.	David	Sarewitz	(2004)	contended	it	is	unavoidable	that	science	will	
become	politicised	both	to	defend	and	contest	normative	frameworks	and	
behaviours.	When	science	reveals	the	inadequacy	of	existing	policies	it	can	be	
politicised	to	further	social	and	environmental	justice	movements	(Gamson,	
1992).	However,	political	processes	can	also	erode	public	trust	in	science	with	
severe	consequences.	Following	Japan’s	devastating	earthquake	and	nuclear	
disaster	in	2011,	a	lack	of	coherent	communication	between	scientists	and	the	
government	lead	to	disinformation	and	divergent	advice	around	disaster	
response,	jeopardising	recovery	efforts	(Arimoto	and	Sato,	2012).		
	
Despite	increasingly	diverse	scientific	approaches	to	disputes	and	solutions,	
policy-making	on	urgent	matters	like	climate	change	continues	to	be	
characterised	by	political	gridlock	and	inertia	(Sarewitz,	2004).	Jasanoff	(2003)	
contends	that	the	opportunities	for	scientists	to	positively	influence	policy	
decisions	depend	on	how	the	issue	is	framed.	Policy	makers	play	large	roles	in	
constructing	what	counts	as	relevant	knowledge,	with	institutional	norms	
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shaping	the	ways	science	is	accepted	and	applied	(Nursey-Bray	et	al,	2014).	
Kropp	and	Wagner	(2010)	suggest	the	utility	of	scientific	expertise	is	gauged	by	
its	ability	to	conform	to	institutional	practices	and	requirements.	Power	
imbalances	result	in	certain	values	and	norms	being	disproportionately	reflected	
in	policy-making	processes.	With	divisions	between	industrial	and	governmental	
science	dissolving,	the	production	of	science	that	serves	prevailing	economic	
interests	is	often	favoured	over	science	conducted	for	public	interest	(Krimsky,	
2003;	Frickel,	2004).	In	spite	of	scientists’	efforts	to	provide	recommendations	
on	policy,	corporate	lobbying	has	a	strong	bearing	over	decisions	(McCormick,	
2007).	
	
Although	the	need	for	science-guided	environmental	policies	is	widely	
recognised,	many	research	efforts	continue	to	be	ignored	or	excluded	from	
political	discourse,	leading	to	the		‘science-policy	gap’	(Nursey-Bray	et	al,	2014).	
Cash	et	al.	(2006)	suggests	that	this	gap	is	caused	by	cultural	discontinuity	
between	knowledge	and	governance,	which	prevents	science	from	being	
successfully	integrated	into	policies.	This	reflects	tensions	between	the	
production	of	knowledge	and	its	application	(Jasanoff,	2003).	Improving	
cooperation	between	the	scientific	community	and	policy-makers	is	seen	as	
increasingly	important	(Bultitude	et	al,	2012).	The	gap	between	knowledge	
generation	and	implementation	has	been	addressed	by	developing	mechanisms	
to	translate	and	connect	different	areas	of	knowledge	(Vogel	et	al.,	2007).	These	
can	take	the	form	of	boundary	objects,	such	as	conceptual	models	and	other	
resources	that	enable	the	transfer	of	understanding	from	one	social	context	to	
another	(Guston,	2001).	They	can	also	take	the	shape	of	boundary	organisations	
such	as	NGOs	or	independent	bodies	that	facilitate	and	mediate	communication	
between	disciplines	or	social	groups	(Guston,	2001).		
	
One	of	the	challenges	in	shaping	science-based	policy	is	the	interpretation	of	
uncertainty.	Scientific	uncertainty	is	often	made	central	to	socio-environmental	
controversies	(Skolnikoff,	1999).	Sarewitz	(2004)	interprets	scientific	
uncertainty	as	a	lack	of	continuity	between	different	scientific	approaches;	
however	it	is	often	framed	as	a	lack	of	understanding	and	used	to	ignore	
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scientific	recommendations	to	policy.	The	broad	spectrum	of	research	and	expert	
opinions	creates	fertile	ground	for	political	leaders	to	cast	doubt	on	the	utility	
and	necessity	of	expertise	(Higgins,	2016).	This	can	create	serious	
misinterpretation	of	policy	options	and	outcomes,	with	untold	social	and	
environmental	consequences.	Authors	such	as	Ralph	Keyes	(2004)	and	Kathleen	
Higgins	(2016)	have	raised	concerns	that	we	are	entering	a	post-truth	era.	
Leaders’	claims	are	no	longer	held	up	to	rigorous	scrutiny	because	commitment	
to	truth	is	no	longer	required	nor	expected.	Apathy	towards	political	dishonesty	
is	enabled	in	part	by	strategic	public	attacks	on	scientists	and	intellectuals,	and	
their	inability	to	provide	definitive	answers	to	complex	questions	(Hager,	2014).	
This	has	caused	major	concerns	both	within	and	outside	of	the	scientific	
community.	It	has	sparked	discussions	about	the	incentives	for	scientists	and	
academics	to	play	more	active	and	vocal	roles	in	policy	discourse	and	political	
dissent	(Frickel,	2004;	Barton	and	Tan,	2010;	Lemons	and	Brown,	2011;	Conde,	
2014).	
	
Of	course	science	does	not	influence	decision-making	solely	in	the	confines	of	
policy	meeting	rooms.	Science	produces	knowledge	that	interacts	with	wider	
publics	and	our	values.	Diverse	publics	both	affect,	and	are	affected	by,	the	
trajectories	of	science	and	policy.	Policy	decisions	are	only	meaningful	to	the	
extent	that	citizens	enact	them.	The	public’s	daily	decisions	simultaneously	
reflect,	reinforce,	and	resist	political	structures	and	policies.	Science	can	affect	
public	decisions	regarding	their	health,	intellectual	pursuits,	recreation,	and	
surrounding	environment.	In	addition	to	this	science	contributes	to	the	public	
knowledge	of	global	issues.	Scientific	knowledge	can	subvert	or	enable	beliefs	
about	the	world	(Kitcher,	2003).	Insofar	as	science	is	regarded	as	revealing	
‘truths’,	it	may	help	shape,	reinforce,	or	erode	people’s	political	identities.	
Scientific	knowledge	may	influence	public	attitudes	towards	policy	options	and	
political	candidates.	In	other	words,	it	can	affect	the	ways	we	practice	
democracy.	Over	the	last	two	decades	it	has	been	more	widely	recognised	that	
diverse	publics	have	unique	access	to	local	knowledge	and	can	valuably	
contribute	to	policy	decisions	(Burgess,	2014).	This	has	seen	greater	inclusion	of	
publics	in	policy-making	processes	about	a	wide	range	of	biosocial	issues.	In	
	 18	
discussing	the	interaction	between	science	and	decision-making	it	is	important	
to	consider	how	scientific	discourses	interact	with	the	values	of	diverse	publics.	
Publics	determine	the	characters	and	policy	options	that	make	it	to	decision	
tables;	they	also	ultimately	determine	what	and	how	decisions	play	out.	
	
2.3 Science	communication	
	
The	sciences	influence	a	great	many	facets	of	life.	From	the	transport,	technology	
and	food	systems	we	have	come	to	rely	on,	to	the	big	challenges	we	face	as	the	
climate,	oceans	and	ecosystems	change	around	us.	The	scientific	community	
works	across	regions	and	across	scales,	observing,	tweaking	and	testing	
elements	of	the	physical	world,	attempting	to	build	us	a	picture	of	it.	The	natural	
sciences	reveal	and	predict	the	impacts	of	anthropogenic	activity	on	the	
environment,	often	producing	knowledge	that	sparks	and	fuels	social	
controversies	(Hess,	2011;	Venturini,	2009).	The	vast	amounts	of	observations,	
hypotheses	and	theories	held	in	the	sciences	are	not	always	communicated	to	
wider	publics	in	an	accessible	manner.	Historically,	limiting	access	to	scientific	
knowledge	has	been	a	means	of	maintaining	political	power	and	control	
(McCormick,	2007).	Bennett	(2003)	highlighted	the	importance	of	developing	
communication	methods	for	the	development	of	democracy.	The	science	
communication	discipline	emerged	to	address	the	need	for	scientific	knowledge	
to	be	disseminated	more	effectively	and	equitably	to	those	without	a	formal	
background	in	science.	The	field	also	aims	to	increase	awareness	about	the	
processes,	possibilities,	and	limitations	of	the	sciences.	Science	communication	
has	become	an	immensely	broad	discipline.	Science	communicators	can	be	found	
working	with	policy	makers,	developing	citizen	science	programs,	making	
natural	history	documentaries,	curating	museum	displays,	working	with	NGOs,	
or	assisting	with	post-disaster	communication.	In	academia,	science	
communication	authors	evaluate	and	explore	the	ways	scientific	knowledge	is	
distributed,	received	and	applied.	Additionally,	science	communication	can	aim	
to	popularise	science	and	technology;	however	this	is	not	an	aspect	of	the	field	
that	I	will	focus	on.	Predominately	I	will	be	discussing	science	communication	
that	is	angled	towards	social	and	environmental	justice	goals.	
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The	field	of	science	communication	was	once	characterised	by	the	‘deficit	model’	
of	communication	(Sturgis	and	Allum,	2004).	This	model	assumed	that	the	public	
deficit	in	scientific	understanding	could	be	rectified	by	a	one-way	flow	of	
information	from	professionals	to	non-professionals.	The	assumptions	embodied	
by	the	deficit	model	inadvertently	reinforced	the	elitism	and	exclusivity	of	the	
sciences.	There	are	differences	between	communicating	at	people	and	
communicating	with	people.	Much	social	commentary	and	research	now	rejects	
the	deficit	model	as	vastly	inadequate	for	effective	communication	(Hess,	2011).	
The	notion	of	the	‘public’	presented	by	the	deficit	model	does	not	account	for	
heterogeneity	of	prior	knowledge,	experience	and	interests	present	in	society.	
There	are	no	fundamental	characteristics	of	the	‘public’	because	it	does	not	exist	
as	a	homogenous	entity,	rather	as	multiple	non-stagnant	groups	(Hess,	2011).	
The	critique	of	the	deficit	model	by	Wynne	(1992)	and	other	authors	lead	to	
participatory	models	of	communication	and	consultation	being	developed	to	
involve	publics	in	science-related	issues.		
	
Developing	better	models	of	science	communication	is	important	for	helping	
communities	alleviate	risks	to	their	health	and	wellbeing.	These	risks	can	come	
from	rapid	hazards	such	as	landslides,	disease	outbreaks,	forest	fires,	
earthquakes	or	tsunamis	(Arimoto	and	Sato,	2012).	They	can	also	take	the	shape	
of	slower	hazards	such	as	erosion,	desertification,	and	pollution	of	air,	soil	and	
water.	Public	engagement	models	of	science	communication	encourage	a	
reciprocal	exchange	of	knowledge,	whereby	scientists	and	publics	gain	a	more	
comprehensive	understanding	of	each	other	(Irwin,	2001).	These	models	aim	to	
recognise	the	broad	spectrum	of	public	values	that	influence	the	ways	scientific	
knowledge	is	received	and	applied.	They	can	also	help	the	scientific	community	
to	be	more	reflexive,	and	sensitive	towards	the	diverse	needs	and	experiences	of	
publics.	In	addition	to	this,	newer	models	recognise	the	significant	contributions	
the	public	can	make	to	scientific	inquiries.	Communities	often	hold	specific	
knowledge	of	local	history	and	environmental	conditions	that	can	be	invaluable	
to	researchers	(Burgess,	2014).		
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Improving	dialogue	between	scientists	and	non-scientists	can	help	groups	
navigate	social	controversies	that	affect	them.	The	movement	towards	an	
inclusive,	participatory	approach	has	been	dubbed	‘democratising	science’,	a	
campaign	to	open	up	access	to	scientific	tools	for	social	empowerment	
(McCormick,	2007).	Effective	communication	of	science	can	help	citizens	feel	
better	informed	to	participate	in	democratic	processes	such	as	referendums,	
policy	submissions,	public	consultations,	and	elections.	Empowerment	can	also	
occur	through	science-informed	community-lead	projects.	Democratising	
scientific	knowledge	can	also	help	bring	attention	to	industrial	activities	that	
pose	a	threat	to	nearby	communities.	Marta	Conde	(2014)	observed	that	
knowledge	has	often	been	manufactured	and	manipulated	in	corporate	interests	
to	the	detriment	of	affected	publics.	More	equitable	distribution	of	scientific	
knowledge	can	help	communities	resist	corporate	co-option	and	exploitation	
(Conde,	2014).	In	these	situations	effective	communication	between	scientists	
and	communities	can	create	knowledge	that	positively	affects	social	justice	
movements.	
	
Science	communication	is	considered	an	important	tool	for	a	healthy	democracy.	
This	role	requires	that	science	communication	be	inclusive	of	all	audiences	
(Massarani	and	Merzagora,	2014).	Although	the	field	has	experienced	rapid	
expansion,	it	is	still	in	its	infancy.	Guentha	and	Joubert	(2017)	recently	released	a	
report	analysing	the	trends	in	science	communication	research	and	found	a	
significant	bias	in	the	research	literature	towards	Western	English-speaking	
countries.	This	means	that	many	of	the	academic	works	on	science	
communication	will	come	from	a	Western-centric	perspective.	This	is	
concerning,	because	we	live	in	a	globalised	world.	Our	activities	affect	the	
biosphere,	and	the	major	ecological	and	social	challenges	we	face	cut	across	
borders,	they	are	not	confined	to	English-speaking	nations.	Countries	that	stand	
to	experience	the	most	significant	effects	of	environmental	change	are	under-
represented	in	the	current	science	communication	literature	(Guentha	and	
Joubert,	2017).	Luisa	Massarani	(2015)	commented	on	the	distinct	lack	of	
science	communication	research	being	conducted	in	Africa,	South	America,	and	
other	regions	in	the	global	South.	Between	countries	there	are	epistemological,	
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cultural	and	situational	differences	that	will	likely	cultivate	very	different	
relationships	between	citizens	and	science.	Models	of	science	communication	
developed	in	Western	countries	may	not	be	appropriate	or	effective	across	
cultures,	as	there	can	be	large	differences	in	how	science	is	received	(Massarani,	
2015).	Social	inclusion	is	not	only	important	with	regards	to	access	of	
knowledge,	but	across	all	phases	of	knowledge	governance	and	production	
(Massarani	and	Merzagora,	2014).	In	addition	to	geographical	
underrepresentation,	Guentha	and	Joubert	(2017)	noted	that	male	authors	from	
English	speaking	countries	were	significantly	over-represented	in	the	published	
literature,	showing	that	gender	imbalance	is	also	a	feature	of	the	science	
communication	field.	While	these	gaps	are	gradually	being	identified	and	
addressed,	science	communication	is	currently	a	Western-centric	field	of	
research	with	predominately	male	authors.	This	raises	long-term	concerns	about	
its	impact	on	democracies	and	global	systems,	and	creates	incentives	for	
continuing	efforts	to	make	the	field	more	diverse,	sensitive	and	inclusive.	
	
In	the	above,	I	have	outlined	some	of	the	ways	science	communication	can	
complement	the	democratic	process,	and	some	of	the	current	challenges	and	
gaps	within	the	field.	The	broad	nature	of	the	discipline	requires	that	it	remains	
responsive	to	changes	both	within	and	outside	of	the	sciences.	Andrea	Bandelli	
encourages	reflection	“on	the	values	that	drive	scientific	endeavour	and	how	
they	interface,	overlap,	reinforce	or	conflict	with	social	and	political	ones.”	
(Bandelli,	2015,	p.1).	In	the	last	year	there	have	been	an	increasing	number	of	
discussions	over	how	the	field	could	enhance	its	contribution	to	democratic	
systems.	Some	have	pushed	for	science	communicators	to	become	more	
outspoken	in	political	spaces	and	more	critical	of	the	status	quo.	By	many	
accounts,	2016	was	a	tumultuous	year	for	Western	politics.	In	a	recent	letter	to	
the	Journal	of	Science	Communication,	Joseph	Roche	and	Nicola	Davis	(2017)	
reflected	on	how	the	relationship	between	science	and	society	may	have	been	
compromised	by	vocal	political	characters	that	denounced	the	value	of	science-
based	policies.	This	sent	ripples	of	alarm	through	many	communities	and	
disciplines,	as	media	air	time	of	climate	denialist	claims	can	further	delay	an	
already	lethargic	response	to	the	climate	and	ecological	crises.	A	number	of	
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social	groups	also	came	under	appalling	fire	from	political	figureheads,	
provoking	criticism	of	the	socio-political	trends	that	saw	these	viewpoints	gain	
popularity.	Discussions	of	incentives	for	science	communicators	to	participate	
more	actively	in	political	activism	are	very	much	alive	within	the	field	(Roche	
and	Davis,	2017).	Emma	Weitkamp	(2017)	recently	encouraged	consideration	of	
the	roles	science	communicators	could	play	in	political	spaces.	Roche	and	Davis	
(2017)	requested	guidance	from	more	experienced	members	in	the	field	on	how	
to	navigate	the	parallel	worlds	of	social	and	professional	responsibility,	
expressing	concerns	about	the	career	risks	of	being	more	politically	vocal.	Rod	
Lamberts	(2017)	called	on	the	science	communication	community	to	be	a	lot	
more	vocal	and	brave	by	embracing	more	publicly	political	spaces.	This	displays	
the	belief	that	more	vocal	communication	of	science	on	political	stages	would	
have	positive	social	impacts,	and	benefits	to	democracy.	These	discussions	join	
increasing	levels	of	academic	interest	in	the	feedback	between	science	and	
activism	(Frickel,	2004;	Barton	and	Tan,	2010;	Lemons	and	Brown,	2011;	Conde,	
2014).		
	
	
2.4				Defining	activism	
		
Activism	is	a	loaded	term.	It	can	prompt	assumptions	of	civil	unrest,	disruption	
and	idealism.	As	political	protest	is	so	quickly	sensationalised,	its	complexity	
often	goes	underappreciated	(Huish,	2013).	While	it	may	be	common	to	
associate	‘activism’	with	illegal	activity	or	social	disturbance,	the	term	
encapsulates	a	much	broader	and	intricate	set	of	processes	and	behaviours.	
Mounting	ecological	and	socioeconomic	challenges	have	sparked	unprecedented	
movements	for	social	and	environmental	welfare	across	the	globe	(Chatterton	
and	Pickerill,	2010).	This	makes	it	a	good	time	to	consider	what	we	might	mean	
by	‘activism’,	and	how	it	fits	into	tumultuous	tides	of	social	change.		
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As	an	assemblage	of	encounters	pushing	the	system	towards	new	
states,	activism	is	one	of	the	causes	bringing	about	evolution	and	re-
creation	within	the	system.		
	
—Marcelo	Svirsky,	2010,	p.	168	
	
Here,	Svirsky	(2010)	describes	activism	as	a	series	of	interactions	aimed	at	
changing	a	social	pattern.	Just	as	with	evolution	in	ecological	systems,	there	are	
pressures	and	incentives	for	change	within	social	systems.	These	pressures	come	
from	perceived	moral	ills	and	harmful	practices,	and	incentives	are	created	when	
those	processes	are	re-imagined.	Activism	attempts	to	remove	the	cap	from	the	
bottleneck,	alleviating	social	pressures	and	allowing	society	to	disperse	into	new	
spaces	and	shapes.	To	define	activism,	we	must	first	consider	the	conditions	
driving	social	change	and	recreation.	Drawing	on	literature	in	geographies	of	
contestation,	I	will	look	at	how	hegemony	creates	controversies,	which	drives	
the	emergence	of	counterpublics,	then	activist	groups.	Next	I	will	review	some	of	
the	qualities	that	typically	distinguish	‘activism’	from	other	types	of	dissent.	I	
will	then	move	towards	defining	activism	by	exploring	it	as	a	form	of	political	
expression,	an	embodiment	of	‘self’,	and	a	practice.	This	will	help	give	a	better	
understanding	of	activism	and	what	I	will	take	it	to	mean	in	this	thesis.		
	
Broadly,	social	movements	occur	to	challenge	or	reinvent	status	quos.	But	what	
forms	a	‘status	quo’	and	what	keeps	it	in	place?	The	status	quo	is	partially	kept	in	
place	by	what	Joseph	Gusfield	(1981)	describes	as	pervasive	‘moral	orders’,	
which	influence	our	daily	decision-making	and	standardise	behaviour	within	
society.	These	orders	become	so	entrenched	they	become	invisible,	and	are	often	
obliviously	accepted	without	due	consideration	of	alternatives.	Gusfield	(1981)	
gives	the	example	of	the	status	quo	condemnation	of	driving	drunk.	The	
condemnation	is	so	strong	that	it	can	prevent	a	wider	conception	of	the	problem	
and	obscure	our	determination	of	its	causes.	For	example,	the	urban	design	that	
keeps	cars	a	dominant	form	of	transport,	or	the	increasing	distances	between	the	
places	where	we	live,	work	and	socialise	(Gusfield,	1981).	Pervasive	‘moral	
orders’	can	leave	wider	structural	factors	less	examined.	
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These	moral	orders	form	part	of	a	society’s	hegemonic	norms.	‘Hegemonic	
norms’	are	the	baseline	social	assumptions	and	enactments	that	often	go	
unquestioned	in	day-to-day	public	discourse	(Young,	2001).	Hegemony	can	be	
visualised	as	what	water	is	to	a	fish	(Anderson,	2004).	A	fish	doesn’t	know	that	
it’s	wet,	‘wetness’	only	occurs	to	those	who	are	dry.	Hegemonic	norms	help	to	
reproduce	and	reinforce	the	dominant	social	structure.	When	these	norms	are	
co-opted	and	constructed	to	serve	the	interests	of	those	in	power,	it	can	subdue	
and	manipulate	discussion	on	matters	of	public	interest	(Gross,	2005).	Social	
controversies	occur	when	underlying	tensions	in	society	come	to	the	surface	and	
erupt	to	polarise	publics	and	reinvent	status	quos	(Turner,	1978;	Gross,	2005).	
Tomasso	Venturini	(2009)	defines	controversies	as	irreducibly	complex	social	
phenomena	in	which	actors	disagree.	They	can	span	across	social	groups,	
including	all	biological	and	non-biological	entities	affected	by	the	disagreement	
(Venturini,	2009).	Controversies	can	prompt	social	transformation,	whereby	
publics	are	created,	polarise	and	dissipate.		
		
Social	controversies	can	highlight	the	limited	capacity	of	the	current	social	
structure	to	serve	a	public’s	interests	or	provide	opportunities.	According	to	a	
paper	brought	out	by	the	Free	Association	(2010),	recognising	these	limitations	
creates	a	‘cramped	space’.	Gilles	Deleuze	(1995)	originally	used	the	term	
‘cramped	space’	to	describe	the	constrained	conditions	that	spark	a	re-
imagination	of	social	possibilities.	‘Cramped	spaces’	are	where	social	movements	
typically	germinate	(Free	Association,	2010).	These	spaces	prompt	what	Pickerill	
and	Chatterton	(2006)	call	‘autonomous	geographies’;	“where	there	is	a	
questioning	of	the	laws	and	social	norms	of	society”	(Pickerill	and	Chatterton,	
2006,	p.1).	When	enough	of	the	public	comes	together	to	question	current	laws	
or	norms,	they	form	what’s	called	a	counterpublic	(Hess,	2011).	Counterpublics	
often	arise	in	response	to	moral	gaps	in	human	activity,	or	where	avenues	for	
democratic	participation	are	being	constricted	(Burns	and	Medvecky,	2018).	
David	Hess	(2011)	describes	counterpublics	as	an	actively	informed	social	
mobilisation	that	counters	official	publics.	They	can	be	made	up	of	networks	that	
advocate	for	public	interest	more	effectively	than	existing	political	power	
structures	(Hess,	2011).	As	they	tend	to	challenge	hegemonic	structures	of	
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power,	political	institutions	often	attempt	to	distinguish	counterpublics	from	the	
lay	public	opinion	(Lezaun	and	Soneryd,	2007).	
		
Counterpublics	challenge	dominant	social	narratives	and	engage	in	forms	of	
political	contestation	and	dissent.	Robert	Huish	(2013)	describes	dissent	as	
contesting	dominant	‘narratives	of	place’	to	mount	symbolic	challenges	to	
authority,	which	are	then	communicated	to	a	wider	public.	‘Activism’	exists	as	a	
part	of	these	broad	forms	of	dissent.	The	term	‘activism’	is	often	used	in	
association	with	groups	that	act	against	a	power	structure,	either	by	influencing	
policy	or	attempting	to	change	public	attitudes	and	behaviour	(Shaw,	2001;	
Huish,	2013).	This	encompasses	a	broad	range	of	contesting	behaviours	and	
advocacy.	Activism	is	often	conducted	by,	or	alongside,	marginalised	groups	
(Huish,	2013).	However,	though	we	often	associate	activism	with	counter-
hegemonic	movements,	it	is	not	a	necessary	feature	of	activism	that	it	challenges	
power	structures.	As	Frances	Fox	Piven	(2010)	pointed	out,	activists	can	also	
advocate	for	authority	and	hegemony.	Distribution	of	the	label	‘activist’	is	heavily	
influenced	by	presumed	political	discourses,	with	left-aligning	groups	more	
likely	to	earn	themselves	‘activist’	titles	(Huish,	2013).	Authors	such	as	Gavin	
Brown	and	Jenny	Pickerill	(2009)	have	acknowledged	that	the	concept	of	
activism	is	inherently	fluid,	meaning	there	are	no	clear	distinctions	between	
activist	and	non-activist.	This	means	there	are	no	distinct	values	or	political	
ideologies	that	constitute	activism,	though	these	are	often	implied.		
	
Activism	is	the	process	of	understanding,	contextualising,	and	
negotiating	issues	with	and	on	behalf	of	a	have-not	community.	[…]	
When	one	becomes	an	activist,	she	or	he	demonstrates	a	voluntary	
willingness	to	effect	change.		
	
—Forenza	and	Germak,	2015,	p.	230	
		
In	this	description,	activism	is	strongly	associated	with	a	desire	to	bring	about	
some	kind	of	change	in	society.	This	change	is	usually	sought	because	of	an	
identified	social	or	environmental	injustice.	These	injustices	can	be	real	or	
perceived.	For	example,	the	grievances	brought	to	light	by	white	supremacist	
activism	are	likely	to	be	brought	about	by	perceived	as	opposed	to	actual	
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injustices.	In	his	discussion	of	‘activist	geographies’	Paul	Routledge	(2009)	kept	
his	definition	of	‘activism’	deliberately	broad	to	account	for	diverse	embodied	
forms	of	contestation.	Activism	exists	at	a	range	of	scales,	involving	a	fluid	
congregation	and	dispersal	of	citizens	around	localised	and	global	issues.	
Grassroots	groups	often	form	in	response	to	a	particular	local	issue,	and	may	
dissipate	once	that	issue	has	been	addressed.	More	structured,	formal	groups,	
such	as	Amnesty	International	or	Greenpeace,	may	address	multiple	issues.	
Shared	experiences	during	campaigns	or	protests	contribute	to	feelings	of	
commonality	and	collective	identity,	which	help	characterise	and	define	activist	
networks	(Brown	and	Pickerill,	2009).	Although	size,	methods	and	approaches	
will	differ	between	groups,	a	key	feature	of	community	activism	is	the	‘relational	
empowerment’	that	occurs	within	and	between	communities	(Christens,	2012).	
When	communities	are	created	to	address	localised	issues,	they	form	a	set	of	
norms	and	articulate	a	set	of	values.	These	localised	values	constitute	what	Paul	
Routledge	(2003)	calls	‘militant	particularisms’.	Localised	campaigns	become	
‘movements’	when	they	converge	with	other	groups	across	wider	scales	
(Routledge,	2003).	From	‘militant	particularisms’	more	universal,	collective	
visions	and	values	can	emerge	(Reid	and	Taylor,	2000).	These	collective	visions	
can	stretch	across	different	spaces	and	scales.	Instances	of	activism	will	involve	
the	‘militant	particularisms’	of	geographically	situated	campaigns,	and	also	the	
threads	of	‘universalisms’	that	emerge	to	connect	and	inform	local	actions.	By	
enacting	both	‘militant	particularisms’	and	more	universal	ideals	activism	
becomes	a	way	of	embodying	and	articulating	political	values,	if	only	
temporarily.			
		
Within	academic	theory	notions	of	what	constitute	activism	are	broad	and	wide	
ranging.	Yet	in	public	discourse,	‘activism’	tends	to	be	associated	with	a	
narrower	set	of	behaviours,	often	involving	acts	of	civil	disobedience.	Civil	
disobedience	is	defined	as	citizens	engaging	in	unlawful	behaviour	to	expose	a	
lack	of	moral	legitimacy	in	a	lawful	action	or	pursuit	(Thomassen,	2007).	It	can	
bring	attention	to	social	injustice	or	call	for	a	change	in	policy	or	governance	
(Bedau,	1961). Civil	disobedience	embodies	direct	physical	resistance	to	a	
process	or	system,	and	is	tied	to	the	principle	of	non-violence	(Bedau,	1961;	
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Lefkowitz,	2007;	Thomassen,	2007).	While	civil	disobedience	is	not	a	defining	
feature	of	activism,	it	plays	an	important	social	and	philosophical	role	in	dissent.	
It	demonstrates	a	deep	discontent	with	social,	political,	or	economic	systems.	
Without	legal	systems	to	shape	social	convention	and	allocate	‘legitimacy’	to	
various	actions,	civil	disobedience	would	not	exist.	The	existence	of	legal	systems	
and	legitimacy	shape	‘activism’	as	a	concept,	because	activism	can	be	
characterised	by	what	it	appears	in	contrast	to.	The	controversial	nature	of	
disobedience	means	that	it	is	likely	to	receive	media	attention.	Communication	
put	out	by	activist	groups	around	acts	of	civil	disobedience	is	more	likely	to	enter	
public	and	political	discourse.	For	this	reason,	I	will	pay	particular	attention	to	
activism	involving	civil	disobedience	in	this	thesis.	
		
Although	the	concept	of	activism	is	fluid	and	contested,	we	often	associate	
certain	qualities	with	activist	movements.	In	Iris	Young’s	‘Activist	challenges	to	
deliberative	democracy’	(2001),	Young	creates	a	dialogue	between	two	
characters,	the	activist	and	the	deliberative	democrat,	to	demonstrate	some	
tensions	between	the	two	positions.	These	tensions	help	characterise	activism	
and	the	qualities	that	may	distinguish	it	from	other	types	of	political	
engagement.	Deliberative	democracy	suggests	ways	for	issues	to	be	addressed	
through	public	deliberation	to	promote	equality	and	social	justice	(Young,	2001).	
It	aims	to	express	a	set	of	ideals	that	democratic	processes	can	be	evaluated	
against	(Young,	2001).	The	activist	character	argues	that	deliberative	settings	
are	managed	and	influenced	by	prevailing	power	structures,	restricting	the	
outcomes	available	within	deliberations	(Young,	2001).	They	also	stress	the	
pervasiveness	of	normative	discourses,	and	the	unequal	interests	they	can	
represent	within	deliberative	settings.	These	include	power	inequalities,	
discriminative	assumptions,	and	dominant	narratives	about	how	society	can	and	
should	work	(Young,	2001).	This	can	make	consensus	agreements	within	
deliberative	settings	‘false’	or	‘distorted’,	as	wider	systems	of	oppression	and	
inequality	can	distort	communication,	affecting	participants’	capacity	to	conceive	
of	their	own	interests	and	others’	(Young,	2001;	Habermas,	1970).	Therefore,	the	
activist	contends	that	social	justice	cannot	be	adequately	expressed	in	the	
deliberative	conditions	described	by	the	deliberative	democrat.	The	description	
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of	these	challenges	brings	a	common	characteristic	of	‘activist’	groups	to	light;	
that	they	are	likely	to	level	constant	challenges	at	any	‘legitimate’	process	of	
political	engagement	and	consensus	decision-making.	Further	than	that,	they	
may	not	believe	any	formalised	political	process	can	be	capable	of	delivering	
social	justice	outcomes.	Their	actions	may	be	“aimed	not	at	commanding	assent	
but	disturbing	complacency.”	(Young,	2001,	p.	687).	
		
Because	[the	activist]	suspects	some	agreements	of	masking	unjust	
power	relations,	the	activist	believes	it	is	important	to	challenge	
discourses	and	the	deliberative	processes	that	rely	on	them	[…]	One	of	
the	activist’s	goals	is	to	make	us	wonder	about	what	we’re	doing,	to	
rupture	a	stream	of	thought,	rather	than	to	weave	an	argument.		
	
—Iris	Young,	2001,	p.	687	
		
These	fictional	characterisations	touch	on	some	important	themes	of	activism	
and	how	it	might	be	perceived	in	contrast	with	other	social	change	efforts,	
including	those	typically	seen	in	science	communication.	Young	(2001)	
emphasises	the	need	for	both	deliberative	and	activist	approaches	while	
recognising	the	tension	between	them.	Activism	may	not	only	exist	to	challenge	
the	particular	decisions	or	actions	of	bodies,	but	to	also	challenge	and	disrupt	the	
processes	of	how	decisions	are	made	and	the	structures	that	they	are	made	
within.	Behaving	in	ways	that	are	socially	unacceptable	can	be	a	way	of	
challenging	what’s	considered	acceptable,	and	how	and	why	it’s	accepted.	
Activism	cannot	be	characterised	by	a	fixed	set	of	values,	but	often	by	its	position	
relative	to	an	accepted,	entrenched,	or	official	process	or	action.	Activists	are	in	a	
constant	process	of	deconstructing	and	negating	hegemonic	norms	that	thread	
through	society	(King,	2005).	Because	activist	groups	tend	to	challenge	social	
structures	and	modes	of	organisation,	within	their	networks	they	often	
experiment	with	horizontal	organisation	and	de-centralised	methods	of	
decision-making	(Chatterton	and	Pickerill,	2010).	The	constant	process	of	re-
imagining	modes	of	co-operation	and	decision-making	helps	activist	groups	
embody	the	societal	shifts	they’re	advocating.	Of	course,	there	is	great	variation	
in	activist	groups’	actual	ability	or	willingness	to	embody	their	political	values,	
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and	attempts	to	embrace	alternative	horizontal	decision-making	practices	are	
not	always	successful	(or,	I	regret	to	say,	practical).	
	
‘Activism’	can	also	be	understood	as	a	form	of	political	expression.	Hannah	
Arendt	(1958)	defined	‘the	political’	as	action	performed	in	public.	‘The	political’	
can	refer	one’s	ideas	of	how	society	could	or	should	work,	informed	by	values,	
interior	experience,	knowledge	and	ideology	(Pulido,	2003).	Activism	is	an	
expression	of	how	people	think	society	ought	to	function,	often	in	contrast	to	the	
way	that	it	actually	functions.	Although	activism	often	appears	as	embodied	
dissent	against	isolated	operations	or	processes,	these	cannot	be	separated	from	
the	wider	socio-political	contexts	in	which	we	live.	Hence	activism	is	an	
embodiment	of	an	alternative	politics	to	the	one	performed	in	the	operation	
activists	oppose.	However,	although	we	often	associate	activism	with	
antagonism,	activism	can	also	enact	‘pre-figurative’	politics,	whereby	activists	
create	space	to	define	themselves	beyond	what	they	oppose	(Free	Association,	
2010).	For	example,	it	is	becoming	more	common	for	activist	groups	to	set	up	
spaces	for	emotional	reflexivity,	processing	of	trauma,	and	vulnerability	to	build	
emotional	connections	and	a	politics	of	care	outside	of	actions	(Brown	and	
Pickerill,	2009).	If	we	employ	a	broad	conception	of	politics	then	every	action	
can,	in	a	sense,	be	counted	as	political	expression.	It	is	more	useful	to	think	of	
activism	as	a	more	deliberate	form	of	political	expression	than	the	politics	we	
perform	day	to	day,	or	unconsciously.	It	is	usually	aimed	at	communicating	and	
spreading	a	particular	politics.	In	his	paper	towards	a	defining	activism,	Marcelo	
Svirsky	(2010)	emphasised	that	activism	was	an	extroverted,	public	process.	
This	fits	with	Arendt’s	(1958)	definition	of	political	expression	being	a	public	
event.	However,	Joanna	Hedva	(2016)	contested	this	in	her	articulation	of	
private	forms	of	‘the	political’,	dissent	and	resistance,	through	her	experience	
with	chronic	illness.	Here,	political	dissent	was	embodied	in	private,	every	day,	
just	by	virtue	of	existing	in	a	state	that	the	state	does	not	hold	as	profitable,	
valuable,	or	visible	(Hedva,	2016).	Defining	either	the	political,	or	activism	as	a	
public	affair	excludes	and	diminishes	the	experiences	of	those	most	negatively	
affected	by	the	status	quo.	If	a	characteristic	of	activism	is	that	it	contends	with	
hegemonic	norms	and	current	political	structures,	then	challenging	the	power	of	
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systems	to	dictate	and	constrain	our	intrapersonal	worlds	should	also	be	
considered	activism.		
	
Laura	Pulido	(2003)	emphasises	that	social	movements	can’t	be	understood	
without	considering	their	interior	dimensions,	such	as	emotions,	passions	and	
psychological	development.	These	interior	dimensions	compose	the	‘self’.	Gavin	
Brown	and	Jenny	Pickerill	(2009)	identify	the	‘self’	as	an	important	location	of	
meaning	for	‘activism’.	Often,	it	is	through	our	interior	emotional	responses	to	a	
behaviour,	injustice	or	political	event	that	we	recognise	our	own	dissent	towards	
an	action	(Forenza	and	Germak,	2015).	Through	these	experiences	we	come	to	
identify	parts	of	our	‘self’	that	are	harmed	by,	or	disagree	with,	existing	
structures	or	actions.	The	‘self’	is	a	site	where	we	try	to	process	the	internal	
effects	of	norms	and	injustices,	and	reconcile	our	emotions	with	our	politics	
(Brown	and	Pickerill,	2009).	The	post	modern	conception	of	identity	is	that	it	
consists	of	conflicting,	fractured	‘selves’	that	are	constructed	across	intersecting	
social	discourses	(Anderson,	2004).	Daily,	we	enact	‘selves’	that	are	complicit	
within	structures	that	conflict	with	other	political	identities	that	we	hold.	We	
may	experience	feelings	of	dissent	towards	a	particular	action,	and	it’s	the	choice	
to	embody	and	express	this	experience	constitutes	activism.	We	could	describe	
‘activism’	as	a	temporary	enactment	of	a	‘self’	that	demands	a	change	in	our	
behavior	or	social	structure;	or	the	active	process	of	embodying	our	‘interior	
dimensions’	that	conflict	with	an	existing	norm	or	practice	(Pulido,	2003).	Social	
movements	can	be	opportunities	for	individuals	to	engage	in	behaviours	and	
expressions	of	self	that	align	with	their	social	or	ecological	values	(Anderson,	
2004).	Through	participating	in	political	action,	alternative	expressions	of	self	
can	adhere	to	identities	of	activism	(Anderson,	2004).	While	citizens	may	only	
engage	with	activism	movements	temporarily,	it	can	affect	life-long	processes	of	
empowerment,	identity	formation,	and	political	consciousness	(Svirsky,	2010).	
From	an	individual’s	point	of	view,	activism	may	not	be	defined	by	one’s	
appearance	at	an	event	or	time	spent	on	a	project,	but	in	the	intricate	and	subtle	
ways	that	dissent	shapes	and	informs	our	imagination	and	expression	of	identity.	
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However,	participation	in	activism	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	self-identification	
as	an	‘activist’.	Chris	Bobel	(2007)	found	that	many	participants	in	a	movement	
did	not	consider	themselves	to	be	activists.	This	contrasts	literature	that	
positions	‘activist’	as	a	collective	identity	formed	by	participation	in	a	social	
movement	(Bobel,	2007).	It	is	useful,	therefore,	to	think	of	activism	as	a	practice	
or	performance	that	individuals	may	engage	in	at	discreet	points	in	time.	This	
creates	a	distinction	between	‘being	an	activist’	and	‘doing	activism’	(Bobel,	
2007).	This	highlights	the	temporary	and	contextual	nature	of	activism,	and	the	
blurry	boundaries	between	‘activist’	and	‘non-activist’.	People	may	assume	
certain	roles	for	a	short	time	or	in	a	particular	place,	but	distinguishing	these	
roles	as	‘activist’	is	not	always	straightforward.	A	reason	that	many	participants	
did	not	identify	themselves	as	activists	was	because	the	standards	perceived	
within	‘activist’	identities	were	unattainable	(Bobel,	2007).	‘Activism’	was	seen	
as	requiring	a	larger	degree	of	perfection	and	self-sacrifice	that	many	
participants	regard	as	achievable	(Bobel,	2007).	This	may	betray	a	wider	trend	
in	assumptions	about	what	activism	is,	what	it	looks	like,	and	who	activists	are.	If	
those	engaging	in	activism	could	not	comfortably	assume	‘activist’	identities,	it	
could	mean	that	their	assumptions	of	what	activism	is,	and	who	engages	in	it,	are	
largely	disconnected	from	the	actual	processes	and	diverse,	fluid	communities	
involved	in	dissenting	movements.	Activism	involves	a	wide	aggregation	of	
behaviour	and	identities,	some	of	which	persist	across	spaces	and	time,	and	
some	of	which	are	discreet	instances.	Conceiving	of	activism	as	practice	allows	
us	to	distinguish	it	from	the	identities	and	political	orientations	that	are	
commonly	associated	with	activism.	
			
From	the	discussion	above,	we	can	see	that	activism	is	a	diverse,	complex,	and	
multi-scalar	phenomena,	aimed	at	transforming	our	world	and	the	worlds	of	
others.	While	I	do	not	believe	political	action	has	to	be	public	to	be	considered	
activism,	in	this	thesis	I	will	narrowly	my	focus	to	activism	that	is	performed	in	
the	public	domain,	sometimes	involving	civil	disobedience,	which	attempts	to	
communicate	with	a	broader	public.	My	working	definition	is	that	activism	is	
active	and	embodied	dissent,	aimed	at	changing	a	practice,	norm	or	structure	to	
achieve	social	and	environmental	justice	outcomes.	As	the	vast	majority	of	
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environmental	harms	are	systemic,	I	believe	activism	must	involve	a	broader	
challenge	to	political	structures	and	power	inequalities	that	drive	our	behaviour.	
I	will	refer	to	the	aims	of	‘activists’	and	‘activism’	interchangeably,	although	I	
recognise	that	this	is	a	clumsy,	and	potentially	problematic	use	of	language.	
When	I	refer	to	‘activists’	I	will	refer	to	a	crude	aggregation	of	values	and	
practices	that	individuals	engage	with	when	they	participate	deliberately	and	
actively	in	social	change	movements.	Finally,	although	the	distinctions	between	
‘social’	and	‘environmental’	activism	are	imagined	and	constructed,	I	will	focus	
primarily	on	activities	dubbed	as	‘environmental’	activism.	One	important	aspect	
of	environmental	activism	is	that	it	tends	to	draw	significantly	on	the	biophysical	
sciences.	This	creates	an	interesting	relationship	between	science	and	activism,	
which	this	thesis	will	explore.	
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3				Exploring	the	relationship	between	science	and	activism	
	
We	live	in,	and	depend	on,	the	biosphere.	Geological,	hydrological	and	
climatological	systems	interact	to	spread	life	over	the	planet.	In	turn,	
communities	of	living	beings	affect	the	ways	these	systems	work.	This	makes	for	
an	irreducibly	complex	(and	irresistibly	interesting)	world.	A	world	science	tries	
to	explain	and	activism	tries	to	change	(Godfrey-Smith,	2003;	Young,	2001).	Both	
science	and	activism	have	rocked,	swayed	and	reinvented	our	societies	for	
centuries	(Godfrey-Smith,	2003;	Taylor,	2000).	Environmental	sciences	are	
producing	ever	more	ideas	and	knowledge	about	the	dynamics	of	geophysical	
and	ecological	systems	(Kropp	and	Wagner,	2010).	Establishing	the	impact	of	
human	agency	on	the	environment	is	exceedingly	difficult	and	exceedingly	
important	for	the	practical	needs	of	humanity	and	the	goals	of	science	alike	
(Phillips,	2001).	As	we	develop	our	understanding	of	biophysical	systems,	we	are	
also	changing	them	with	accelerating	speed	and	intensity	(Lambin	et	al,	2001).	
There	no	longer	exists	an	ecosystem	on	earth	that	is	not	affected	by	humans	
(Vitousek	et	al,	1997).	Enter	environmental	activism	from	stage	left	(usually),	
which	aims	to	influence	behaviours	that	affect	the	biosphere	and	its	living	
systems	(Chatterton	and	Pickerill,	2010).	Environmental	conflicts	and	
controversies	like	climate	change,	land	degradation,	pollution,	overfishing	and	
biodiversity	loss	intersect	with	environmental	science	disciplines	such	as	
biology,	ecology,	climatology,	oceanography,	and	geology	(Hess,	2011;	Venturini,	
2009).	When	I	use	the	term	‘environmental	science’	in	the	following	sections,	I’ll	
be	referring	to	the	scientific	narratives	created	within	these	disciplines,	which	
are	often	used	to	frame	and	understand	environmental	challenges	(Conde,	
2014).		
	
In	the	previous	chapter,	we	saw	that	gaps	often	exist	between	knowledge	
produced	in	the	environmental	sciences	and	our	environmental	policies	and	
behaviour	(Nursey-Bray	et	al,	2014).	The	work	of	environmental	activists	often	
intersects	with	these	gaps,	and	research	from	the	natural	sciences	often	informs	
the	work	of	activists	and	NGOs	seeking	to	affect	policy	and	behaviour	change	
(Martinez-Alier	et	al,	2011).	Yet	in	addition	to	addressing	this	policy	gap,	
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activists	often	take	issue	with	the	social	structures	behind	policy	processes	and	
decisions.	While	both	environmental	scientists	and	activists	attempt	to	affect	the	
course	of	environmental	conflicts,	their	values,	strategies	and	goals	can	differ,	
clash	or	align	in	different	contexts.	From	our	current	social	and	ecological	
predicament,	it	seems	fitting	to	ask	how	science	and	environmental	activism	
might	affect	each	other’s	causes.	Exploring	this	relationship	could	provide	useful	
insights	to	science	communicators,	who	often	attempt	to	bridge	communicative	
gaps	and	disseminate	knowledge	during	environmental	conflicts.	These	
communications	affect	the	trajectories	of	those	conflicts.	Current	discussions	
around	the	role	of	science	communicators	in	political	activism	make	it	timely	to	
consider	the	scientific	narratives	used	in	activism,	and	their	implications	for	
social	and	environmental	justice	(Roche	and	Davis,	2017;	Lamberts,	2017;	
Weitkamp,	2017).	
	
	
					3.1				Finite	and	infinite	games	
	
To	explore	the	relationship	between	science	and	activism,	I’ll	draw	on	the	theory	
of	finite	and	infinite	games	(Carse,	1986).	Humanity	plays	two	types	of	games−	
the	finite	and	the	infinite	(Carse,	1986).	Our	finite	games	are	fixed	in	space	and	
time−	there	is	an	end−	and	there	is	a	winner	(Harré	et	al,	2017).	Stopping	a	
particular	company’s	logging	project	is	a	finite	game—those	are	specific	trees	
you	are	trying	to	save,	and	if	you	stop	that	company	logging	the	game	is	won.	
Infinite	games	are	not	fixed	in	space	and	time;	the	aim	of	the	game	is	to	keep	the	
game	going	(Harré	et	al,	2017).	Keeping	a	forest	alive	is	an	infinite	game−	there	
will	always	be	changes	and	threats	to	contend	with,	the	lives	of	individual	beings	
will	start	and	end,	but	the	aim	of	the	game	is	to	keep	the	lives	coming.	Using	the	
concept	of	finite	and	infinite	games,	I	will	explore	the	relationship	between	
science	and	activism	from	four	angles.	First	I	will	look	at	the	ways	science	
positively	affects	activism.	Second	I	will	look	at	how	activism	can	positively	affect	
science.	Next,	at	how	activism	can	negatively	affect	science,	and	finally,	how	
science	can	negatively	affect	activism.	I	hope	this	discussion	will	give	both	
activist	and	scientific	communities	a	deeper	understanding	of	one	another’s	
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games,	and	how	our	finite	and	infinite	games	can	help	and	hinder	one	another.	
While	environmental	crises	are	escalating,	so	are	our	abilities	to	share	ideas	
about	our	world,	and	how	to	shape	it.	Let’s	look	closely	at	the	narratives	we’re	
creating	about	humanity’s	current	challenges.	How	might	they	be	affecting	our	
imagination	of	the	world,	each	other,	and	all	the	finite	and	infinite	games	we	
play?	
	
	
					3.3				The	games	of	environmental	activism	
	
Environmental	movements	can	be	transformative	forces,	drivers	of	social	and	
political	change	(Giugni	and	Grasso,	2015;	Touraine,	1981;	Wapner,	2002).	To	
explore	the	ways	that	science	and	activism	may	affect	one	another,	first	we	need	
to	consider	the	social	change	objectives	of	environmental	activism.	At	its	core,	
environmental	activism	endeavours	to	preserve	life,	and	the	capacity	of	physical	
systems	to	support	it	(Wapner,	2002).	It	can	aim	to	preserve	the	lives	of	
individuals,	a	species,	a	community	of	species,	or	unknown	numbers	of	future	
species.	Conflicts	over	environmental	protection	are	becoming	larger,	more	
diverse	and	transnational	(Gould,	Pellow	and	Schnaiberg,	2004).	In	spite	of	this,	
the	world’s	ecosystems	are	collapsing	under	human	influence	(Bland	et	al,	2017).	
The	environmental	movement	aims	to	alter	our	behaviour	in	order	to	avert,	or	at	
least	to	soften,	this	collapse.		
	
Environmental	activist	objectives	concern	the	interaction	between	human	beings	
and	the	non-human	environment	(Wapner,	2002).	The	vast	expanse	of	human	
desires,	and	the	elaborate	forms	of	organization	and	technology	we	create	to	
meet	them,	have	had	a	profound	impact	on	the	biosphere	(Stern,	2000).	
Environmental	activists	perceive	some	of	these	impacts	as	harmful.	I	say	
‘perceive’	because	people	do	not	share	a	homogenous	conception	of	‘the	
environment’,	or	what	constitutes	‘harm’.	Human	behaviour	is	environmentally	
significant	when	it	changes	the	distribution	of	an	ecosystem’s	materials	and	
energy,	or	alters	the	structure	of	an	ecological	system	(Stern,	2000).	Behaviours	
such	as	clearing	forests	or	dumping	pollutants	have	a	direct	effect	on	
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environments	(Stern,	2000).	Other	behaviours	can	indirectly	affect	
environments	by	shaping	the	social	context	in	which	people	make	environmental	
decisions	(Stern,	2000).	Indirect	behaviours	can	include	supporting	or	opposing	
policies	that	affect	our	interaction	with	ecosystems.	Environmental	activists	aim	
to	change	behaviours	they	regard	as	directly	or	indirectly	degrading	land,	air,	
water	or	species	diversity	(Wapner,	2002).	These	efforts	and	objectives	vary	
widely	in	terms	of	organizational	characteristics,	location,	focus,	ideology,	
political	stance,	and	inclusivity	of	other	issues	and	actors	(Wapner,	2002).		
	
Environmental	activists’	objectives	will	depend	on	what	dimension	of	the	
environment	they	value,	which	human	behaviours	they	perceive	as	harming	
those	dimensions,	and	what	actions	they	believe	would	alleviate	that	harm	
(Wapner,	2002).	Views	about	which	human	behaviours	are	damaging,	or	
whether	activism	has	a	positive	effect	on	the	environment,	are	contested.	Paul	
Stern	(2000)	makes	a	distinction	between	environmental	intent	and	
environmental	impact.	The	pro-environmental	intent	of	activists	in	their	
objectives,	strategies,	actions,	or	ideologies,	does	not	necessarily	correspond	
with	their	environmental	impact.	The	ways	we	perceive	cause	and	effect,	and	
environmental	change,	are	greatly	affected	by	our	norms,	hegemonies	and	
cultural	contexts.	For	example,	campaigns	aimed	around	better	recycling	
systems	may	be	publicly	perceived	as	having	a	positive	effect	on	the	
environment	(Pellow	et	al,	2007).	However,	the	effect	of	recycling	is	only	
‘positive’	relative	to	its	hegemonic	counterpart.	Recycling	temporarily	stems	the	
volume	of	human	waste	entering	ecosystems,	yet	it	remains	an	industrial	system,	
requiring	energy	and	material	input;	therefore	it	still	operates	as	a	consuming	
force	on	ecosystems	(Pellow	et	al,	2007).	This	shows	the	objectives	of	
environmental	activism	do	not	always	align	with	our	perceptions	of	these	
objectives,	or	their	environmental	outcomes.		
	 	
In	addition	to	this,	the	motivations	behind	‘pro-environmental’	activism	are	by	
no	means	homogenous.	Stern	and	Dietz	(1994)	and	Schultz	(2000)	describe	
belief	norm	theory,	whereby	people	demonstrate	environmental	concern	for	
markedly	different	reasons.	These	motivations	can	roughly	be	classed	as	egoistic,	
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social	altruistic,	or	biospheric	(Schultz,	2000).	In	other	words,	environmental	
behaviour	can	be	motivated	by	concern	for	the	self,	other	humans,	and	other	
living	things.	Of	course	distinction	between	these	three	classes	is	arbitrary−	
these	concerns	are	not	exclusive	or	independent	of	one	another	(Schultz,	2000).	
Perceptions,	interpretations	and	representations	of	the	self,	others,	and	the	
biosphere	will	differ	between	cultures,	and	between	people.	Schultz	(2000)	
proposes	that	we	value	other	people	and	dimensions	of	the	non-human	
environment	through	their	perceived	relationship	to	our	selves.	We	vary	in	the	
degree	to	which	we	include	other	people	and	non-human	beings	in	our	
representations	of	self	(Schultz,	2000).	I	agree	with	Schultz	(2000)	that	our	
feelings	of	connectivity	and	interdependence	with	other	living	things	will	affect	
our	environmental	concerns;	however	I	do	not	believe	feelings	of	inclusion,	
connection,	or	interdependence	are	necessary	to	form,	or	act	out	of,	concern	for	
others	and	the	environment.	The	degree	to	which	different	concerns	motivate	
activists	will	affect	the	scope	of	their	objectives,	and	the	outcomes	experienced	
by	different	people	and	ecosystems	(Schultz,	2000).	Environmental	activism	
motivated	predominately	by	biospheric	concerns	may	downplay	its	potential	to	
negatively	affect	groups	of	people.	When	concern	for	humans	is	the	prime	
motivational	factor,	activist	objectives	may	display	narrower	conceptions	of	the	
biosphere	(Holifield,	2001).	Environmental	activism	motivated	predominately	by	
egoistic	concern	might	obscure	the	effects	of	activism	both	on	other	people	and	
the	biosphere,	yet	activism	motivated	predominately	by	concern	for	others	and	
the	biosphere	can	do	harm	to	the	self	(Brown	and	Pickerill,	2009).	The	scale	and	
motivations	of	environmental	activist	objectives	are	heterogenous,	and	
outcomes	may	vary	in	their	alignment	or	abrasion	with	social	justice	goals.			
	
Both	the	formation	and	analysis	of	environmental	activist	objectives	depends	on	
how	we	socially	construct	the	‘environment’	(Taylor,	2000).	Dorceta	Taylor	
(2000)	advocates	a	social	constructivist	perspective,	suggesting	that	the	
‘environment’	does	not	refer	to	a	set	of	visible,	objective,	or	identifiable	
conditions,	but	a	set	of	shared	perceptions,	meanings	and	interpretations	
brought	about	by	collective	processes.	From	this	perspective,	‘the	environment’	
is	not	something	that	lies	outside	our	social	world,	but	is	encapsulated	in	our	
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assignment	of	meaning	to	our	social	world	(Taylor,	2000).	Differences	in	social	
location	such	as	culture,	race,	gender	and	class	lead	to	different	experiences	of	
the	environment,	different	relationships	with	it,	and	different	representations	of	
it	(Holifield,	2001;	Taylor,	2000).	This	in	turn	will	lead	to	differences	among	
social	groups	in	the	ways	environmental	harms	and	grievances	are	perceived,	
constructed	and	communicated.	Different	groups	of	environmental	activists	will	
have	plural	conceptions	of	the	‘environment’,	which	will	shape	the	development	
of	their	objectives	(Holifield,	2001).		
	
In	Western	nations	environmental	activism	was	initially	concerned	with	discreet	
conservation	campaigns	(Park,	2013).	Their	main	objectives	included	wilderness	
preservation	and	encouraging	conservative	use	of	resources.	These	movements	
were	characterized	by	the	Romantic	Environmental	Paradigm	(REP),	and	
included	many	middle	to	upper	class	professionals	who	benefitted	from	localized	
environmental	conservation	(Taylor,	2000).	After	the	1960s	there	was	a	shift	to	
the	New	Environmental	Paradigm	(NEP),	which	expanded	activist	objectives	to	
address	wider	social,	economic	and	political	regimes	that	contributed	to	
environmental	degradation	(Park,	2013;	Taylor,	2000).	The	objectives	fostered	
by	the	NEP	involve	incremental	changes	to	the	socio-political	system,	which	is	
still	characteristic	of	many	mainstream	environmental	movements	(Taylor,	
2000).	Rigorous	critiques	have	been	leveled	at	objectives	born	out	of	the	REP	
and	the	NEP,	for	they	often	rest	on	inherently	racist	and	classist	constructions	of	
the	environment	and	environmental	controversies	(Sandler	and	Pezzulo,	2007).	
These	critiques	and	revelations	lead	to	the	rise	of	the	Environmental	Justice	
Paradigm	(EJP),	which	challenged	the	traditional,	more	narrowly	conceived	
objectives	of	the	REP	and	NEP	(Holifield,	2001;	Taylor,	2000).	The	EJP	constructs	
and	communicates	environmental	conflicts	differently	based	on	the	recognitions	
that	environmental	injustice	is	inextricable	from	social	discrimination,	and	that	
people	of	colour	have	fundamentally	different	environmental	experiences	to	
white	people	(Taylor,	2000).		
	
The	EJP	arose	in	response	to	the	social	inequality,	power	imbalances	and	conflict	
central	to	our	relationship	with	ecosystems	(Gould,	Pellow	and	Schnaiberg,	
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2004).	While	the	effects	of	industrial	operations	and	waste	are	borne	by	‘the	
commons’,	we	do	not	share	common	experiences	of	those	effects	(Gould,	Pellow	
and	Schnaiberg,	2004).	Environmental	racism	constitutes	discrimination	in	
environmental	decision-making,	the	targeted	exposure	of	marginalised	
communities	to	toxic	waste,	and	the	exclusion	of	people	of	colour	from	
mainstream	environmental	movements	(Holifield,	2001).	By	making	issues	of	
race,	class,	gender	and	culture	more	central	components	of	environmental	
activism,	the	EJP	addresses	the	processes	of	colonial	violence,	dispossession,	
marginalization	and	oppression	that	have	fundamentally	altered	interactions	
and	relationships	between	people	of	colour	and	ecosystems	(Taylor,	2000;	
Holifield,	2001).	The	EJP	has	lead	many	environmental	activists	to	develop	more	
contentious	and	multifaceted	objectives	to	address	socio-economic	and	political	
systems	that	a)	render	some	groups	more	vulnerable	with	the	degradation	of	
ecosystems	and	b)	entrench	inequalities	in	the	ways	the	effects	of	environmental	
degradation	are	distributed	or	experienced	(Gould,	Pellow	and	Schnaiberg,	
2004).	
	
The	varied	campaigns,	objectives,	and	actions	of	environmental	activists	can	still	
roughly	be	classed	as	arising	from	the	REP,	the	NEP	or	the	EJP	(Taylor,	2000).	
Objectives	will	take	a	variety	of	forms−	both	finite	and	infinite	games	get	played	
in	the	environmental	movement	(Harré	et	al,	2017).	The	environmental	sciences	
can	feed	into	these	games	and	affect	their	trajectories.	The	finite	games	of	
activists	involve	the	objectives	you	can	achieve,	in	a	place	or	in	a	time.	For	
example,	a	finite	game	to	stop	a	coalmine	from	opening,	to	change	a	law	for	
marine	protection,	to	ban	an	object	like	plastic	bags,	or	a	practice	like	whaling.	
Finite	games	dominate	much	of	the	communications	of	environmental	activism,	
as	campaigns	are	most	effective	when	they	clearly	state	actionable	and	
achievable	goals.	The	infinite	games	environmental	activism	plays	are	harder	to	
place	on	a	map	or	a	calendar,	but	they	fundamentally	affect	our	relationship	with	
the	environment,	and	all	the	finite	games	we	play	within	it.	Activists	play	infinite	
games	to	shape	narratives,	discourses,	cultural	systems	of	symbolism,	meaning,	
patterns	and	norms	(Wapner,	2002).	Infinite	games	can	be	played	for	intangible	
things—like	perceptions,	relationships,	emotional	connections,	and	values	like	
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love,	care,	justice	and	equality.	There	are	infinite	games	to	tease	out	the	
internalized	‘social	fields’	of	power	and	relationships	that	influence	our	cultural	
understanding	and	behavior	(Wapner,	2002).	For	example,	an	infinite	game	
might	be	to	address	our	internalized	biases	that	keep	the	experiences	of	other	
people,	or	non-people,	less	visible	to	us.	There	is	no	end	to	that	game,	as	we	are	
continually	learning	and	changing	in	the	ways	we	see	one	another.	
Communication	is	another	example	of	an	infinite	game.	What	we	have	the	
capacity	to	experience	changes,	and	what	we	have	the	capacity	to	communicate	
changes,	but	we	will	forever	be	approaching	our	ability	to	communicate	the	
human	experience	in	full.	These	are	the	infinite	games	we	play	and	learn	by	
playing,	and	they	won’t	finish	until	we	do.	The	changeability	of	both	ecosystems	
and	society	means	there	is	no	clear	or	stagnant	model	for	what	a	healthy	
relationship	between	humans	and	environments	look	like,	but	environmental	
activists	strive	for	it	nonetheless.	
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4					How	does	science	positively	influence		
environmental	activism?	
	
The	natural	sciences	yield	knowledge	about	biophysical	systems,	how	we	affect	
them,	and	how	we	can	live	more	safely	within	them.	Science	is	often	mobilized	as	
a	tool	for	pursuing	environmental	justice	(Conde,	2014).	In	the	following	section,	
I	will	look	at	ways	science	positively	influences	environmental	activism.		
	
• How	does	science	help	activist	groups	challenge	environmental	
behaviour?	
• How	does	science	empower	communities	in	socio-environmental	
conflicts?		
• How	does	science	contribute	to	activists’	credibility?		
	
	
4.1		How	does	science	help	activists	challenge	environmental						 		
	 		behaviour?	
	
While	environmental	activists	try	to	convince	us	that	some	of	our	interactions	
with	ecosystems	are	harmful,	the	environmental	sciences	try	to	shed	light	on	the	
ways	humans	change	ecosystems.	Descriptions	like	‘degradation’	and	‘harm’	are	
subjective	and	often	anthropocentric,	but	I	interpret	ecological	harm	to	be	
actions	that	reduce	a	system’s	capacity	to	support	an	abundance	and	diversity	of	
life	(Bradley	et	al,	2012).	The	combination	of	capitalism,	global	trade,	and	
commercialism	means	that	most	peoples’	patterns	of	consumption	in	wealthy	
nations	are	sustained	by	industrial	alteration	of	ecosystems	(Gould,	Pellow	and	
Schnaiberg,	2004).	If	it’s	not	grown,	it’s	mined—so	the	saying	refers	to	
everything	we	consume.	Where	‘it’	grows	and	how	‘it’	is	mined	is	usually	
invisible	to	us;	not	to	mention	the	who’s	that	harvest,	catch,	or	mine	‘it’.	In	a	
globalized	world,	we	live	at	increasing	distances	from	the	production	processes	
of	materials	we	connect	with	(Gould,	Pellow	and	Schnaiberg,	2004).	The	
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environmental	effects	of	our	behaviour	are	not	visible	or	easily	anticipated	from	
the	social	location	of	our	decisions.		
	
Our	patterns	of	consumption	are	largely	determined	and	driven	by	production,	
as	outlined	in	Allan	Schnaiberg’s	‘treadmill	of	production’	theory	(Gould,	Pellow	
and	Schnaiberg,	2004).	The	theory	shows	that	production	processes	evolved	to	
take	less	time	and	human	labour,	but	to	take	more	environmental	materials	and	
energy.	While	consumers	may	‘choose’	between	the	products	available	to	them,	
decisions	regarding	production	methods,	materials,	technologies,	ecological	
entities	and	human	labour	are	beyond	their	realms	of	choice	(Gould,	Pellow	and	
Schnaider,	2004).	Positioned	at	the	very	end	of	the	treadmill,	we	sit	at	various	
stages	of	unawareness	of	the	processes	that	bring	us	the	majority	of	what	we	see,	
eat	and	touch.	We	live	largely	unconscious	of	what	our	system	takes	to	function.	
From	land	to	ocean	to	climate,	our	impact	is	indescribable,	but	science	tries	to	
describe	it.	Science	can	help	identify,	describe,	and	make	visible	some	of	the	
environmental	impacts	of	behaviours	entrenched	in	our	socio-economic	system,	
thus	giving	activist	groups	more	substantial	grounds	to	contest	them	(Young,	
2001;	Wapner,	2002;	Gould,	Pellow	and	Schnaiberg,	2004).	Knowledge	yielded	in	
the	sciences	can	help	bring	us	closer	to	the	distant	effects	of	our	system,	and	help	
close	the	gap	of	understanding	between	the	decisions	we	make	and	the	impact	
they	have.	
	
Case	study:	
	
For	much	of	the	population	in	wealthy	countries,	purchasing	food	from	
supermarkets	is	a	behavioural	norm.	The	vast	commercial	availability	of	fish	
makes	it	difficult	to	convince	publics	that	many	species	are	overfished	and	in	
rapid	decline.	Supermarket	shelves	stocked	with	fish	are	visible	to	many	of	us−	
population	collapses	are	not.	Our	ability	to	take	fish	from	the	sea	often	outstrips	
our	ability	to	see	what’s	left.	Untold	unknowns	are	at	play	in	the	ocean,	making	
any	assessment	of	the	world’s	fish	populations	exceedingly	difficult	(Jackson	et	
al,	2001;	Clover,	2004).	The	2009	advocacy	documentary,	‘The	End	of	the	Line’,	
casts	a	light	on	the	devastation	of	the	ocean’s	ecosystems	at	the	hands	of	
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industrial	fisheries	(Hird	and	Murray,	2009).	Directed	by	Rupert	Murray,	the	film	
is	a	good	example	of	science-informed	activism.	It	explores	overfishing	through	
interviews	with	marine	ecologists,	fisheries	scientists,	members	of	indigenous	
communities	and	ex-fishermen.	The	combined	knowledge	of	fish	population	
dynamics,	food	webs,	environmental	pressures,	and	industrial	catch	rates	to	help	
map	the	extent	of	overfishing	and	its	effects	(Jackson	et	al,	2001).	The	stories	link	
corporate	exploitation	of	the	oceans,	poor	government	regulation,	and	increased	
fish	consumption	to	steep	drops	in	fish	populations,	biodiversity,	and	overall	
ecological	decline	(Clover,	2004;	Hird	and	Murray,	2009).	This	degradation	of	
marine	ecosystems	contributes	to	economic	instability	and	food	insecurity	for	
coastal	communities	around	the	world	(Clover,	2004;	Hird	and	Murray,	2009).	
The	marine	science	communicated	throughout	the	documentary	shows	viewers	
how	patterns	of	consumption	and	production	fit	into	the	broader	global	patterns	
of	ecosystem	change.		
	
By	incorporating	knowledge	from	fisheries	and	marine	scientists	into	‘The	End	
of	the	Line’,	producers	were	able	to	make	the	implications	of	our	behaviour	more	
visible.	Scientists	were	also	able	to	make	predictions	about	the	future	ecological	
consequences	of	industrial	fishing	if	it	continues	unchecked	(Hird	and	Murray,	
2009).	Heavily	exploited	species	like	Blue	Fin	tuna	are	expected	to	be	extinct	
before	2050	(Hird	and	Murray,	2009).	This	gave	the	film	grounds	to	challenge	
the	inadequate	regulation	by	governments;	the	ecologically	destructive	practices	
of	fishing	industries,	and	citizens’	consumption	of	endangered	species	(Clover,	
2004).	Around	the	film’s	release,	activists	launched	websites	that	collated	
research	from	the	Marine	Stewardship	Council	on	the	sustainability	status	of	fish	
species	sold	in	supermarkets	(Levitt	and	Thomas,	2011).	Greenpeace	activists	
also	orchestrated	a	stunt	against	a	restaurant	serving	Bluefin	tuna	in	London	
(Levitt	and	Thomas,	2011).	The	combined	pressure	of	these	tactics	saw	Marks	&	
Spencer	terminate	their	sale	of	Bluefin	tuna,	while	Waitrose	and	Sainsburys	
supermarkets	reported	an	increase	in	sales	of	sustainable	fish	species	following	
the	release	of	the	film	and	websites	(Levitt	and	Thomas,	2011).	Richard	
Harrington,	spokesperson	for	the	MSC,	said	‘The	End	of	the	Line’	had	a	lasting	
impact	because	it	connected	fisheries	management	science	with	marine	
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conservation	and	biodiversity	issues,	which	hadn’t	been	done	before	(Levitt	and	
Thomas,	2011).		
	
The	strategic	use	of	scientific	material	in	‘The	End	of	the	Line’	helped	advance	a	
number	of	finite	and	infinite	games	for	environmental	activism.	The	finite	games	
in	this	campaign	were	to	reduce	the	supply	of	threatened	fish	species	by	
commercial	outlets.	Another	successful	finite	game	was	achieving	a	measurable	
change	in	consumer	decisions	over	species	consumption.	Many	of	our	desires	are	
socially	constructed,	and	industries	play	a	large	role	in	constructing	those	
desires	(Schiller,	1996).	The	marine	science	communicated	in	the	film	might	help	
to	socially	deconstruct	our	desire	for	certain	fish	species.	However,	suggesting	
that	consumer	decisions	drive	the	behaviour	of	the	fishing	industry	would	ignore	
the	unequal	distributions	of	power	intrinsic	to	the	political	economy	(Gould,	
Pellow	and	Schnaiberg,	2004).	An	infinite	game	is	to	foster	a	culture	of	ecological	
responsibility	(Wapner,	2002).	This	documentary	made	visible	the	lives	and	
challenges	of	diverse	species	that	we	often	consume	without	question.	This	has	
the	potential	to	influence	our	cognitive	patterns	of	association	between	our	
behaviour	and	its	effects	on	others.	Marine	ecologists	demonstrated	that	our	
industrial	behaviour	is	causing	a	collapse	of	the	ocean’s	ecosystems	(Hird	and	
Murray,	2009).	Although	science	is	not	morally	prescriptive,	it	may	trigger	
emotional	responses	that	raise	uncomfortable	questions	about	what	our	
industrial	systems	take	from	earth.	By	extending	our	field	of	vision,	science	can	
make	us	more	aware	of	those	our	behaviour	is	ultimately	affecting,	which	helps	
citizens	hold	industries	and	government	accountable	for	their	practices	
(McCormick,	2009).	This	contributes	to	the	infinite	game	of	environmental	
activism	to	change	our	relationship	with	ecosystems,	and	to	foster	respect	for	
non-human	forms	of	life	that	share	the	world	with	us.		
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				4.2		How	does	science	empower	communities	in	socio-environmental						
	 conflicts?	
	
We	are	part	of	the	ecosystem	we	inhabit.	Rarely	does	ecological	harm	take	place	
without	collateral	harm	to	communities	(Schlosberg,	2013).	Socio-economic	
systems	that	incentivize	ecologically	destructive	behaviour	usually	rely	on	social	
inequality	and	exploitation	(Schlosberg,	2013).	Structural	inequality	can	be	
maintained	through	an	uneven	dispersion	of	profits,	risks,	resources	and	
environmental	impacts	(Paulson	et	al.,	2003;	Conde,	2014).	This	allows	the	
effects	of	environmental	harm	to	fall	disproportionately	hard	on	certain	
devalued	groups	(Schlosberg,	2013;	Cole	and	Foster,	2001).	Prevailing	socio-
economic	discourses	can	reinforce	socio-political	discrimination,	oppression,	
and	environmental	dispossession.	For	example,	development	discourses	can	
help	industries	maintain	control	over	land	and	water	catchments	(Conde,	2014).	
The	gap	between	those	with	power	over	environmental	policies	and	those	
subjected	to	their	worst	effects	forms	the	basis	of	the	environmental	justice	
movement	(Taylor,	2000).	Power	structures	that	drive	social	inequality	also	
drive	ecologically	destructive	practices,	and	an	infinite	game	of	environmental	
activism	is	to	challenge	those	structures.	Addressing	power	distribution	is	an	
infinite	game	because	power	is	in	constant	movement	and	flux,	with	non-
stagnant	groups	and	individuals	trying	to	gain,	or	regain	power	over	themselves	
or	others.	Science,	like	any	form	of	knowledge,	has	the	potential	to	affect	the	
balance	of	power	(Conde,	2014).	Creating	and	utilizing	scientific	knowledge	can	
help	marginalised	groups	pursue	environmental	justice	through	political	
processes	and	power	contestation	(Paulson	et	al.,	2003;	Conde,	2014;	
Schlosberg,	2013).		
	
Case	study:	
	
Globally,	market	incentives	and	mineral	depletion	are	driving	extractive	
industries	into	more	socially	and	ecologically	vulnerable	areas	(Conde,	2014).	
Increasing	numbers	of	activist	groups,	particularly	in	the	global	south,	are	
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collaborating	with	scientists	to	uncover	the	ecological	and	public	health	hazards	
posed	by	industries	(Martinez-Alier,	2003;	Conde,	2014).	Uranium	mining	has	
taken	place	in	Niger	for	over	30	years	in	colonial	and	post-colonial	conditions,	
leaving	power	imbalances	deeply	entrenched	(Conde,	2014).	Marta	Conde	
(2014)	documented	grassroots	organisations	co-operating	with	scientists	to	
address	the	impacts	of	mining.	Marginalised	residents	of	Arlit	and	Akokan	towns	
are	heavily	dependent	on	two	Areva	mines,	giving	the	company	power	over	
communities	and	sway	over	policy	decisions	(Conde,	2014).	After	a	number	of	
workers	died,	NGO	Aghir	in’man	collaborated	with	independent	radiation-testing	
laboratory,	CRIIRAD	(Commission	de	recherché	et	d’information	independantes	
sur	la	radioactivite)	to	gather	contamination	samples	(Conde,	2014).	Combining	
local	knowledge	with	the	scientific	expertise	revealed	a	more	complete	
understanding	of	the	mine’s	impacts	(Conde,	2014).	The	results	were	later	
published	and	publicly	released.	Accessing	and	reproducing	scientific	knowledge	
helped	the	activist	group	to	gain	legitimacy	and	visibility;	to	comprehend	and	
respond	to	hazards	of	mining;	and	to	challenge	misinformation	produced	and	
amplified	by	industries	(Conde,	2014;	Michaels	and	Monforton,	2005).	O’Rourke	
(2002)	describes	another	example	of	‘community	driven	regulation’	where	
community	groups	in	Vietnam	pressured	government	bodies	with	scientific	
findings	until	they	created	better	pollution	regulation	policies.		
	
Scientific	expertise	can	empower	communities	caught	in	environmental	conflicts	
by	identifying	the	scale	and	nature	of	industrial	threats	to	public	health	and	
ecosystems.	From	a	finite	game	perspective,	this	provides	communities	with	
immediate	practical	recommendations	to	alleviate	hazardous	effects.	Activist	
groups	can	increase	government	and	corporate	accountability	by	making	
research	publicly	available	(McCormick,	2009).	This	can	contribute	to	another	
finite	game	of	securing	safer,	and	more	equitable	environmental	policies.	In	
terms	of	the	infinite	games	of	environmental	justice,	the	collaboration	between	
communities	and	scientific	experts	can	positively	affect	their	self-determination	
regarding	health	and	surrounding	ecosystems.	Scientific	methods	can	uncover	
information	that	challenges	the	discourses	and	power	structures	that	keep	
people	subject	to	disproportionate	environmental	harm,	and	keep	environments	
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subject	to	disproportionate	harm	by	people.	This	remains	an	infinite	game	
because	we’re	perpetually	in	the	process	of	discovering	what	equality,	autonomy	
and	healthy	relationships	with	ecosystems	look	like,	and	how	we	can	move	
towards	them.		
	
						4.3				How	does	science	contribute	to	activists’	credibility?		
	
Whether	environmental	activists’	objectives	are	finite	or	infinite,	they	must	
attempt	to	communicate	them.	Socio-environmental	conflicts	involve	
disagreement	over	the	significance	and	meaning	of	an	aspect	of	reality	(Benford,	
1993).	What	we	determine	to	be	significant	and	meaningful	in	the	world	has	a	
bearing	on	how	we	represent	and	articulate	reality.	‘Framing’	is	the	term	social	
movement	scholars	give	to	processes	of	signification	and	meaning	construction	
(Gamson	et	al,	1982;	Benford	and	Snow,	2000).	Activists	must	‘frame’	their	
environmental	grievances	and	proposed	changes.	Framing	involves	deciding	
what	of	our	world	to	make	visible	to	others.	Activists’	framing	processes	will	
depend	on	their	construction	of	the	‘environment’,	how	they	perceive	harm,	and	
where	they	situate	the	cause	of,	and	responsibility	for,	that	harm	(Benford	and	
Snow,	2000).	Frames	become	the	interpretive	schemes	that	help	us	recognize,	
process	and	position	events	within	our	experience	(Goffman,	1974).	They	help	us	
attribute	meaning	to	our	perceptions,	and	decide	on	courses	of	action	(Benford	
and	Snow,	2000).	Environmental	sciences	feed	into	these	framing	processes,	
influencing	how	environmental	controversies	are	constructed	and	
communicated.	This	can	affect	how	credible	environmental	activists’	campaigns	
and	actions	are	taken	to	be.		
	
Dominant	social	paradigms	encompass	the	worldview,	values,	habits	and	social	
filters	that	people	use	to	interpret	the	world.	They	are	difficult	to	challenge	or	
replace	because	peoples’	identities	and	constructed	interpretations	of	reality	are	
entrenched	within	them	(Taylor,	2000).	Knowledge	produced	by	the	
environmental	sciences	can	help	give	activists	more	credible	grounds	to	
challenge	narratives	that	have	previously	dominated	in	environmental	conflicts	
(Conde,	2015).	For	example,	indexes	such	as	GDP	are	often	used	to	counter	
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activist	narratives,	yet	they	do	not	adequately	account	for	human	reliance	on	
ecological	entities	that	do	not	pass	through	the	monetary	economy	(Martinez-
Allier,	2003).	Water	pollution	and	deforestation	by	industries	may	affect	a	rural	
community’s	immediate	survival	needs,	but	through	a	GDP	index	such	ecological	
losses	will	appear	less	significant	relative	to	the	economic	incentives	of	
extractive	projects	(Martinez-Alier,	2003).	By	researching	peoples’	reliance	on	
their	surrounding	environment	and	the	ecological	effects	of	industry,	scientists	
can	create	alternative	indexes	to	rival	dominant	ones	like	GDP	(Martinez-Alier	et	
al,	2011).	This	knowledge	gives	activist	groups	more	credible	grounds	to	
challenge	narratives	that	downplay	the	risks	and	losses	that	are	invisible	in	
capital	assessments	(Martinez-Alier,	2003).	
	
Taylor	(2000)	observes	that	activist	groups	tend	to	shift	from	a	‘rhetoric	of	
rectitude’	to	a	‘rhetoric	of	rationality’.	Scientific	narratives	can	contribute	to	this	
shift,	as	they	have	historically	been	associated	with	values	such	as	objectivity	
(Haraway,	1988).	Governments,	institutions,	and	industries	often	‘counterframe’	
activist	narratives,	by	undermining	or	neutralizing	their	articulation	of	reality	
(Benford	and	Snow,	2000).	Activist	groups	can	use	scientific	narratives	to	
respond	to	seemingly	legitimate	counter-frames.	For	example,	campaigns	against	
oil	extraction	can	now	be	framed	in	the	context	of	the	global	climate	crisis	
(Greenpeace,	2018).	Climate	change	framing	can	counteract	diverting	assurances	
from	the	oil	industry	about	operational	safety	in	regards	to	spills	and	blowouts,	
and	combat	criticisms	of	NIMBYism	(not	in	my	back	yard)	leveled	at	anti-drilling	
campaigns.	Scientific	narratives	can	also	help	activists	reframe	campaigns	that	
are	labeled	as	overly	idealistic	or	emotional.		
	
Case	study:	
	
In	Namibia,	environmental	NGO	Earthlife	campaigned	against	the	expansion	of	
Rio	Tinto’s	Rössing	uranium	mine,	condemning	the	mine’s	ill-effects	on	the	
health	of	workers	(Shindondola-Mote,	2008;	Conde,	2014).	However,	Rössing	
denounced	their	campaign	and	claims	as	unscientific	and	emotional	(Conde,	
2014).	To	combat	delegitimizing	narratives,	Earthlife	collaborated	with	CRIIRAD	
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to	conduct	the	research	they	needed	to	launch	formal	challenges	to	mining	
legislation	(Conde,	2014).	The	scientific	expertise	of	CRIIRAD	gave	Earthlife	
more	credibility	when	co-produced	knowledge	was	presented	to	the	public	
(Conde,	2014).	This	shows	that	science-informed	activism	is	more	likely	to	be	
taken	seriously	in	institutional	or	policy	settings.	
	
Accusations	of	being	overly	emotional,	idealistic	or	irrational	are	common	tactics	
used	to	delegitmise	environmental	activism.	This	keeps	the	depth	and	
complexity	of	environmental	change	obscured,	and	plays	a	role	in	
disempowering,	derailing,	and	de-energising	movements.	Finding	new	
narratives	for	environmental	grievances,	and	our	options	of	response,	is	an	
infinite	and	daunting	game	of	environmental	activism	that	science	can	make	a	
positive	contribution	to.	
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5					How	does	activism	positively	influence	science?	
	
The	objectives	of	science	are	as	broad	and	diverse	as	the	persons	involved.	They	
span	across	a	vast	landscape	of	interests	and	values.	Although	mounting	socio-
economic	pressures	favour	the	production	of	industrial	or	profitable	science,	
many	scientists’	efforts	are	still	directed	at	producing	knowledge	for	publics’	
interests	(Frickel,	2004).	What	is	(or	is	not)	in	public	‘interest’	is	not	for	any	one	
of	us	to	say,	but	it	can	include	factors	like	health,	equality,	mental	wellbeing,	
ecosystem	quality,	and	safety	from	violence	and	environmental	hazards.	These	
issues	are	often	entwined	with	the	environmental	sciences.	In	my	working	
definition	of	the	environmental	sciences,	I	describe	them	as	the	cumulative	
methodological	efforts	to	observe	and	understand	the	density	and	distribution	of	
matter	and	energy	around	the	biosphere.	These	efforts	are	often	undertaken	in	
the	interests	of	affecting	our	behaviour	within	and	towards	ecosystems.	
Increasingly,	corporate	lobbying	is	influencing	the	environmental	decisions	that	
scientists	wish	to	affect	(McCormick,	2007).	When	science	synchronises	with	
political	movements	it	reveals	more	ways	in	which	science	can	be	used	for	public	
benefit	(Moore,	1996).	Collaborations	between	scientists	and	activists	can	
inform	the	values	and	strategies	of	both	activists	and	scientists	alike	
(McCormick,	Brown	and	Zavestoski,	2003).	I	will	look	at	the	following	ways	
environmental	activism	can	contribute	positively	to	the	environmental	sciences.	
	
• How	does	activism	increase	the	application	of	science	in	environmental	
conflicts?	
• How	does	activism	contribute	to	methods	in	the	sciences?	
• How	does	activism	contribute	to	the	epistemic	development	of	science?	
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									5.1				How	does	activism	increase	the	application	of	science	in							
	 							environmental	conflicts?	
	
In	the	face	of	rapidly	changing	ecosystems,	science	can	be	a	tool	for	social	change	
movements	and	environmental	problem-solving	(Kropp	and	Wager,	2010;	
Likens,	2004;	Skolnikoff,	1999;	McCormick,	2009).	Although	the	sciences	can	
help	establish	the	viability,	or	non-viability,	of	solutions	to	environmental	
challenges,	there	is	debate	over	the	extent	to	which	scientists	should	be	involved	
in	policy	advocacy	(Gray	and	Campbell,	2009;	Martinez-Alier	et	al,	2011).	Some	
authors	argue	that	scientists	are	ethically	obligated	to	advocate	for	their	
preferred	policies	(Blockstein,	2002).	Others	believe	scientists	should	contribute	
to	policy,	but	not	actively	engage	in	advocacy	(Lackey,	2007).	Activists	groups	
and	NGOs	can	help	alleviate	this	tension	by	advocating	for	the	policy	changes	
illuminated	by	scientists	(Gordon,	2006;	Gray	and	Campbell,	2009).	This	allows	
scientists	to	keep	their	distance	from	moral	and	political	interpretations	of	their	
research.	This	distance	can	help	preserve	publics’	faith	in	the	integrity	of	
research	processes.	Scientists	may	jeopardise	their	careers	or	future	research	
opportunities	if	they	are	perceived	as	having	a	partisan	agenda.	This	means	
there	are	times	when	activist	groups	positively	contribute	to	the	games	of	
scientists	by	being	politically	vocal	on	their	behalf.	Activists	have	more	freedom	
to	reframe	science	to	reveal	its	socio-political	and	ethical	implications	
(McCormick,	2007).	This	can	extend	the	influence	and	relevance	of	science	by	
putting	it	in	the	context	of	peoples’	social,	environmental,	and	political	
experiences.	
	
During	socio-environmental	conflicts	there	is	often	contestation	over	possible	
responses	to	an	environmental	grievance.	The	creation	of	Marine	Protected	
Areas	(MPAs)	is	a	good	example	of	tensions	that	can	arise	between	scientific	and	
local	approaches	to	ecological	restoration.	Developing	strategies	that	allow	
marine	environments	and	fish	populations	to	recover	from	destructive	fishing	is	
a	huge	challenge.	It	requires	integrated	knowledge	of	spawning	rates,	migration	
routes,	environmental	conditions,	and	population	buffers	(Lauk	et	al,	1998).	The	
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marine	sciences	have	a	huge	amount	to	contribute	to	the	development	MPAs.	
Governments,	scientists	and	other	interest	groups	often	favour	top-down	
scientific	approaches	to	MPAs,	because	of	prevailing	beliefs	in	a	positivist	
conception	of	science	(Weible	et	al,	2004).	However,	these	top-down	approaches	
often	fail,	as	they	sideline	citizens	and	local	knowledge	(Weible	et	al,	2004).	The	
positive	environmental	effects	of	scientific	strategies	are	compromised	when	
those	strategies	don’t	fit	into	specific	social	contexts.	Environmental	activist	
groups	can	facilitate	communication	between	scientists,	publics,	and	policy	
makers,	and	help	integrate	local	and	scientific	knowledge	(Gray	and	Campbell,	
2009).	They	can	mediate	the	tensions	and	conflicts	that	arise	between	actors	
who	advocate	for	purely	scientific	approaches	to	conservation,	and	those	who	
support	more	collaborative	approaches	(Gray	and	Campbell,	2009).	This	
contributes	positively	to	the	environmental	sciences	because	it	allows	research	
to	be	understood	and	used	practically	in	different	socio-political	contexts	
(Lundquist	and	Granek,	2005).	
	
Activist	movements	can	bring	scientific	ideas	onto	the	public’s	radar	(de	Saille,	
2014).	Grassroots	groups	and	NGOs	often	make	science	more	accessible	and	
relevant	to	communities	during	environmental	justice	conflicts	(Conde,	2014;	
McCormick,	2009).	They	also	combat	misrepresentations	of	scientific	findings	in	
the	media	and	political	discourses	(McCormick,	2009).	Industries	and	
governments	often	amplify	or	manufacture	scientific	uncertainty	in	order	to	
downplay	the	hazardous	effects	of	their	behaviour	on	public	health	and	
ecosystems	(Michaels	and	Monforton,	2005).	This	can	erode	public	trust	in	the	
value	and	reliability	of	environmental	science.	Activists’	investigations	have	
found	that	information	is	often	manufactured	or	withheld	by	powerful	interest	
groups	to	manipulate	public	discourse	(McCormick,	2009;	Muggli	et	al,	2001).	
Activist	groups	make	research	available	to	the	public	by	translating	it	into	
articles,	stories	and	reports	that	are	accessible	to	non-experts	(McCormick,	
2009).	Putting	environmental	science	in	context	can	help	publics	connect	to	
different	facets	of	a	socio-environmental	conflict.	Environmental	activists	have	
strategic	expertise,	along	with	media	and	communication	skills	that	help	them	
maximise	the	reach	and	influence	of	the	science	they	communicate.	They	can	
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also	identify	political	pressure	points	where	scientific	research	can	inform	and	
influence	the	attitudes	of	publics	and	policy	makers	towards	environmental	
conflicts.		
	
Case	study:	
	
When	the	New	Zealand	government	began	opening	up	large	areas	of	ocean	for	
deep-sea	oil	and	gas	exploration	in	2008,	activist	groups	around	the	country	
formed	a	network	of	resistance	(Bond	et	al,	2015).	In	2012	the	Exclusive	
Economic	Zone	(EEZ)	Act	made	oil	and	gas	exploration	‘non-notified	
discretionary’;	excluding	the	public	from	consultation	on	any	phase	of	the	
process,	including	seismic	surveying	and	exploratory	drilling.	The	only	groups	
consulted	on	the	Oil	and	Gas	Block	Offers	are	Iwi,	hapu	and	local	body	councils.	
At	local	council	meetings,	members	of	the	public	can	ask	to	speak	to	items	on	the	
council’s	agenda.	Oil	Free	activists	gathered	research	regarding	the	ecological	
effects	of	seismic	ocean	blasting,	the	predicted	risks	and	impacts	of	an	oil	spill,	
and	the	contributions	of	oil	and	gas	to	climate	change.	They	presented	this	
knowledge	through	deputations	at	the	council	meetings	discussing	the	Oil	and	
Gas	Block	Offers.		
	
In	Christchurch,	the	city	council	strengthened	their	submission	against	the	Oil	
and	Gas	Block	Offers	with	climate	research	provided	by	Oil	Free	activists	
(Christchurch	City	Council,	2016).	More	council	members	became	publicly	vocal	
about	the	issue	(Mitchell,	2016;	Small	and	Hayward,	2016).	A	media	article	
following	an	Oil	Free	deputation	quoted	the	group’s	claims	that	further	use	of	
fossil	fuels	would	contribute	to	rising	temperatures,	and	subsequent	increases	in	
disease	and	food	insecurity	worldwide	(Small	and	Hayward,	2016).	At	a	council	
meeting	in	Dunedin,	media	quoted	Oil	Free	activists’	claims	that	current	known	
oil	and	gas	reserves	cannot	not	be	burned	if	climate	change	is	to	be	limited	to	
two	degrees	of	warming,	a	claim	which	aligns	with	the	scientific	consensus	
(Green,	2015).	In	both	cities	some	council	members	resisted	discussion	of	
climate	change	in	relation	to	oil	exploration	(Green,	2015;	Small	and	Hayward,	
2016).	These	tensions	sparked	the	media’s	interest,	and	activist’s	claims	about	
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climate	change	were	given	more	space	in	their	articles	(Green,	2015;	Small	and	
Hayward,	2016).	This	suggests	council	discussions	and	media	coverage	of	the	
Block	Offers	would	have	been	much	narrower	without	input	from	the	Oil	Free	
groups.	
	
The	Oil	Free	groups’	well-researched	deputations	raised	the	profile	of	council	
positions	on	the	Block	Offers,	and	made	climate	change	more	central	to	the	deep-
sea	oil	controversy	(Green,	2015;	Small	and	Hayward,	2016).	Stevienna	de	Saille	
(2014)	describes	similar	scenarios	whereby	activists	choose	to	demonstrate	
through	more	formal	avenues	to	affect	social	change.	Activists	can	develop	skills	
to	communicate	scientific	information,	or	‘interactional	expertise’,	which	allows	
them	to	be	recognised	as	contributors	of	expert	knowledge	(Habermas	1969,	
1987;	de	Saille,	2014).	Grounding	values-based	arguments	with	scientific	
knowledge	can	help	activists	challenge	normative	discourses	(de	Saille,	2014).	
The	global	context	of	climate	research	collated	by	Oil	Free	activists	challenged	
councils’	normative	discussions	on	oil	and	gas	exploration,	which	are	often	
limited	to	localised	risks	and	benefits.	The	media	coverage	of	meetings	and	
deputations	allowed	environmental	knowledge	to	be	widely	disseminated,	
broadening	the	scope	of	public	discourse	on	deep-sea	oil.	The	councils’	
previously	limited	knowledge	of	oil	exploration	impacts,	combined	with	the	
media’s	validation	of	activists’	scientific	claims,	positioned	the	Oil	Free	groups	as	
valuable	sources	of	knowledge.	Activists	increased	the	uptake	and	application	of	
the	environmental	sciences	by	collating	and	presenting	research	strategically	to	
inform	the	attitudes	of	local	councils,	making	sharp	use	of	a	political	opportunity.	
	
	
							5.2					How	does	activism	contribute	to	methods	in	the	sciences?	
	
Environmental	activism	can	affect	the	direction	and	practice	of	scientific	
research.	When	activists	become	involved	in	scientific	endeavours	their	
experiences	can	help	inform	research,	and	facilitate	new	understanding	between	
publics	and	scientists	(McCormick,	2009).	Environmental	justice	groups	often	
integrate	public	health	issues	with	ecosystem	concerns,	and	have	contributed	to	
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the	development	of	new	concepts	of	science	such	as	postnormal	science	and	
public	ecology	(Bullard,	1990;	McCormick,	2009;	Gray	and	Campbell,	2009).	
These	allow	for	contestation	of	values	and	concepts	within	science	(Gray	and	
Campbell,	2009).	‘Co-production’	is	described	as	a	simultaneous	evolution	of	
knowledge	and	social	change	(Conde,	2014;	Forsyth,	2003).	It	refers	to	the	
processes	of	scientific	and	local	knowledge	being	gathered,	framed	and	diffused	
(Jasanoff,	2004).	Grassroots	environmental	groups	often	possess	local	
knowledge	that	is	invaluable	to	scientists	trying	to	establish	the	impacts	of	
industries	(Conde,	2014).	These	groups	can	often	mobilise	networks	of	local	
volunteers	to	contribute	to	scientific	research.	This	can	help	reveal	research	
gaps,	and	enhance	scientific	methodologies	and	findings.	
	
Case	study:	
	
Corburn	(2005)	described	activists	in	a	low-income	Brooklyn	community	calling	
attention	to	scientists’	inadequate	investigation	into	pollution	exposure.	
Community	activists	pushed	for	scientists	to	take	local	knowledge	into	account,	
and	to	involve	citizens	in	the	research	process	(Corburn,	2005).	A	collaboration	
of	science	professionals	and	residents	looked	further	into	the	effects	of	local	air	
pollution,	the	hazards	of	fishing	from	a	polluted	river,	and	the	high	asthma	rates	
in	the	Latino	community	(Corburn,	2005).	New	scientific	knowledge	was	co-
produced	from	that	research	and	integrated	into	policy	(Corburn,	2005).	These	
kinds	of	collaborations	can	affect	scientific	strategies,	findings,	norms	and	
methods,	but	not	without	controversy	(McCormick,	2009).	However,	Corburn	
(2005)	argues	that	this	type	of	co-production	does	not	compromise	the	value	of	
environmental	science,	but	enhances	the	value	of	other	types	of	knowledge.	In	
this	case	activists	were	able	to	push	science	professionals	into	including	
residents’	local	knowledge	in	research	processes,	which	lead	to	more	successful	
approaches	to	environmental	health	issues	(Corburn,	2005).	This	contributes	
positively	to	the	environmental	sciences	by	directing	research	to	areas	where	it	
will	have	the	most	social	relevance.	
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Additionally,	environmental	activism	can	contribute	to	the	practice	of	
environmental	science	by	attracting	public	attention	to	scientific	controversies.	
Activists	groups	publicise	scientific	controversies	with	their	campaigns,	acts	of	
civil	disobedience,	and	media	stunts.	In	addition	to	raising	the	profile	of	various	
scientific	endeavours,	this	can	affect	the	funding	and	resources	allocated	to	the	
environmental	sciences.	Environmental	activism	can	help	reveal	the	ways	
environmental	science	is	undermined	and	underfunded	in	comparison	to	
industrial	science.	
	
Case	study:	
	
Days	before	the	Paris	Climate	Talks	in	2015,	activists	in	New	Zealand	boarded	a	
government-owned	scientific	research	vessel	that	had	recently	been	refitted	to	
do	prospecting	work	for	oil	and	gas	companies.	The	National	Institute	of	Water	
and	Atmospheric	research	(NIWA)	vessel	had	previously	been	used	for	ocean	
and	climate	research.	The	taxpayer	funded	refit	allowed	the	vessel	to	be	
contracted	out	to	companies	prospecting	for	deep-sea	oil	and	gas	off	New	
Zealand’s	coastline.	The	activists	occupied	the	vessel	and	held	it	in	port	to	draw	
public	attention	to	the	allocation	of	scientific	resources	towards	private	
industrial	interests	and	away	from	public	and	environmental	interests.	The	
controversial	nature	of	civil	disobedience	granted	the	action	substantial	
attention	in	the	media	(RNZ,	2015).	This	allowed	communications	about	climate	
change	and	the	misallocation	of	scientific	resources	to	reach	a	wide	audience.	
Actions	like	this	can	highlight	the	market	forces	that	marginalize	environmental	
science	and	favour	industrial	science.		
	
These	examples	show	some	of	the	ways	activism	contributes	to	the	finite	games	
of	environmental	science.	These	finite	games	include	raising	interest	in,	and	
funding	for,	particular	research	projects.	Environmental	activism	can	assist	these	
games	with	their	media	strategies	and	public	awareness	campaigns.	Other	finite	
games	of	the	environmental	sciences	include	developing	methods	to	answer	
specific	research	questions.	Activist	groups	can	contribute	to	these	games	by	
facilitating	local	residents’	involvement	in	research,	and	calling	attention	to	gaps	
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in	research	questions	and	methods.	These	efforts	also	contribute	positively	to	
the	infinite	game	of	science	to	develop	its	processes	for	producing	knowledge	
that	helps	us	address	social	and	environmental	challenges.	The	game	is	infinite	
because	different	challenges	will	arise	in	perpetuity,	and	new	knowledge	will	
always	be	required	to	help	us	meet	them.	
	
	
5.3					How	does	activism	contribute	to	the	epistemic	development	of			
	 science?	
	
Developing	and	maintaining	epistemic	integrity	is	an	infinite	game	in	the	
environmental	sciences.	It	is	an	infinite	game	because	there	is	no	epistemic	
standard	that	we	can	know	of	before	we	reach	it,	and	there’s	no	way	of	knowing	
when	we	reach	it.	The	sciences	are	constantly	reworking	and	reimagining	their	
practices	to	produce	more	‘reliable’	knowledge.	Those	in	the	social	studies	of	
science	(SSS)	have	often	criticized	the	modern	sciences	for	presenting	itself	as	
objective	or	neutral	(Gray	and	Campbell,	2009).	Critics	maintain	that	science	is	
socially	and	culturally	contextual,	constructing	a	specific	representation	of	
reality	through	power	relationships	(Haraway,	1991;	Gray	and	Campbell,	2009).	
Political	activism	can	challenge	and	change	the	way	formal	knowledge	in	the	
sciences	is	produced	(de	Saille,	2014).	The	normative	discourses	that	inform	
scientific	disciplines	can	lack	(or	deliberately	exclude)	significant	information	
that	could	enhance	our	knowledge	claims	and	opinions	(de	Saille,	2014).	As	
environmental	activism	often	appears	in	opposition	to	many	hegemonic	norms,	
it	can	inform	science	of	the	power	relationships	and	cultural	assumptions	that	
direct	and	constrain	its	production	of	knowledge.	Environmental	justice	groups	
have	brought	to	light	the	racial	discrimination	embedded	in	many	environmental	
research	practices	(Holifield,	2001).	This	contributes	to	the	epistemic	
development	of	the	sciences	because	it	demonstrates	that	social	discrimination	
can	dictate	scientific	representations	of		environmental	‘realities’.		
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Epistemic	development	is	an	infinite	game	that	is	only	played	if	people	want	to	
play	it.	For	the	game	to	be	played,	potential	participants	in	the	game	have	to	
value	integrity	and	the	pursuit	of	reliable	knowledge.	Dissent	can	be	
epistemically	productive	(Medina,	2013).	Environmental	activism	can	contribute	
to	the	epistemic	development	of	the	sciences	by	holding	powerful	institutions	to	
account	for	their	knowledge	claims.	Activist	efforts	to	illuminate	the	actors	and	
strategies	behind	climate	change	denial	are	an	example	of	this.	The	‘science’	
manufactured	to	serve	corporate	oil	interests	is	not	always	peer-reviewed,	and	
can	lead	to	confusion	and	distrust	around	science	as	a	discipline.	By	
demonstrating	the	creation	of	misinformation,	and	the	public	relations	
campaigns	that	manipulate	public	and	political	discourses,	environmental	
activism	can	help	to	preserve	the	value	of	scientific	endeavours	in	a	world	some	
authors	are	describing	as	‘post-truth’	(Keyes,	2004;	Higgins,	2016).	Trying	to	
preserve	the	integrity	of,	and	respect	for,	the	sciences	in	a	‘post-truth’	era	is	an	
infinite	game,	because	the	very	concepts	of	‘truth’	and	‘integrity’	are	elusive.	
They	are	not	necessarily	achievable	goals,	yet	we	strive	for	them	nonetheless.	
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6					How	does	activism	negatively	influence	science?	
	
In	their	attempts	to	protect	ecosystems,	activists	often	aim	to	hinder	some	type	
of	human	activity.	But	activism	can	also	hinder	efforts	from	within	the	
environmental	sciences	that	aim	to	protect	ecosystems.	The	environmental	
sciences	aim	to	produce	reliable	knowledge	that	can	guide	our	response	to	
environmental	challenges,	and	also	to	preserve	the	value	and	integrity	of	the	
discipline.	I	will	explore	some	of	the	ways	environmental	activism	can	
undermine	these	aims.		
	
• How	does	activism	prevent	science	from	informing	environmental	
controversies?	
• How	does	activism	obscure	scientific	discourses?	
• How	does	activism	inhibit	engagement	with	science?	
	
	
6.1					How	does	activism	prevent	science	from	informing				 			 	
	 		environmental	controversies?	
	
Global	environmental	crises,	like	climate	change,	have	captured	the	attention	of	
environmental	scientists	and	activists	alike.	Keeping	ecosystems	intact,	healthy	
and	functioning	is	an	infinite	game	of	many	environmental	scientists,	and	by	its	
nature	it	can	never	be	‘won’.	The	environmental	sciences	try	to	enhance	our	
understanding	of	the	biosphere	and	how	we	affect	and	respond	to	environmental	
change.	Activism	contests	the	relationship	between	humans	and	ecosystems—by	
its	nature	it	is	controversial.	With	controversial	activism	comes	a	high	risk	of	
public	backlash,	which	can	create	stigma	towards	certain	actors	and	positions	
within	socio-environmental	conflicts.	This	can	have	an	effect	on	the	
environmental	science	community,	whose	knowledge	keenly	intersects	
environmental	controversies.	Many	activist	groups	use	sensational	tactics	to	call	
attention	to	environmental	injustice	(Fassin,	2009;	Juris,	2008).	These	can	
involve	‘spectacular	actions’	that	put	activist	concerns	into	the	spotlight	and	onto	
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the	political	agenda	(Fassin,	2009;	Kapstein,	2001).	Environmental	science	
associated	with	controversial	activist	tactics	risks	becoming	stigmatised.	When	
activists	perform	sensational	actions,	governments	and	institutions	often	
respond	by	delegitimising	or	trivialising	a	group’s	behaviour,	narratives	and	
campaign	(Juris,	2008).	Counter-framing	is	an	attempt	to	undermine	a	group’s	
articulation	of	reality	(Benford	and	Snow,	2000).	Powerful	actors	may	
strategically	cast	doubt	on	the	credibility	of	activist	knowledge	when	economic	
interests	are	threatened	by	campaigns	(Conde,	2015).	If	activists	have	
incorporated	scientific	discourses	into	their	campaigns	or	actions,	publics	can	
encounter	this	knowledge	in	the	context	of	these	delegitimising	counter-
narratives.	The	sciences	have	done	a	great	deal	to	establish	the	scale	and	urgency	
of	environmental	crises,	and	this	urgency	is	often	used	to	justify	controversial	
stunts.	This	can	mean	scientists’	work	to	build	knowledge	and	facilitate	action	on	
challenges	like	climate	change	can	become	linked	to,	and	tarnished	by,	the	
behaviour	of	activists.	
	
Activism	can	prevent	science	from	informing	socio-environmental	conflicts	by	
derailing,	distracting,	or	dominating	public	discourse	about	environmental	
challenges.	Environmental	activists	often	use	civil	disobedience	as	part	of	a	
strategy	to	interrupt	industrial	action,	or	strategically	in	itself,	as	a	‘stunt’,	to	stir	
up	media	and	public	attention	(Lefkowitz,	2007).	When	activists	perform	stunts,	
the	media	can	construct	them	as	irresponsible,	ill	informed,	irrational,	and	
disruptive	(Diprose	et	al,	2017;	Juris,	2008).	These	constructions	help	maintain	
the	status	quo,	because	those	advocating	for	change	are	presented	as	
unacceptable	or	‘other’	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	Activists	can	choose	tactics	that	
inadvertently	distract	publics	from	the	complexity,	nuances,	and	implications	of	
environmental	crises.	Sensational	or	controversial	actions	can	orient	media	
coverage	towards	a	group’s	action	on	an	issue,	which	can	dominate	the	media	
space,	overshadowing	knowledge	of	the	issue	itself.	Scientific	discourses	that	
could	help	facilitate	public	responses	to	an	environmental	challenge	may	be	
sidelined	or	underemphasised	in	favour	of	social	drama.	The	actions	designed	to	
make	an	issue	more	visible	can	paradoxically	keep	the	depth,	context	and*-*	
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complexity	of	an	issue	invisible.	In	these	instances	the	environmental	sciences	
can	receive	collateral	damage	by	being	incorporated	into	activism.	
	
Case	study:	
	
In	2015,	Greenpeace	performed	a	publicity	stunt	to	communicate	the	urgency	of	
climate	action	to	delegates	gathered	at	the	UN	climate	talks	in	Lima	(Collyns,	
2015).	Activists	trespassed	on	grounds	adjacent	to	the	ancient	Nazca	lines,	a	
UNESCO	world	heritage	site,	to	lay	out	large	material	letters	that	spelt	‘Time	for	
Change!	The	Future	is	Renewable’.	In	doing	so,	the	group	left	tracks	in	the	earth	
around	the	ancient	symbols,	damaging	the	fragile	historical	site.	Indigenous	
peoples	of	the	Nasca	culture	carved	the	lines	over	1500	years	ago	(Silverman	and	
Browne,	1991).	By	trespassing	and	causing	damage	to	the	sacred	site,	
Greenpeace	caused	widespread	offence	and	outrage	in	Peru	(Collyns,	2015).	The	
action	received	extensive	coverage	by	major	international	media	outlets	such	as	
Vice,	BBC,	The	Guardian,	and	NBC.	In	all	international	media	articles	the	action	
came	across	as	careless,	arrogant,	and	culturally	insensitive	(Collyns,	2015).	The	
physical	and	emotional	damage	of	the	action	undoubtedly	delegitimized	the	
message,	and	was	a	profound	distraction	from	the	controversies	inherent	to	the	
UN	climate	talks.	Well-established	NGOs	often	collate	and	distribute	scientific	
knowledge	during	socio-environmental	conflicts	(de	Saille,	2014).	When	NGOs	
demonstrate	poor	judgment,	it	can	affect	their	credibility	and	the	public’s	trust	in	
the	knowledge	they	provide.	Sensational	actions	like	this	can	derail	more	
informative	and	constructive	discourse	around	climate	change,	and	conceal	
opportunities	for	systemic	change.	
	
Case	study:	
	
In	addition	to	sensational	actions,	activists	sometimes	demonstrate	extreme	
behavior	that	can	lead	to	stigma	and	prejudice	towards	environmental	
campaigns.	In	Tasmania,	clashes	between	grassroots	activists,	police	and	loggers	
escalated	to	the	point	of	violence	on	many	occasions	(Safi,	2014).	For	decades,	
activists	have	set	up	occupations	and	sabotaged	commercial	logging	operations	
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to	protect	Tasmania’s	old-growth	forests.	In	an	article	published	in	the	Guardian,	
Michael	Safi	(2014)	begins	his	story	of	the	conflict	with	a	description	of	loggers	
arriving	to	work	to	find	human	excrement	smeared	over	their	equipment	and	
safety	gear.	The	article	proceeds	with	the	clashes	between	activists	and	loggers,	
and	the	painful	division	it	caused	within	the	Tasmanian	community.	The	
interpersonal	conflict	and	personalities	formed	the	train	of	the	story.	A	tactic	
that	employs	the	use	of	human	feces	deviates	rather	sharply	from	social	norms.	
It	is	easy	to	construct	this	behaviour	as	‘extreme’.	Commercial	logging	is	less	
easy	to	construct	as	‘extreme’	behaviour,	even	though	ecologically	and	
climatologically	speaking	it	has	extreme	consequences	(Milman,	2012).	If	
industries	can	link	environmental	research	with	‘extreme’	activism	they	have	
more	public	license	to	delegitimise	or	dismiss	it.	This	can	create	public	and	
institutional	prejudice	towards,	or	resistance	to,	the	research	and	
recommendations	of	environmental	scientists.	In	this	case	the	activists’	
behaviour	did	not	resonate	with	the	environmental	experiences	of	the	majority.	
Instead,	their	tactics	provoked	an	emotive	response	sufficient	to	divert	public	
attention	from	the	social	and	environmental	effects	of	commercial	logging.	
Tactics	like	this	can	help	the	media	maintain	status	quos	by	constructing	
environmentalists	as	unacceptable	or	‘other’	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	This	presents	
a	significant	barrier	to	publics	engaging	with	the	sheer	scale	of	ecological	change	
wrought	by	human	behavior.	
	
The	controversy	and	polarity	sparked	by	sensational	actions	can	dominate	
media	and	public	discussion	(Juris,	2008).	Fassin	(2009)	asserts	that	activists’	
tactics	are	not	always	directed	at	finding	meaningful	solutions;	it’s	easier	to	
make	strong	statements	about	the	need	for	change	than	it	is	to	change	things.	In	
both	of	these	cases,	activism	prevented	science	from	informing	socio-
environmental	controversies	by	derailing	public	discourse.	This	can	negatively	
affect	the	finite	games	of	science	to	provide	knowledge	that	enriches	public	
discussion	on	particular	environmental	conflicts,	such	as	deforestation	in	
Tasmania.	The	distracting	elements	of	sensational	or	‘extreme’	activism	can	also	
hinder	the	infinite	game	of	environmental	scientists	to	build	our	understanding	
of	the	biosphere	and	its	response	to	human	activity.		
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					6.2					How	does	activism	obscure	scientific	discourses?	
	
In	any	campaign,	environmental	activists	have	a	set	of	goals	they	are	trying	to	
achieve.	Science	is	a	part	of	the	wide	range	of	experiences,	values	and	knowledge	
that	contribute	to	activist	objectives	(Conde,	2015;	Brown	and	Pickerill,	2009).	
Activist	groups	will	cherry	pick	scientific	knowledge	to	support	their	actions	and	
campaign.	In	their	messaging,	activists	do	not	give	a	full	or	detailed	impression	of	
scientific	discourses;	rather	they	select	pieces	of	knowledge	for	their	
communicative	impact.	Sensationalising	certain	research	can	obscure	publics’	
understanding	of	the	science	intersecting	an	environmental	conflict.	Information	
can	become	distorted	through	activist	campaigns	(Fassin,	2009).	Environmental	
activists	communicate	science	with	a	view	to	prompting	a	particular	response,	
be	it	a	change	in	behaviour	or	change	in	attitude	towards	an	industrial	activity.	
Groups	may	take	knowledge	out	of	context	to	inspire	a	desired	response	from	
publics	or	officials.	This	can	inhibit	peoples’	understanding	of	the	spatial	and	
temporal	variation	in	environments,	and	our	relationships	with	them.	
Knowledge	particular	to	localised	environmental	conflicts	may	be	extrapolated	
out	to	broader,	more	general	campaigns.	Alternatively,	more	universalised	
knowledge	may	be	mobilised	to	address	localised	environmental	conflicts.	In	
both	cases,	there	is	spatial	and	temporal	discontinuity	between	the	
environmental	challenge	and	the	scientific	knowledge	being	mobilised	to	
address	it.	This	discontinuity	will	always	exist,	but	it	can	be	exacerbated	when	
activist	agendas	conceal	nuances	and	differences	between	environmental	
conflicts.		
	
Environmental	activist	groups	often	use	strategies	similar	to	those	in	marketing	
or	public	relations	to	secure	public	visibility	and	support	for	their	cause	(Fassin,	
2009;	Spar	and	La	Mure,	2003).	Securing	public	support	for	a	campaign	is	often	
achieved	by	creating	a	very	clear,	simple	message,	which	can	be	readily	
understood	by	publics.	The	strategic	need	for	clarity	and	non-ambiguity	can	
appear	in	tension	with	scientific	discourses,	as	the	environmental	sciences	are	
fertile	grounds	for	uncertainty,	limitations,	variables	and	competing	claims.	In	
their	efforts	to	be	clear,	inspire	confidence,	and	appear	right	activists	can	
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obscure	the	nuances	and	complexities	of	the	environmental	sciences.	Activist	
groups	and	NGOs	have	often	been	accused	of	instrumentalism,	whereby	the	
perceived	ends	justify	their	means	(Fassin,	2009).	In	cases,	NGOs	have	made	
false	scientific	claims	to	further	a	particular	environmental	agenda	(Fassin,	
2009).	Actions	like	this	can	have	serious	ramifications	for	publics’	understanding	
of,	and	trust	in,	the	environmental	sciences.	This	can	impede	scientists’	ability	to	
provide	publics	with	useful	and	reliable	information	about	environmental	
challenges.		
	
There	are	times	when	activist	and	scientific	communities	directly	clash	over	
responses	to	environmental	challenges.	In	these	cases	there	is	significant	
potential	for	environmental	activism	to	disrupt	the	efforts	of	environmental	
scientists.	Controversy	over	genetically	modified	organisms	(GMOs)	is	a	good	
example	of	this.	Genetic	modification	technology	manipulates	the	genetic	
material	of	organisms	by	transferring	it	within	and	between	species.	The	
applications	of	the	science	range	from	advancing	particular	industrial	interests	
to	combatting	malnutrition	(Mayer,	2005).	GMO	projects	vary	widely	in	their	
objectives	and	predicted	effects,	and	most	have	been	met	with	staunch	
opposition	from	environmental	activists	(Mayer,	2005).	Many	anti-GMO	
campaigns	are	values-based,	expressing	opposition	to	humans	altering	the	
physical	structure	of	life.	This	is	valid	in	itself,	however	the	campaigns	often	
default	to	messaging	around	unpredictable	and	hazardous	effects,	and	scientific	
uncertainty.	This	messaging	is	often	at	odds	with	the	information	put	out	by	the	
scientific	community,	thus	the	public	understanding	of	where	the	concerns	and	
risks	are	actually	thought	to	lie	is	obscured.	Activist	groups	successfully	created	
stigma	around	GMOs,	which	can	simplify	and	conceal	the	complex	differences	
between	GMO	projects,	their	potential,	who	benefits	from	them,	and	who	or	what	
is	put	at	risk.	This	tension	between	scientific	and	activist	communities	reveals	
some	of	the	ways	environmental	activism	can	distort	and	derail	scientific	
discourses	and	public	discussion.		
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Case	study:	
	
The	development	of	Golden	Rice	is	a	good	example	of	activist	and	scientific	
narratives	clashing	over	solutions	to	environmental	challenges.	Golden	Rice	is	a	
genetically	modified	strain	of	rice	capable	of	containing	far	more	provitamin	A	
than	other	species	(Paine	et	al,	2005).	Developing	more	nutritionally	dense	food	
would	contribute	to	public	health,	and	lower	the	amount	of	arable	land	needed	
to	meet	our	nutritional	needs.	Much	of	the	scientific	community	involved	in	the	
development	of	Golden	Rice	celebrated	its	potential	for	alleviating	malnutrition;	
however	many	environmental	NGOs,	including	Greenpeace,	remained	opposed	
to	its	distribution	(Mayer,	2005).	While	many	scientists	deny	that	Golden	Rice	
poses	any	risks	to	public	health	or	the	environment,	anti-GMO	campaigns	are	
often	centred	around	the	unpredictable	environmental	and	public	health	hazards	
associated	with	their	development	and	distribution	(Lu	and	Snow,	2005;	Mayer,	
2005).	By	framing	many	anti-GMO	campaigns	around	scientific	uncertainty,	
activist	groups	created	a	blanket	stigma	against	genetic	modification.	Each	GMO	
project	will	have	vastly	different	social	and	environmental	effects,	and	different	
risks	and	rewards	associated	with	it.	The	nature	of	these	differences	is	obscured	
by	reactionary	campaigns.	This	stigma	has	lead	much	of	the	public	to	reject	GMO	
projects	on	principle,	and	created	many	more	hurdles	in	GMO	research	and	
regulation	processes	(Mayer,	2005).	This	has	come	as	great	frustration	to	
scientific	communities	who	see	genetic	modification	as	a	solution	to	health	and	
environmental	crises	(Paine	et	al,	2005;	Mayer,	2005).	Hardline	and	polarised	
positions	can	distract	us	from	more	thorough	discussions	regarding	the	potential	
of	GMO	projects,	and	the	genuine	ethical	concerns	and	risks	associated	with	
them.	Furthermore,	in	campaign	communications	activist	groups	can	conflate	the	
environmental	and	social	health	risks	of	genetic	engineering	with	the	hazards	of	
corporate	control,	power	abuse	and	industrial	malpractice.	This	can	create	
confusion	between	the	dangers	posed	by	GM	science	itself,	and	the	dangers	of	
power	inequality.	Obscuring	the	scientific	landscape	of	an	issue	can	prevent	
more	rigorous	discussions	about	the	moral	implications	of	GMOs	from	taking	
place.	This	impedes	environmental	scientists’	efforts	to	explore	and	develop	
options	of	response	to	environmental	crises.	It	also	harms	constructive	dialogues	
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between	scientists	and	publics—an	infinite	game	that,	although	not	always	
explicit	in	scientific	practices,	affects	the	production	and	use	of	scientific	
knowledge	in	global	environmental	conflicts.	
	
	
6.3					How	does	activism	inhibit	engagement	with	science?	
	
Responding	to	environmental	crises	requires	us	to	be	receptive	to	knowledge	of	
an	issue	and	the	courses	of	action	available	to	us.	Many	powerful	institutions	
have	a	vested	interest	in	directing	public	attention	away	from	the	implications	of	
environmental	science	research	(Conde,	2014).	Knowledge	uncovered	by	the	
environmental	sciences	can	improve	our	capacity	to	respond	to,	and	mitigate	the	
impacts	of	collapsing	ecosystems	(Kropp	and	Wagner,	2010).	However,	
knowledge	alone	is	not	enough.	To	face	our	current	challenges	we	need	a	
collective	response	to	knowledge.	Finding	resourceful	ways	to	build	community	
resilience,	restore	ecosystems,	and	alleviate	the	effects	of	environmental	hazards	
requires	that	we	communicate	and	co-operate	with	one	another	well.	There	are	
times	when	activism	can	hinder	the	ability	of	communities	to	be	receptive	to	
environmental	knowledge,	and	to	find	the	common	ground	needed	to	
communicate,	co-operate	and	act	collectively	in	the	face	of	challenges	
(Chatterton,	2006).	This	usually	happens	when	activists	rely	on	combative	
tactics	that	polarise	publics	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	This	can	prevent	the	
environmental	sciences	from	informing	our	response	to	ecosystem	collapse,	and	
from	positively	affecting	the	pursuit	of	environmental	justice.	
	
Although	climate	change	is	already	proving	catastrophic	for	communities	around	
the	world,	there	is	still	no	agreement	over	a	clear	and	meaningful	path	of	action	
(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	Authors	have	given	numerous	reasons	as	to	why	inertia	
around	climate	change	prevails,	including	global	complexity,	public	apathy	and	
helplessness,	and	no	clear	adversaries	(Chatterton,	Featherstone	and	Routledge,	
2013;	Randall,	2005).	Some	responses	to	climate	change,	like	carbon	trading,	can	
occur	within	the	frameworks	of	a	capitalist	socio-economic	system	(Diprose	et	al,	
2017).	Many	groups,	however,	argue	that	climate	change	cannot	be	addressed	
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within	the	system	that	caused	it,	and	advocate	for	more	radical	actions,	changes,	
and	politics	(McAfee,	2016;	Diprose	et	al,	2017).	With	no	consensus	over	what	
actions	should	be	taken	on	climate	change,	binaries	emerge	between	radical	
action	and	reformist	actions	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	Reformist	actions	occur	within	
current	political	and	economic	structures,	while	those	advocating	for	more	
radical	changes	often	find	themselves	in	conflict	with	prevailing	socio-political	
structures	and	practices	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	As	such,	environmental	activists	
often	engage	in	combative	strategies	of	power	play	that	mimic	the	art	of	war	
(Fassin,	2009).	Much	of	the	time,	political	activism	relies	on	the	construction	of	
‘friends’	and	‘foes’	(Chatterton,	2006).	This	creates	a	feedback	loop,	as	the	
activist	tactics	that	arise	from	polarising	theories	of	change	can	further	polarise	
publics	on	issues.	
	
Often,	activist	groups	strategically	mobilise	science	to	contest	power	
relationships	and	identify	opponents	(Conde,	2015).	When	scientific	knowledge	
is	continually	used	as	a	strategic	tool	in	political	power	negotiation,	people	may	
come	to	value	science	for	its	argumentative	power,	as	opposed	to	valuing	the	
knowledge	for	how	it	might	inform	and	facilitate	creative	responses	to	
environmental	crises.	As	environmental	activism	often	aligns	with	‘leftist’	
politics,	there	is	a	risk	that	science	communicated	by	activist	groups	will	become	
associated	with	a	narrow	band	of	the	politics.	Science	is	not	extricable	from	the	
socio-political	circumstances	that	shape	it,	in	other	words,	it	is	not	apolitical	
(Harraway,	1988).	However,	if	certain	scientific	knowledge	is	strongly	associated	
with	one	‘end’	of	a	political	spectrum,	it	can	become	stigmatised,	sidelined	or	
discredited	in	mainstream	discourse.	The	polarity	and	confrontational	
communication	that	activism	reinforces	can	distract	people	from	the	broad	
implications	of	the	knowledge	being	communicated.	This	can	prevent	richer,	
more	intersectional	discussions	of	responses	to	environmental	challenges	from	
occurring	amongst	publics	across	the	political	spectrum.	Division	can	limit	the	
ability	of	communities	to	address	broader	economic	and	socio-political	
conditions,	which	are	often	the	source	of	communities’	environmental	conflicts	
(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	
	
	 68	
Combative	forms	of	activism	can	prevent	common	ground	from	being	
established	amongst	publics	(Chatterton,	2006).	Recognising	shared	ground	with	
other	humans	is	an	essential	part	of	transferring	knowledge	and	collectively	
responding	to	it.	Paul	Chatterton	(2006)	describes	the	ways	egocentricism	can	
overshadow	collectivism	in	spaces	were	direct	actions	are	taking	place.	
Communication	between	activists	and	publics	can	break	down	during	invasive	
demonstrations	(Chatterton,	2006).	This	constrains	opportunities	for	co-
operative	dialogue,	and	reinforces	biases	and	divisions	between	‘activist’	and	
‘non-activist’	members	of	the	community.	Combative	situations	also	impede	the	
dissemination	of	knowledge,	as	people	often	resist	information	they	interpret	as	
a	threat	to	their	political	beliefs	and	identities	(Pulido,	2003).	This	can	inhibit	
communication,	entrench	stigmas	or	prejudice,	and	reinforce	narratives	that	
prevent	publics	from	engaging	with	the	effects	of	our	behaviour	towards	
ecosystems,	and	their	implications	for	humanity	(Chatterton,	2006).		
	
Case	study:	
	
In	May	2016,	350.org	launched	‘Break	Free	from	Fossil	Fuels’,	a	global	invitation	
to	take	non-violent	direct	action	against	fossil	fuel	extraction	(Diprose	et	al,	
2017).	Over	30,000	people	took	part	in	20	actions	around	the	world	(Diprose	et	
al,	2017).	In	New	Zealand,	grassroots	groups	focused	on	pressuring	the	ANZ	
Bank	to	divest	from	fossil	fuels.	These	investments	amount	to	13.5	billion	dollars,	
and	help	fund	companies’	extraction	of	oil,	coal	and	gas	(350	Aotearoa,	2016).	
Diprose	et	al	(2017)	interviewed	the	activists	that	participated	in	the	Dunedin	
protest.	Around	180	activists	sat	in	rows	to	block	the	entrances	of	three	ANZ	
bank	ranches.	In	previous	ANZ	actions	around	the	country	activists	had	only	
targeted	a	single	branch,	which	had	remained	closed,	but	in	Dunedin	the	three	
branches	remained	open.	Presumably	at	the	request	of	ANZ,	the	police	made	no	
attempts	to	move	or	arrest	the	protesters,	and	customers	were	encouraged	to	
walk	over	lines	of	seated	activists	to	get	into	the	bank.	The	groups’	tactic	to	
blockade	three	banks	put	them	into	direct	confrontation	with	ANZ	customers,	
who	were	not	the	intended	target	of	the	protest.	Blockaders	reported	angry	
reactions	from	passers	by,	and	physical	violence	from	customers	who	kicked,	
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pushed	and	stood	on	them	to	get	to	through	bank	doors	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	
Police	sanctioned	this	violence	by	actively	encouraging	customers	to	walk	over	
protesters	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).		
	
The	Dunedin	action	received	much	greater	media	attention	than	other	ANZ	
actions	because	of	the	escalated	conflict	between	customers	and	activists.	The	
most	widely	circulated	video	captured	an	eighty-year-old	woman	being	helped	
over	lines	of	activists	by	police	(McNeilly,	2016).	This	footage	sparked	a	far	
greater	public	response	than	previous	coverage	of	ANZ	protests	around	the	
country	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	Media	coverage	of	the	Dunedin	action	focused	on	
the	‘disrespectful’	behaviour	of	activists,	who	‘forced’	the	woman	to	walk	
through	them	at	her	own	risk	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	There	was	widespread	
outrage	at	the	customers’	ordeal,	with	large	volumes	of	comments	on	articles	
and	social	media,	including	accusations	that	the	protest	had	harmed	the	climate	
movement	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	The	disproportionate	amount	of	media	on	the	
confrontation	in	Dunedin	diverted	attention	from	ANZ’s	fossil	fuel	investments,	
the	scientific	consensus	on	the	hazardous	effects	and	urgency	of	the	climate	
crisis,	and	the	opportunities	we	have	for	collective	action.	
	
The	polarity	and	division	that	combative	activism	creates	can	affect	the	ways	we	
interact	with	environmental	knowledge.	Our	interaction	with	environmental	
knowledge	will	shape	our	interaction	with	the	biosphere.	Creating	reliable	
knowledge	is	an	infinite	game,	and	the	environmental	science	community	is	a	
player.	Knowledge	can	only	be	‘reliable’	if	we	can	rely	on	it	as	a	practical	guide	
for	our	thought	and	action	in	the	world.	For	knowledge	to	become	reliable,	we	
must	try	relying	on	it,	and	to	do	this	we	must	be	receptive	and	responsive	to	it.	
Countless	authors	have	lamented	the	inertia	on	environmental	crises	despite	the	
large	body	of	knowledge	and	response	options	available	to	us	(Chatterton,	
Featherstone	and	Routledge,	2013;	Randall,	2005;	Diprose	et	al,	2017).	Erik	
Swyngedouw	(2009)	argues	that	responses	to	challenges	like	climate	change	are	
impeded	by	the	self-correcting	power	structures	of	capitalism,	which	
delegitimise	alternatives	and	resistance	with	post-political	discourses.	These	
self-correcting	power	structures	affect	the	ways	we	receive	and	process	
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knowledge.	Narratives	that	reinforce	competition,	distrust,	and	division	between	
social	groups	hinder	a	collective	and	co-operative	response	of	the	critical	mass	to	
environmental	knowledge.	Actions	that	reinforce	these	narratives	impede	the	
infinite	game	of	environmental	science	to	help	inform	humanity	on	how	to	live	
more	safely	within	a	variable	and	limited	biosphere.	
	
Our	socio-economic	‘systems’	and	self-correcting	structures	of	power	are	the	
cumulative	effects	of	our	interactions,	with	one	another	and	our	environment.	
We	learn	and	perform	the	systems	that	surround	us.	The	ways	we	use	and	
communicate	knowledge	performs	a	pattern	that	we	demonstrate	to	others.	
Activist	campaigns	often	rely	on	the	construction	of	‘friends’	and	‘foes’,	echoing	
classic	narrative	structures	based	on	the	triad	of	a	hero,	a	villain	and	a	victim	
(Chatterton,	2006).	This	narrative	structure	is	familiar	and	allows	activist	
campaigns	to	be	understood	more	easily;	however	it	relies	on	division	between	
the	three	positions.	During	a	direct	action	or	campaign,	this	formula	is	used	to	
position	activists	as	‘heroes’,	‘victims’	or	‘villains’	in	media	and	public	discourses.	
This	simplistic	division	results	in	combative	actions	and	narratives	being	
deployed	to	address	our	environmental	behaviour.	In	the	context	of	a	campaign,	
science	is	often	used	to	assert	or	justify	a	position	in	one	of	these	three	roles,	or	
position	another	group	in	one	of	these	roles	in	a	narrative.	Combative	campaigns	
and	behaviour	by	activists	can	perpetuate	the	use	of	knowledge	as	a	tool	of	
division.	This	can	affect	peoples’	reception	of	environmental	knowledge	and	
perception	of	its	implications.	It	can	create	barriers	to	engagement	with,	and	
trust	in,	environmental	science.	If	knowledge	and	its	implications	are	not	trusted	
and	explored,	that	knowledge	is	not	given	the	chance	to	become	a	reliable	guide	
for	our	behaviour.	The	combative	narratives	perpetuated	by	activists	can	disrupt	
the	infinite	game	of	environmental	scientists	to	make	knowledge	of	our	changing	
biosphere	visible,	and	reliable.		
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7					How	does	science	negatively	influence		
environmental	activism?	
	
Increasingly,	environmental	activist	groups	are	looking	beyond	specific	
campaigns	and	calling	for	systemic	change	(Chatterton,	Featherstone	and	
Routledge,	2013).	This	demonstrates	a	growing	awareness	that	most	
environmental	harms	are	inseparable	from	the	unequal	socio-political	
relationships	that	enable	them	(Godfrey	and	Torres,	2016).	Climate	change,	in	
particular,	is	widely	acknowledged	to	be	systemic	(Godfrey	and	Torres,	2016).	If	
a	major	game	of	environmental	activism	is	to	strive	for	environmental	justice,	a	
requisite	game	must	address	the	power	imbalances	that	regulate	our	
interactions	with	ecosystems.	Changing	our	systems	is	a	complex	game.	While	
many	activists’	campaigns	traditionally	positioned	targets,	tactics	and	objectives	
in	tangible	locations,	socio-political	systems	of	inequality	are	created	throughout	
any	and	all	of	our	relationships.	Pursuing	systemic	change	requires	that	activists	
pose	a	deep	challenge	to	often-invisible	norms	of	interaction	and	communication	
(Lamberts,	2017).	Scientific	narratives	have	become	normative	and	‘status	quo’	
in	our	communications	about	climate	change	(Kahan	et	al,	2012;	Medvecky,	
2017).	These	prominent	narratives	influence	our	imagination	of	the	world.	They	
affect	how	we	perceive	and	interact	with	one	another,	and	how	we	create	or	
challenge	inequality.	In	their	letter	to	the	science	communication	community,	
Roche	and	Davis	(2017)	asked,	“Is	it	not	our	responsibility	to	call	out	inequality	
in	whatever	form	we	encounter	it,	be	it	social	inequality,	oppression	of	cultural	
groups,	violence	against	women	or	any	other	threats	to	democracy?”	(Roche	and	
Davis,	2017,	L01).	In	this	section,	I	argue	that	the	dominance	of	scientific	
narratives	in	public	discourse	can	prevent	us	from	encountering	inequality,	
oppression,	and	violence;	and	prevents	us	from	being	deeply	confronted	by	
inequality,	oppression	and	violence.	Consequently,	scientific	narratives	can	see	
systems	of	social	and	environmental	injustice	upheld	and	unchallenged.	The	
following	questions	explore	three	ways	that	science	negatively	influences	the	
games	of	environmental	activism.	Although	there	are	three	questions,	the	
themes	examined	in	each	section	are	overlapping,	interrelated	and	often	
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inseparable	from	one	another.	These	questions	explore	how	prevalent	scientific	
narratives	maintain	socio-economic	and	political	systems	that	activists	are	trying	
to	change.		
	
	
• How	does	science	constrain	the	social	imagination	of	environmental	
conflicts?	
• How	does	science	contribute	to	epistemic	injustice?	
• How	does	science	undermine	emotion	in	environmental	conflicts?	
	
	
						7.1					How	does	science	constrain	the	social	imagination	of		
																	environmental	conflicts?	
	
Our	imagination	of	the	world	affects	how	we	behave	within	it.	We	construct,	
contest	and	contemplate	our	conceptions	of	reality	by	sharing	imaginings	of	
what	the	world	is,	how	it	works,	and	how	we	experience	it	(Diprose	et	al,	2017).	
When	we	communicate,	we	can	reinforce	or	challenge	systems	of	inequality	by	
affecting	the	‘social	imagination’	(Medina,	2013).	Our	imaginative	inclinations	
are	affected	by	what	is	made	visible	to	each	of	us,	and	what	has	remained	(or	
been	kept)	invisible.	In	turn,	this	hones	our	selective	attention,	leading	us	to	
highlight	aspects	of	societies	and	environments	over	others	(Longino,	1990;	
Medina,	2011).	The	prevailing	social	imagination	that	we’re	exposed	to	affects	
what	we	learn	to	notice,	and	what	we	learn	not	to	notice.	We	become	sensitised	
to	certain	knowledge	and	knowledge	systems,	and	desensitised	to	others.	This	
shapes	what	we	‘know’,	what	we	conceive	as	being	possible	to	‘know’,	and	the	
ways	we	conceive	of	‘knowing’.	This	determines	the	kinds	of	environmental	
interactions	we	pursue.	An	infinite	game	of	environmental	activism	is	to	explore,	
or	re-explore,	healthy	human-ecosystem	relationships.	The	aim	of	the	game	is	to	
keep	healthy	relationships	going.	How	well	we	play	that	game	depends	on	what	
we	imagine	ecosystems,	ourselves,	and	others	to	be.		
	
	 73	
Both	our	ability	and	our	inability	to	relate	to	others	(and	to	particular	
aspects	of	ourselves)	is	mediated	by	the	social	imagination,	the	kind	of	
imagination	that	opens	our	eyes	and	hearts	to	certain	things	and	not	
others,	enabling	and	constraining	our	social	gaze.		
	
—Jose	Medina,	2011,	p.22	
	
The	social	imagination	shapes	and	informs	the	scientific	process,	and	
simultaneously	scientific	narratives	enhance	the	collective	imagination.	
Historically,	the	‘myth’	of	dispassionate	inquiry	has	granted	the	sciences	
epistemic	dominance,	giving	them	prestige	and	prominence	within	the	‘social	
imagination’	(Jaggar,	1989;	Nowotny	et	al,	2005;	Medina,	2013).	But	just	as	
scientific	narratives	can	open	our	eyes	and	hearts	to	certain	things,	they	can	
close	them	to	others.	When	science	directs	our	social	gaze	towards	certain	
phenomena,	our	gaze	can	be	diverted	from	aspects	of	our	relationships	that	
shape	our	perceptions,	our	knowledge,	and	our	behaviour.	Scientific	narratives	
can	conceal	and	perpetuate	social	assumptions	that	lie	at	the	root	of	structural	
injustices.	As	Alison	Jaggar	noted,	“the	modern	Western	conception	of	science	
[…]	reflects	the	imperialism,	racism,	and	misogyny	of	the	societies	that	created	
it.”	(Jaggar,	1989,	p.162).	Scientific	narratives	position	social	assumptions	as	
features	of	the	world,	and	the	epistemic	credibility	of	the	sciences	means	they	
are	less	likely	to	be	recognised	or	challenged.	Consequently,	science	has	power	to	
perpetuate	the	assumptions	and	prejudices	that	underlie	structural	injustice.		
	
For	example,	Emily	Martin	(1991)	describes	how	patriarchal	assumptions	and	
traditional	male-female	romance	narratives	heavily	influenced	biologists’	
observations	of	human	fertilisation.	Researchers	recorded	active,	competitive	
behaviour	of	the	sperm	on	a	‘mission’	to	‘assault’	or	‘penetrate’	the	egg;	and	the	
passive,	‘dormant’	behaviour	of	the	egg	waiting	for	‘rescue’	(Martin,	1991,	
p.490).	A	gendered	social	imagination	kept	early	researchers’	gaze	from	seeking	
or	seeing	an	egg’s	pro-active	chemical	processes	to	aid	or	hinder	fertilisation	by	
different	sperm	cells	(Martin,	1991).	Researchers’	language	to	describe	female	
sex	cell	processes	implied	wastefulness,	fragility,	passivity	and	dependence,	
while	language	used	to	describe	male	sex	cell	processes	implied	strength,	action	
and	efficiency	(Martin,	1991).	The	very	notion	of	assigning	cells	a	‘gender’	
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demonstrates	how	strongly	the	social	imagination	encourages	us	to	create	sexist	
divisions.	Gendered	assumptions	determined	the	ways	scientists	perceived,	
constructed	and	communicated	these	biological	processes.	These	observations	
formed	an	account	of	reality	that	assumes,	and	relies	on,	differential	attribution	
of	qualities	based	on	gender.	These	narratives	were	then	fed	into	the	social	
imagination.	Social	constructions	such	as	‘gender’	are	often	implicit	in	scientific	
constructions,	which	grants	them	legitimacy.	Because	science	proclaims	to	
describe	the	biophysical	world,	unjust	social	assumptions	embedded	within	
scientific	narratives	are	easily	imagined	as	characteristics	of	‘nature’,	as	opposed	
to	learned	patterns	of	relating	to	one	another.	These	learned	patterns	affect	how,	
and	who,	we	come	to	be.	Martin’s	(1991)	account	of	the	egg	and	sperm’s	
gendered	romance	provides	a	good	metaphor	for	this.	At	the	time	of	conception,	
cells	that	become	human	are	already	having	their	motivations,	qualities,	abilities	
and	limitations	projected	onto	them	by	onlookers.	Before	we	even	come	to	‘be’,	
what	is	true,	or	possible	of	us	is	already	being	guessed	and	assumed;	and	thereby	
directed	and	constrained.	Scientific	narratives	help	embed	unjust	assumptions	
into	our	processes	of	‘knowing’	the	world.	If	structures	of	inequality	manifest	in	
our	imaginations	of	one	another	and	ourselves,	then	science	can	maintain	these	
structures	by	acting	as	a	vehicle	for	assumptions	that	create	prejudice	and	power	
imbalance	between	people.	This	hinders	environmental	activists’	play	in	the	
game	for	environmental	injustice	by	perpetuating	systemic	inequality.			
	
Scientific	frames	are	usually	favoured	to	make	complex	crises	like	climate	change	
visible	and	conceptually	available	(Kahan	et	al,	2012;	Medvecky,	2017).	This	
means	scientific	narratives	contribute	significantly	to	the	social	imagination	of	
environmental	conflicts.	Public	and	political	discussions	refer	to	climate	change	
as	it	is	understood	and	framed	by	science	(Taylor	et	al,	2003).	Consequently,	
environmental	activists	often	appeal	to	science	for	explanations	of	climate	
change	causes	and	responses.	However,	valuing	science	as	a	resource	for	
addressing	environmental	challenges	is	different	from	accepting	science’s	
framing	of	those	challenges	(Irwin	and	Wynne,	1996).	The	narrowness	and	
particularity	of	these	frames	may	not	be	acknowledged	because	they	reflect	the	
social	context	of	dominant	groups	(Forsyth,	2003).	Science	tells	climate	change	
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as	a	story	of	rising	emissions,	parts	per	million	of	carbon	in	the	atmosphere,	
fossil	fuels,	global	temperature	rise,	and	changing	weather	patterns.	These	
stories	allow	us	to	separate	the	physical	manifestations	of	climate	change	from	
the	social	relations	that	drive	our	environmental	behaviour	(Giddens,	2009;	
Chatterton,	Featherstone	and	Routledge,	2013).	While	stories	of	energy	use	and	
the	greenhouse	effect	are	most	familiar	to	many	of	us,	climate	change	is	also	a	
story	of	colonisation,	oppression,	racism,	social	exploitation,	and	cultural	
genocide	(Powys	Whyte,	2017).	Scientific	narratives,	however,	typically	locate	
the	causes	of	climate	change	at	the	extraction	and	combustion	of	fossil	fuels.	
They	divert	our	social	gaze	from	the	power	relationships	and	systemic	violence	
that	precede	climate-changing	actions.	The	epistemic	dominance	of	the	sciences	
allows	the	causes	located	and	emphasised	by	science	to	become	more	rigid,	more	
real,	in	the	social	imagination.	This	prevents	people	from	acknowledging	
fundamental	and	interconnected	reasons	for	the	climate	crisis	(Shellenberger	
and	Nordhaus,	2009).	Scientific	explanations	allow	us	to	imagine	climate	
change’s	causes	and	responses	without	deep	and	critical	reflection	on	how	
aspects	of	our	inter	and	intrapersonal	relationships	constitute	inequality	
colonialism	and	oppression.	This	makes	many	scientific	narratives	complicit	in	
the	systems	that	reinforce	social	and	environmental	injustice.	Not	only	do	
popular	climate	narratives	obscure	the	inequality	that	lies	at	the	root	of	climate	
change,	they	also	obscure	the	ways	systemic	inequality	affects	the	distribution	
and	experiences	of	climate	change	effects	around	the	world.	Science-orientated	
constructions	of	the	climate	crisis	dominate	our	social	imagination;	diverting	our	
social	gaze	from	the	raw	and	challenging	insights	of	groups	most	affected	by	a	
changing	climate,	and	industrial	operations	that	change	it	(Forsyth,	2003).		
	
Case	study:			
	
On	the	22nd	of	March	2017,	a	collaboration	of	groups	blockaded	the	New	Zealand	
Petroleum	conference	in	New	Plymouth.	The	region	has	a	history	of	colonial	
violence,	indigenous	resistance,	and	occupation	by	oil	and	gas	industries.	The	
blockade	groups	were	Climate	Justice	Taranaki,	Friends	of	Waitara	River,	Frack	
Free,	members	of	the	Parihaka	community,	Oil	Free	Wellington,	Oil	Free	
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Auckland,	Greenpeace,	Auckland	Peace	Action,	350	Aotearoa,	Pacific	Panthers,	
and	Ngatiawa	Ki	Taranaki	Trust.	Many	indigenous	activists	in	the	blockade	made	
speeches,	positioning	climate	change	as	conceptually	and	experientially	
inextricable	from	the	processes	of	colonial	oppression	and	systemic	inequality.	
However,	most	articles	about	the	blockade	did	not	draw	attention	to	these	links.	
The	New	Zealand	Herald	quoted	a	non-indigenous	activist,	“We	have	the	
technology	and	science	now	to	move	away	from	fossil	fuels,	it	is	time	to	get	
cracking	and	do	it”	(Hanne,	2017).	This	reflects	climate	activists’	habitual	
direction	of	the	social	gaze	towards	science	as	a	motivator	for	social	change.	An	
online	article	in	the	popular	media	outlet	Stuff	included	this	excerpt,	
	
	[The	Petroleum	conference]	began	with	keynote	speaker	Iain	
Stewart,University	of	Plymouth	geoscience	communication	and	BBC	
series	Planet	Oil	presenter,	who	spoke	on	how	the	science	
community	needed	to	connect	with	the	public	to	dispel	myths	and	
ease	unrest.	[…]	“People	over-estimate	the	hazards	and	people	are	
angry,”	he	said.	“But	it’s	the	science	community	who	failed	to	
properly	educate	and	communicate	the	technical	science.”	Those	in	
the	petroleum	industry	were	well	aware	of	climate	change	and	
agreed	with	the	utilisation	of	renewable	resources,	but	the	reality	
was	“the	very	use	of	oil	defines	us”,	Stewart	said.	(Baker,	2017)	
	
The	social	gaze	is	directed	again	towards	science	as	the	most	(or	only)	
appropriate	body	of	knowledge	that	defines	and	addresses	climate	issues.	
Controversy	over	‘technical	science’	is	positioned	as	the	reason	for	social	friction	
over	oil	exploration.	‘Hazards’	are	positioned	as	both	‘estimated’	and	in	the	
future,	diverting	public	attention	from	the	current	harmful	feedbacks	between	
fossil	fuel	exploration,	climate	change,	and	oppression.	This	is	an	example	of	the	
“testimonial	exclusion”	of	oppressed	groups,	whose	perspectives	hold	
transformative	potential	for	our	social	relationships	and	environmental	
behaviour	(Anderson,	2012,	p.	166;	Medina,	2013).		
	
Deep	political	conflicts	entwined	with	ecological	damage	often	remain	
underemphasised	or	concealed	in	scientific	constructions	of	environmental	
issues	(Forsyth,	2003).	While	scientific	narratives	encourage	reflection	on	fossil	
fuel	use,	they	are	part	of	the	socially	sanctioned	silence	that	insulates	us,	
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particularly	dominant	groups,	from	the	effects	of	our	behaviour	(Chatterton,	
2006).	When	environmental	science	narratives	dominate	the	social	imagination	
they	divert	our	gaze	from	how	we	may	uphold	(or	resist)	injustice	in	the	intimate	
spaces	within	and	between	us.	This	negatively	affects	the	infinite	game	of	
environmental	activism	to	pursue	fair	environmental	relations.	
	
	
						7.2					How	does	science	contribute	to	epistemic	injustice?	
	
Scientific	narratives	often	take	centre	stage	in	environmental	conflicts.	They	are	
given	the	spotlight	on	public	platforms;	be	it	in	media	articles,	news	items,	or	
panel	debates.	Public	platforms	and	professionalised	‘science	communication’	
efforts	are	testament	to	the	epistemic	privilege	that	science	enjoys	over	other	
fields	of	knowledge	(Medvecky,	2017).	This	grants	science	‘credibility	excess’,	a	
form	of	epistemic	injustice	(Medina,	2013).	Miranda	Fricker	(2003),	Elizabeth	
Anderson	(2012)	and	Jose	Medina	(2013)	have	covered	significant	ground	on	
‘epistemic	injustices’.	They	occur	when	an	individual	or	group	is	excluded	from	
epistemic	activities	such	as	creating	knowledge	and	making-meaning,	or	when	
peoples’	experiences	of	the	world	are	obscured	and	undermined	by	prevailing	
epistemic	practices	(Medina	2013;	Fricker,	2007).	For	example,	women’s	
testimonies	of	the	fear	and	discomfort	of	sexual	harassment	were	(are)	often	
minimised	or	disbelieved	(Jaggar,	1989).	This	constitutes	epistemic	injustice	
because	it	denies	women	knowledge	of	their	own	experiences.	Furthermore,	
disaffirmation	creates	epistemic	obstacles	to	their	making	sense	of	those	
experiences.	Patriarchal	narratives	create	epistemic	biases	against	women,	
which	subsequently	maintain	patriarchal	power	by	rendering	facets	of	women’s	
experiences	de-realised.	Structural	inequality	affects	our	epistemic	sensibilities,	
in	other	words,	what	and	whose	knowledge	we	habitually	accept—or	reject.	We	
commit	epistemic	injustices	by	attributing	an	agent	too	much	credibility	
(credibility	excess)	or	too	little	(credibility	deficit)	(Fricker,	2007;	Medina,	
2013).	Credibility	is	inherently	comparative;	we	could	not	grant	a	level	of	
credibility	to	knowers	or	knowledge	without	perceiving	counterparts	as	more	or	
less	credible	(Medina,	2013).	Science	cannot	receive	credibility	excess	without	
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others	experiencing	associated	credibility	deficits.	This	negatively	affects	
activists’	game	for	environmental	justice	in	a	number	of	ways.	
	
Firstly,	when	science	receives	credibility	excess	it	can	strengthen	the	structures	
of	injustice—epistemic	and	otherwise.	This	is	because	epistemic	injustice	and	
systemic	oppression	enjoy	a	mutually	constitutive	relationship	(Medina,	2013;	
Jaggar,	1989).	As	Alison	Jaggar	(1989)	points	out,	the	“alleged	epistemic	
authority	of	the	dominant	groups	then	justifies	their	political	authority”	(Jaggar,	
1989,	p.165).	Our	mechanisms	for	assigning	credibility	to	knowers	and	
knowledge	are	largely	unconscious,	sculpted	by	prevailing	epistemic	paradigms	
and	‘standards’	of	credibility	that	tend	to	reflect	the	experience	of	dominant	
groups	(Anderson,	2012;	Medina,	2013).	Platforms	and	credibility	excess	give	
science	power	to	calibrate	these	mechanisms,	thus	influencing	our	habits	of	
attributing	or	withholding	epistemic	credibility	in	our	interactions.	Typically,	we	
deflect	knowledge	that	does	not	fit	our	filtered	standards	of	rationality	(Trocco,	
2002).	This	can	lead	to	credibility	deficits	against	systemically	oppressed	groups,	
whose	knowledge	and	experiences	often	contradict	prevailing	depictions	of	
reality	(Medina,	2013).	These	epistemic	injustices	reproduce	unequal	social	
relations.	Even	when	groups	recognise	biases	embedded	in	prevailing	narratives,	
epistemic	biases	against	them	prevent	their	grievances	from	being	heard	or	
accepted	(Medina,	2013).	The	prevalence	and	epistemic	authority	of	the	sciences	
cannot	be	separated	from	its	role	in	reinforcing	structures	of	power	and	axes	of	
oppression.	This	impedes	activists’	infinite	game	for	environmental	justice,	as	
systemic	inequality	positively	contributes	to	ecological	harm.	
	
Secondly,	the	credibility	excess	of	the	sciences	limits	our	range	of	
epistemological	resources	to	address	environmental	challenges.	When	scientific	
narratives	are	repeatedly	in	the	spotlight,	it	keeps	other	types	of	knowledge	
backstage,	understudied,	and	unfamiliar.	The	theory	that	‘diversity	trumps	
ability’	maintains	that	if	a	group	is	trying	to	address	a	complex	problem	(a	
changing	atmosphere,	for	example),	epistemic	diversity	amongst	group	members	
will	serve	them	better	than	an	abundance	of	excellent	‘problem-solvers’	(Medina,	
2013;	Anderson,	2006).	When	‘excellent’	scientific	narratives	receive	excessive	
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credibility	and	media	space	it	constricts	the	epistemic	diversity	of	public	
discourse.	Ian	Werkheiser	(2017)	describes	a	mutually	reinforcing	relationship	
between	ecological	and	epistemic	loss.	During	environmental	challenges,	
communities	often	have	their	epistemic	self-determination	undermined	by	
external	scientific	experts	(Werkheiser,	2017).	The	perceived	superiority	of	the	
sciences	can	be	used	to	dismiss	the	efficacy	of	localised	systems	of	knowledge,	
with	indigenous	knowledge	particularly	at	risk	(Werkheiser,	2017).	This	is	an	
epistemic	injustice	to	groups’	whose	ways	of	knowing	ecosystems	are	
eradicated.	Diverse	epistemologies	yield	a	broader	range	of	adaptive	responses	
to	environmental	change,	and	when	the	range	of	epistemological	methods	is	
diminished,	so	too	is	community	resilience	(Werkheiser,	2017).		
	
Finally,	emphasis	on	the	sciences	in	environmental	conflicts	comes	at	the	
expense	of	ethical	discourses.	While	science	remains	a	hero	on	the	stage	of	
ecological	crises,	ethical	discourses	appear	as	a	side	character.		Science	is	
granted	a	public	platform	because	of	its	epistemic	authority,	but	platforms	also	
give	science	practitioners	authority,	so	credibility	excess	becomes	self-
reinforcing	(Medvecky,	2017).	This	gives	scientific	knowledge	permission	to	be	
more	real	than	ethical	discourses.	Consequently,	in	public	and	political	
discourses,	appeals	to	science	are	often	more	acceptable	than	ethical	appeals.	It	
may	be	politically	legitimate	to	talk	about	changing	the	composition	of	the	entire	
atmosphere,	but	less	legitimate	to	address	the	fact	that	we	know	our	daily	habits	
are	killing	people,	and	still	we	cannot	change	them.	Science	can	tell	us	why	
Pacific	peoples	will	lose	their	islands,	but	they	cannot	tell	us	why	we	should	take	
responsibility	for	our	role	in	their	plight.	When	activist	groups	adhere	to	
unspoken	standards	of	‘credibility’,	they	may	censor	moral	appeals	in	favour	of	
scientific	narratives	that	will	grant	them	legitimacy.	This	further	minimises	the	
visibility	of	ethical	discourses,	inhibiting	our	connection	with	ecological	crises	
and	the	deeper	motivations	we	may	have	for	addressing	them.		
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Case	study:	
	
I	shall	approach	this	case	study	differently,	with	an	auto	ethnographic	account	of	
a	presentation	by	coal	mining	company	Bathurst	Resources	Ltd,	described	in	my	
introduction.	In	2014,	Hamish	Bohannan	(former	CEO)	talked	to	engineering	
professionals	in	Canterbury	about	the	future	of	coal	in	New	Zealand’s	South	
Island,	and	the	company’s	proposed	mining	projects.	Bohannan	acknowledged	
climate	change,	but	reminded	the	audience	of	the	essential	services	coal	provides	
around	the	world.	I	asked	Bohannan	how	he	could	justify	new	mines	when	
eighty	per	cent	of	known	fossil	fuels	must	be	left	in	the	ground	to	keep	global	
warming	within	two	degrees.	I	also	mentioned	people	would	suffer	in	the	face	of	
sea	level	rise,	droughts,	floods,	fires	and	disease	in	a	warming	world.	At	the	end	
of	the	presentation,	the	moderator	acknowledged	our	“emotional	argument”,	and	
thanked	Bohannan	and	the	rest	of	the	audience	for	their	discussion	of	practical	
and	scientific	factors	around	coal	use.	I	proceeded	to	cite	the	bodies	of	scientific	
research	that	supported	my	concerns	about	climate	change.		
	
Positioning	my	comments	as	‘emotional’	was	a	strategic	move	to	minimise	their	
legitimacy.	This	is	an	example	of	epistemic	injustice.	The	moderator	undermined	
my	appeals	by	suggesting	the	presenters’	testimonies	had	more	scientific	and	
technical	credibility.	This	reflects	the	Western	tradition	to	associate	‘reason’	with	
dominant	social	groups,	and	to	position	less	dominant	groups	as	excessively	
emotional	(Jaggar,	1989).	It	also	shows	how	the	implied	‘impartiality’	of	the	
sciences	can	help	maintain	power	imbalances	(Guston,	2001).	This	shows	
another	systemic	bias—that	the	presence	of	emotion	diminishes	the	reliability	of	
a	knower’s	testimony.	My	initial	aversion	to	being	labelled	‘emotional’	shows	
how	deeply	this	bias	is	embedded.	By	defaulting	to	scientific	reasoning	to	gain	
legitimacy,	I	endorsed	the	moderator’s	unseen	formulas	for	attributing	
credibility.	Adhering	to	unjust	criteria	for	credibility	reinforces	their	power	and	
influence,	perpetuating	the	hierarchies	that	rely	on	them	(Jagger,	1989).	My	
response	to	the	moderator	was	scientifically	sound,	epistemically	‘credible’,	but	
completely	irrelevant.	I	should	have	said,	“We	are	discussing	the	burning	of	a	fuel	
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that	will	increase	the	likelihood	of	human	suffering	around	the	planet—an	
emotional	response	is	pretty	fucking	appropriate	don’t	you	think?"		
	
I	missed	an	opportunity	to	focus	directly,	and	openly,	on	ethics.	Although	
scientific	knowledge	is	credited	with	epistemic	reliability,	it	cannot	always	be	
relied	upon	to	deliver	fair	epistemic	interactions.	The	credibility	excess	of	the	
sciences	impeded	our	finite	game	to	connect	the	audience	with	the	ethical	
consequences	of	coal	expansion.	It	also	obstructed	our	infinite	game	to	make	
social	and	environmental	ethics	core	motivating	factors	of	human	decision-
making.	This	game	is	infinite	because	we	are	forever	disputing	and	uncovering	
the	nature	of	the	‘ethical’	relationships	we’re	seeking,	and	the	extended	
consequences	of	decisions	we’re	making.	These	biases	prevent	us	from	having	
frank	ethical	discussions	about	who	we	think	we	are	and	why	we’re	doing	what	
we’re	doing	here.		
	
	
						7.3					How	does	science	undermine	emotion	in	environmental	 	
	 					conflicts?	
	
We	tend	to	think	that	sharing	knowledge	is	a	good	thing.	Particularly	if	we	think	
it’s	useful	knowledge.	Consider,	for	a	moment,	all	of	the	public	and	private	
conversations	about	climate	change	you	have	ever	encountered.	How	many	of	
those	turned	into	debates	over	the	degree	to	which	climate	change	was	
‘happening’,	or	contentions	over	aspects	of	biophysical	research?	We	have	spent	
a	lot	of	time	convincing	and	resisting	one	another	about	the	scientific	‘reality’	of	
a	changing	climate	(Forsyth,	2003;	Taylor	et	al,	2003).	Habitually	performing	or	
referring	to	the	climate	‘debate’,	regardless	of	its	outcome,	keeps	our	
conversations	within	scientific	parameters.	In	public,	private,	and	political	
discussions	about	climate	change,	appealing	to	science	is	a	knowledge	sharing	
norm.	This	observation	is	supported	by	the	views	of	other	authors	that	science	is	
the	most	popular	frame	for	discussing	climate	change	(Kahan	et	al,	2012;	
Medvecky,	2017).	Knowledge	sharing	norms	(KSNs)	are	formal	or	informal	
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expectations	of	what	knowledge	we	should	share	and	what	knowledge	to	
withhold	in	any	given	situation	(Grasswick,	2011).	Typically,	increasing	the	
volume	of	knowledge	that	we	share	is	positioned	as	a	prima	facie	good,	a	KSN	
commonly	associated	with	movements	towards	social	liberation	(Grasswick,	
2011).	It	is	not	difficult	then,	to	see	why	activists	would	readily	communicate	the	
knowledge	most	regularly	positioned	as	relevant	to	the	climate	crisis—science.	
This	has	been	our	mistake.	In	this	final	section,	I	argue	that	science	KNSs	in	the	
climate	movement	impede	the	development	of	epistemic	practices	that	would	
serve	us	better	in	the	infinite	game	for	environmental	justice.	As	Heidi	Grasswick	
(2011)	points	out,	positioning	knowledge	sharing	as	a	prima	facie	good	
drastically	understates	the	roles	that	KSNs	play	in	hindering	the	development	of	
the	types	of	knowledge	necessary	for	liberatory	social	change.	
	
Throughout	this	discussion	so	far,	we	have	looked	at	ways	our	creation,	
distribution,	and	communication	of	knowledge	affects	the	course	of	our	social	
and	environmental	relationships.	Another	theme	I	have	emphasised	is	the	
mutually	reinforcing	relationship	between	systemic	oppression	and	
environmental	damage	(Godfrey	and	Torres,	2016).	In	the	previous	section,	we	
saw	that	prevailing	epistemic	practices	play	a	role	in	creating	and	maintaining	
oppressive	social	relations	(Medina,	2013).	If	environmental	activists	want	to	
transform	the	social	relations	that	underpin	ecological	harms,	they	need	new	
epistemologies	that	will	facilitate	this	transition	(Medina,	2013).	Not	only	is	this	
a	game	to	change	what	we	know,	it’s	a	game	to	change	how	we	know.	This	is	
similar	to	Heidi	Grasswick’s	(2011)	description	of	a	‘liberatory	epistemology’,	
which	“seeks	to	develop	epistemological	tools	[…]	that	will	help	generate	the	
kind	of	knowledge	required	to	bring	about	positive	(liberatory)	social	change.”	
(Grasswick,	2011,	p.	244).	This	prompts	a	tangle	of	investigations	far	too	broad	
and	deep	to	do	justice	to	in	this	section,	but	I	shall	pull	a	thread	and	look	at	just	
one	way	I	believe	science	impedes	activists’	movement	towards	such	a	liberatory	
epistemology,	and	that	is	when	science	KSNs	in	the	climate	movement	
undermine	our	emotions	and	their	epistemic	potential.	Emotions	can	help	unlock	
liberatory	perspectives	and	new	ways	of	knowing	(Grasswick,	2011;	Jaggar,	
1989).	Science	KSNs	can	keep	us	from	emotional	tools	to	illuminate,	subvert	and	
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transform	epistemic	paradigms	and	social	relations	that	lie	at	the	heart	of	
environmental	injustice.		
	
Traditionally,	Western	science	claimed	epistemic	authority	by	positioning	
emotions	as	epistemically	subversive	(Jaggar,	1989;	Nelson,	2008;	Longino,	
1990).	According	to	Alison	Jaggar	(1989),	this	helped	reproduce	social	
hierarchies	by	allowing	dominant	groups	to	undermine	the	epistemic	authority	
of	groups	culturally	associated	with	‘emotion’,	such	as	women	and	people	of	
colour.	Emotional	responses	to	experiences	of	systemic	injustice	stoked	
narratives	that	positioned	marginalised	subjects	as	more	‘emotional’	and	their	
testimonies	as	less	reliable	(Jaggar,	1989;	Medina,	2013).	Consequently,	both	
expression,	and	suppression,	of	emotions	are	politically	significant	(Brown	and	
Pickerill,	2009).	The	case	study	in	the	previous	section	describes	the	credibility	
excess	of	science	being	used	to	undermine	my	emotions	in	a	dispute	about	coal.	
This	is	not	an	isolated	incident—this	is	a	pattern.	Although	it	is	now	widely	
acknowledged	that	science	is	not	value-free,	it	cannot	separate	itself	from	its	
history,	nor	from	the	values	of	‘rationality’	and	‘dispassionate	investigation’	that	
continue	to	affect	the	ways	science	is	used	and	perceived	(Jaggar,	1989;	Irwin	
and	Wynne,	1996;	Guston,	2001).	Consciously	or	unconsciously,	science	is	still	
used	to	censor	our	expression	of	emotions	in	environmental	conflicts.	This	limits	
our	epistemic	potential.	As	Jaggar	(1989)	argues,	emotions	are	valuable	sources	
of	knowledge,	and	play	a	fundamental	(but	underestimated)	role	in	knowledge	
construction.	Emotions,	particularly	those	of	oppressed	groups,	can	be	powerful	
epistemic	resources	for	recognising	injustices,	challenging	power	imbalances	
and	re-imagining	social	relations	(Medina,	2013;	Jaggar,	1989;	Wilkinson,	2009;	
Brown	and	Pickerill,	2009).	By	helping	to	suppress	and	subordinate	emotions,	
science	restricts	us	from	the	transformative	knowledge	that	we	could	receive	
from	emotional	expression—each	other’s	and	our	own.	
	
The	game	for	liberatory	epistemologies	is	truly	infinite.	The	more	we	liberate	our	
knowledge	practices,	the	more	we	are	able	to	recognise	the	ways	they	have	been	
oppressed—or	oppressive.	The	limitations	of	our	current	epistemic	paradigms	
will	always	restrict	our	ability	to	imagine	new	ways	of	knowing	and	perceiving.	
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Our	emotions	are	epistemically	liberatory	when	they	help	us	overcome	these	
‘obstacles	of	unimaginability’	by	subverting	blind	spots	and	internalised	
‘structures’	of	injustice	(Medina,	2013).	As	it	stands,	systemic	inequality	helps	
mediate	our	epistemic	boundaries	by	shaping	our	cognitive-affective	structures	
of	belief,	which	limit	our	capacities	to	see,	hear,	and	relate	to	others	(Medina,	
2013).	For	example,	‘active	ignorance’	involves	cognitive	defence	mechanisms	
that	keep	dominant	groups	from	recognising	the	experiences	of	marginalised	
subjects,	insulating	them	from	knowledge	of	systemic	oppression	(Medina,	2013;	
Grasswick,	2011;	Anderson,	2018).	These	patterns	of	selective	attention	allow	us	
to	make	some	lives	more	real,	more	‘grievable’,	than	others	(Butler,	2004).	Jaggar	
(1989)	suggests	that	“outlaw”	emotions	have	the	power	to	subvert	our	epistemic	
boundaries	and	illuminate	untruths	in	oppressive	systems	of	belief.	
	
Conventionally	unexpected	or	inappropriate	emotions	may	precede	
our	conscious	recognition	that	accepted	descriptions	and	justifications	
often	conceal	as	much	as	reveal	the	prevailing	state	of	affairs	[…]	They	
may	help	us	to	realize	that	what	are	taken	generally	to	be	facts	have	
been	constructed	in	a	way	that	obscures	the	reality	of	subordinated	
people.			
	
—Alison	Jaggar,	1989,	p.	167	
	
Outlaw	emotions	disrupt	previous	cognitive-affective	links,	creating	friction	that	
can	prompt	us	to	reconcile	between	our	feelings	and	beliefs	(Brown	and	
Pickerill,	2009).	If	our	internal	status	quo	is	what	water	is	to	a	fish	(water’s	not	
wet	unless	you’re	dry)	‘outlaw’	emotions	are	when	a	fish	is	unexpectedly	shot	
into	the	air	by	a	whale’s	blowhole.	These	emotions	can	prompt	‘meta-lucidity’,	
whereby	one	‘sees’	the	effect	of	epistemic	norms	on	one’s	perceptions	and	social	
relations	(Medina,	2013).	This	can	disarrange	the	epistemic	boundaries	that	
reproduce	systems	of	inequality.	By	making	new	cognitive	pathways	available,	
outlaw	emotions	open	up	new	possibilities	for	seeing,	hearing,	knowing	and	
relating	to	one	another	(Jaggar,	1989;	Medina,	2013;	Fricker,	2007).	Emotions	
are	not,	by	any	means,	above	epistemic	scrutiny,	but	they	should	be	considered	
seriously	rather	than	being	dismissed	(Jaggar,	1989).	Science’s	history	of	
invalidating	emotions	continues	to	understate	their	epistemic	significance	in	
environmental	conflicts.		
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For	example,	consider	the	following	exchanges	of	knowledge.	First,	when	I	
attended	lectures	on	climate	change	in	my	geography	degree,	I	received	
knowledge	that	helped	me	campaign	against	fossil	fuel	use,	and	critically	assess	
social	behaviour	and	policy	in	terms	of	its	affect	on	the	climate.	This	changed	
what	I	knew,	but	not	how	I	knew	it.	Second,	in	a	decolonisation	workshop	for	
activists	in	Waitangi,	2016,	people	of	colour	reacted	emotionally	when	I	
obliviously	dominated	discussions.	Experiencing	this	exchange	of	emotions	
forced	me	to	address	the	psychological	depth	of	systemic	inequalities,	and	gave	
me	a	more	intimate	sense	of	its	roots	in	my	cognitive,	perceptive,	and	
communicative	habits.	The	exchange	increased	not	only	what	I	know,	but	what	
and	how	I	have	the	capacity	to	‘know’.	In	all	my	previous	acquisition	of	
knowledge	about	climate	change,	not	once	had	my	social	and	epistemic	
behaviour	been	challenged	in	such	a	way.	This	makes	the	second	exchange	of	
knowledge	more	epistemically	liberating	than	the	first,	and	therefore	a	better	
source	of	resistance	to	the	social	structures	that	underpin	environmental	
injustice,	even	though	the	exchange	itself	did	not	contain	knowledge	about	the	
environment.	Although	not	formally	justified,	my	claim	here	is	based	on	my	
‘moral	intuition’,	a	common	tool	in	ethical	theorising,	Rawls’	Theory	of	
Equilibrium	being	one	example	(Daniels,	2018).	While	science	KSNs	persist	in	
environmental	conflicts,	they	may	stifle	opportunities	for	emotional	dialogues	
that	could	liberate	our	relationships	and	expand	our	epistemic	capacities.		
	
A	possible	objection	is	that	science	KSNs	needn’t	come	at	the	expense	of	such	
emotional	exchanges	and	testimonies—both	types	of	discourse	could	be	valued	
in	tandem.	However,	as	Grasswick	(2011)	points	out,	KSNs	are	not	only	habits	of	
sharing	knowledge,	but	also	of	withholding	knowledge.	The	KSNs	of	science	in	
environmental	conflicts	does	not	have	to	invalidate	emotional	testimonies	to	
suppress	them—they	create	social	pressure	that	prevents	them	from	being	
expressed.	Marginalised	groups	in	particular	have	a	long	history	of	withholding	
knowledge	for	their	own	epistemic	and	social	survival	of,	and	resistance	to,	
oppression	(Grasswick,	2011).	When	others	invalidate	our	emotions,	they	can	
de-realise	our	experience	and	obscure	self-knowledge,	undermining	us	in	our	
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humanity	(Fricker,	2007).	As	science	has	been	used	historically	to	invalidate	
peoples’	emotional	experiences,	certain	testimonies	may	be	habitually	withheld	
in	contexts	like	environmental	conflicts	where	scientific	paradigms	are	
prevalent.	This	means	science	KSNs	can	jeopardise	the	safety	and	trust	required	
for	exchanges	of	emotions	and	knowledge	across	structures	of	power,	a	vital	
aspect	of	the	infinite	game	for	environmental	justice	(Anderson,	2018;	Medina,	
2013;	Grasswick,	2011).	Furthermore,	the	knowledge	habitually	withheld	may	
have	transformative	potential	for	our	inter	and	intrapersonal	relationships,	
meaning	penalty	shots	missed	in	the	infinite	game	for	liberatory	epistemologies.			
	
Finally,	our	expressions	of	emotion	are	more	than	an	epistemic	tool—they	are	an	
embodiment	of	our	vulnerability.	Although	we	differ	in	our	experience,	
interpretation,	and	construction	of	‘emotions’—we	feel	(Brown	and	Pickerill,	
2009;	Jaggar,	1989).	When	we	talk	about	the	climate	crisis,	we’re	talking	about	
our	vulnerability	to	change,	danger,	violence,	grief,	fear,	and	death.	While	
scientific	narratives	preserve	an	emotional	distance	from	the	human	impacts	of	
climate	change,	we	gain	an	intellectual	understanding	of	the	crisis	without	
understanding	it	affectively.	Without	these	affective	links,	we’re	likely	to	
maintain	cognitive	mechanisms	of	resistance,	both	to	our	own	vulnerability	and	
that	of	others’	(Medina,	2013).	In	this	sense,	science	KSNs	can	be	socially	
alienating,	because	they	help	us	keep	a	fundamental	aspect	of	our	humanity	
denied	(Broks,	2017).	This	hinders	the	infinite	game	for	environmental	justice,	
because	typically,	when	people	feel	alienated,	they	don’t	want	to	play.	
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8					Summary,	recommendations	and	concluding	remarks	
	
Throughout	this	thesis,	we	have	covered	some	rough	and	variable	terrain.	We	
have	seen	snapshots	of	finite	and	infinite	games	being	played	around	the	world,	
for	a	better	world.	While	the	diversity	and	intensity	of	efforts	is	profoundly	
moving,	it	is	distressing	that	they	are	so	urgently	needed.	To	briefly	recap,	first	I	
looked	at	how	scientific	knowledge	can	be	an	invaluable	tool	in	activists’	games	
to	reform	policy,	challenge	industrial	operations,	and	deliver	material	
improvements	to	ecosystems	and	communities	at	the	forefront	of	environmental	
conflicts.	Next,	I	described	instances	where	activism	positively	affects	the	
sciences	by	motivating	new	investigations,	strategically	furthering	the	public	and	
political	reach	of	scientific	research,	and	contributing	to	the	epistemic	integrity	
of	the	sciences.	Thirdly,	I	described	ways	that	environmental	activism	negatively	
affects	the	work	of	scientists	by	obscuring	scientific	findings,	jeopardising	the	
credibility	of	scientific	efforts,	and	perpetuating	a	combative	approach	to	
environmental	challenges.	Finally,	I	explored	how	science	can	negatively	affect	
the	games	of	activists,	by	diverting	the	public	imagination	from	the	social	
relations	that	drive	environmental	injustice,	committing	epistemic	injustice,	and	
hindering	activists’	game	for	a	liberatory	epistemology	by	undermining	emotions	
in	environmental	conflicts.	I	believe	this	final	section	revealed	an	aspect	of	the	
science/activism	relationship	that	is	often	unrecognised	and	underestimated,	
particularly	in	the	climate	movement.	Investigation	into	the	role	of	knowledge	
sharing	norms	within	environmental	movements	may	reveal	ways	they	create	
stagnation	and	inertia	that	obstruct	our	games	for	social	and	epistemic	change.	
In	our	communications,	we	often	consider	how	we	want	to	affect	what	we	each	
‘know’.	We	are	less	likely	to	consider	how	our	communications	affect	what	we	
each	have	the	capacity	to	know,	and	how	ways	of	knowing	are	suppressed—or	
liberate.	Out	of	all	the	ground	covered	throughout	this	discussion,	I	think	this	
final	section	reveals	the	most	significant	and	interesting	territory	for	further	
exploration.	
	
With	conversations	arising	about	the	potential	roles	(and	responsibilities)	of	
science	communicators	in	political	activism,	I	hope	we	can	be	more	discerning	
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about	contexts	where	sharing	scientific	knowledge	can	further	the	game	for	
environmental	justice,	and	contexts	where	it	can	be	obstructive.	I	strongly	
encourage	activists,	scientists	and	science	communicators	alike	to	critically	
reflect	on	ways	their	finite	games	keep	deeply	rooted	structures	of	socio-
environmental	injustice	supported.	Activists	and	science	communicators	often	
share	a	commitment	to	environmental	justice,	and	both	could	benefit	from	more	
dialogue,	co-operation	and	skills	sharing.	This	could	help	build	capacity	for	new	
research,	but	more	importantly	it	could	build	capacity	for	new	relationships.	I	
hope	this	discussion	has	given	activist	and	scientific	communities	a	greater	
appreciation,	understanding,	and	respect	for	one	another’s	games,	and	the	
challenges	of	playing	them.	Because	the	aim	of	our	games	is	so	often	the	same—
the	aim	of	the	game	is	to	keep	the	game	going.		
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Creative	component	
	
	‘Acting	Out:	The	Nature	of	Disobedience’	was	written	alongside	the	academic	
component	of	the	thesis,	and	is	intended	for	a	broader	audience.	It	follows	
stories	of	environmental	activism	in	Aotearoa,	New	Zealand.	These	stories	draw	
on	a	combination	of	my	own	experiences,	my	research	into	historical	campaigns,	
and	interviews	with	Steve	Abel	and	Jojo	McVeagh.	From	defending	native	forests,	
to	fighting	coalmines,	to	communicating	about	climate	change,	these	stories	
create	an	intimate	picture	of	past	and	present	environmental	conflicts.	They	shed	
light	on	the	communicative	gulfs	we	face	in	the	infinite	game	for	environmental	
justice,	weaving	together	personal	and	scientific	narratives	to	connect	readers	
with	environmental	crises	and	complexity.	Although	the	project	is	about	the	
games	of	environmental	activists,	it	is	also	a	game	itself.	Roaming	between	
physical,	theoretical,	and	mental	landscapes,	the	game	of	this	project	is	to	
explore	the	epistemic	and	emotional	boundaries	that	distance	us	from	
environmental	changes	and	challenges.	
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